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Abstract
This thesis uses modern macroeconomic modeling techniques and panel data econo-
metrics to quantitatively measure the determinants of financial globalization and its
e↵ects on advanced and developing economies. The first two chapters of this thesis
provide the starting point for the quantitative analysis of international gross capital
flows and valuation e↵ects between two asymmetric countries and it serves policy-
makers to quantify these matters in an diaphanous manner. In the first chapter,
I construct a novel two-country DSGE model with endogenous portfolio choice to
study the role of structural asymmetries in explaining the size and composition of
capital flows between emerging and advanced economies. In the second chapter, we
calibrate an extension to the previous model in order to discuss the potential deter-
minants of the large increase in Canadian Net Foreign Assets with the US observed
after 2012. The last two chapters of this thesis provide an econometric analysis
which uses empirical data at the world level to quantitatively measure economic
integration determinants and its e↵ects. In the third chapter, we examine the link
between economic globalization and spatial inequality in a panel of 142 countries
over the period 1992-2012 using instrumental variable techniques. In the fourth
chapter, I provide results to show how the Lucas Paradox has turned even more
pronounced during the Great Recession than in the previous decades.
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Preface
“We are all linked together by sharing the same planet. One country’s actions
can, and do, have large e↵ects on others. The international economy is linked in
myriad and very complex ways. Globalization is thus a reality with which we will
have to deal. If we deal with it in the right way, the world of the future can be marked
by shared prosperity.”
— Joseph Stiglitz, Economics Nobel Laureate.
During the last few decades, both gross capital and trade flows across countries
have reached unprecedented levels. Furthermore, emerging economies are now
net importers of foreign direct investment while being net exporters of financial
capital. Advanced economies, such as the US, do exactly the opposite by importing
bonds and exporting FDI. That is two-way-capital flows. The relevance of portfolio
composition in terms of FDI and bonds is directly related to the scale in gross
capital flows because the di↵erent types of flows provide heterogenous implications
for macroeconomic and financial stability. In fact, the combination of large and
heterogenous gross capital flows creates wealth transfers, through valuation e↵ects,
between advanced and emerging countries whenever exchange rates and stock prices
fluctuate.
In the first chapter, I build an open-economy New Keynesian model that in-
corporates the portfolio choice of FDI-equity and bonds to study the role of
structural asymmetries in explaining two-way capital flows between emerging and
advanced economies. In a symmetric two-country model, the household optimal
position on each foreign assets is equal in both countries, so that net bond and
net equity positions are zero. Therefore, the two-way-capital flows pattern cannot
arise in these models. In fact, there must be some asymmetries that explain the
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positive (negative) net bond and negative (positive) net equity position in emerging
(advanced) economies. Results indicate that a higher volatility on technology and
interest rate shocks in emerging economies may be a potential explanation, since it
reinforces long positions in local bonds over short positions in foreign bonds, while
it reduces foreign equity over local equity positions.Two-way capital flows also arise
under the presence of higher price stickiness in the emerging economy since nominal
rigidities diminish foreign equity positions. Furthermore, we find that a higher
home good bias leads to a higher home equity bias.
In the second chapter, which is co-authored with Miguel Casares, we calibrate
an extension to the model described in Chapter 1 to discuss the determinants of the
increase in Canadian Net Foreign Asset position with the US observed after 2012.
We demonstrate that the proposed model performs quite well in explaining the
business cycle statistical moments and the high degree of cyclical synchronization
between Canada and the US. We find new evidence on a reversed two-way capital
flows pattern characterizing the Canada-US net foreign investment relationship:
Canada has a negative position on bond holdings owned by US investors while a
positive balance emerges on equity holdings from US firms. Overall, the model
performs quite well in describing the main business cycle statistics. A global
technology shock, the US fiscal contraction, an adverse wage-push shock in the US
and the unconventional (QE) monetary stimulus provide insights to describe the
recent capital flows between Canada and the US.
In the third chapter, which is co-authored with Roberto Ezcurra, we examine
the link between economic globalization and spatial inequality in a panel of 142
countries over the period 1992-2012. Our instrumental variables estimates reveal
a strong causal e↵ect of the degree of economic integration with the rest of the
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world on spatial inequality, indicating that the advances in the process of global-
ization currently underway contribute to significantly increasing regional income
disparities. This means that globalization leads to the emergence of losing and
winning regions within countries, and that the group of losing (winning) regions
tends to be made up of low-(high-)income regions. This result has to do with the
regressive spatial impact of actual economic flows, while existing restrictions on
trade and capital do not exert a significant e↵ect in this context. Our findings
are robust to the inclusion in the analysis of di↵erent covariates that may be
correlated with both spatial inequality and globalization, and are not driven by a
specific group of influential countries. Likewise, the observed relationship between
economic integration and spatial inequality does not depend on the measures used
to quantify the magnitude of regional income disparities within the various countries.
In the fourth chapter, I examine the Lucas Paradox during the Great Reces-
sion.1 Results show that in the 2008-2015 period, the Paradox might be even more
pronounced than in the previous decades. Moreover, our findings suggest that
disaggregating capital flows by type of capital is important since trade flows are
found to be a key determinant of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and credit to
private sector mostly explains Portfolio Equity flows.
1This chapter contains a research paper that has been already published (See Del Villar, 2018)
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Introducción en Castellano
“Todos estamos unidos por compartir el mismo planeta. Las acciones de un páıs
pueden afectar, y de hecho, afectan notablemente al resto. La economı́a internacional
esta unida de formas innumerables y muy complejas. La globalización es una realidad
con la que tenemos que lidiar. Si lidiamos con ella de forma correcta, el mundo del
futuro puede marcarse por una prosperidad compartida. ”
— Joseph Stiglitz, Premio Nobel de Economı́a.
Durante los últimos años, tanto los flujos de capital como el comercio in-
ternacional han alcanzado niveles históricos. Sin embargo, éste crecimiento ha
sido heterogéneo a nivel global: Las economı́as emergentes son importadoras de
inversión extranjera directa (IED) y exportadoras de capital financiero (bonos).
Por el contrario, las economı́as avanzadas, como USA, exportan IED para importar
bonos. Éste fenómeno, se conoce en la literatura como flujos bi-direccionales de
capital internacional. La relevancia de investigar la composición de los flujos
brutos de capital, en términos de IED y bonos, está directamente relacionada con
el volumen de dichos flujos. La IED y el capital financiero generan diferentes
implicaciones sobre la macroeconomı́a y la estabilidad financiera. Hoy en d́ıa, la
combinación de elevados volúmenes de capital con una composición heterogénea,
genera transferencias de riqueza entre los distintos páıses cada vez que los tipos de
cambio o los precios de las acciones fluctúan, generando aśı ganadores y perdedores
de la globalización financiera.
Ésta tesis doctoral utiliza las últimas técnicas de modelaje teórico macroecónomico
y de econometŕıa de panel de datos para medir de forma cuantitativa los efectos
de la globalización financiera y de la integración económica en páıses avanzados y
en v́ıas de desarrollo. Por un lado, los dos primeros caṕıtulos sirven como punto
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de partida para el análisis de los flujos brutos de capital y la valoración de activos
desde el punto de vista de la teoŕıa macroeconómica y financiera internacional. Por
otro lado, en los dos últimos caṕıtulos, análizamos con técnicas econométricas las
causas y las consecuencias de la globalización económica, con especial enfásis en la
desigualdad regional.
En el primer caṕıtulo, se desarrolla un modelo teórico de dos páıses con selección de
cartera endógena, de IEA y bonos, para estudiar el papel de las asimetŕıas estruc-
turales en explicar tanto el volumen como la composición de los flujos de capital
entre páıses avanzados y emergentes. En un modelo simétrico, los ciudadanos de
cada economı́a seleccionaŕıan de forma óptima la misma posición extranjera en cada
activo, IEA y bonos. Por lo tanto, las posiciones netas tanto en bonos como en
IED deben ser cero. Entonces, la evidencia emṕırica sobre flujos bi-direccionales no
se puede explicar con un modelo simétrico. De hecho, debe haber alguna asimetŕıa
entre ambas economı́as que explique porqué las posiciones netas son diferentes de
cero. Los resultados de éste estudio arrojan que los principales determinantes son
la mayor volatilidad en las innovaciones de los shocks de tecnoloǵıa y de tipos de
interés, aśı como una mayor rigidez en los precios nominales presente en los páıses
emergentes. Además, encontramos que una mayor apertura comercial genera una
mayor diversificación de la cartera de inversión.
En el segundo caṕıtulo, calibramos una extensión del modelo previamente desar-
rollado en el primer caṕıtulo para explicar los determinantes del aumento de la
posición financiera externa (NFA) de Cánada con EEUU observada a partir de 2012.
Éste art́ıculo supone la primera vez que se calibra un modelo de dos páıses DSGE
con selección de cartera endógena. Es más, el modelo simula de forma satisfactoria
los principales momentos estad́ısticos para las series de datos trimestrales de EEUU
y Canada. Los resultados sugieren que los principales determinantes del incremento
de la NFA en Canada, fueron el incremento de la productividad global, la pólitica
viii
monetaria del QE llevada a cabo por la Reserva Federal de EEUU, y un shock
adverso a los salarios de las empresas localizadas en EEUU.
En el tercer caṕıtulo, examinamos el link entre la globalización económica y la
desigualdad espacial en un panel de 142 páıses para el periódo 1992-2012. Es la
primera investigación a nivel global sobre los efectos de la integración económica en
la desigualdad regional de los páıses. Los resultados demuestran que la globalización
financiera ha creado regiones ganadoras y regiones perdedoras. Para entender la
magnitud de los resultados, los autores muestran un ejemplo. Si Malawi en 2010,
hubiera tenido un nivel de globalización similar al de Turqúıa, es decir un 25%
mayor, su grado de desigualdad espacial hubiera incrementado aproximadamente
un 17.6%.
Por último, en el cuarto caṕıtulo, estudio cómo la Paradoja de Lucas ha incre-
mentado durante la Gran Recesión. El famoso Puzzle de Lucas (1990) se centra en
explicar porqué el capital no fluye de los páıses ricos hacia los páıses pobres, donde el
rendimiento de éste es mayor. Éste art́ıculo, Del Villar (2018), se centra en analizar
los determinantes de los flujos de IED y bonos a nivel internacional, y encuentra
que durante la Gran Recesión la paradoja se ha acentuado considerablemente. Es
más, las explicaciones tradicionales sobre el papel de la calidad de las instituciones
dejan de ser la solución a la Paradoja.
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Chapter 1
Gross capital flows between
emerging and advanced economies:
A two-country portfolio choice
model
1.1 Introduction
A heated debate has derived from the contradictions between standard open
economy models predictions, empirical evidence on the macroeconomic e↵ects of
international capital flows and policy makers’ beliefs (Blanchard et al., 2016). Since
1990, the world has experienced an impressive boost in gross cross-border capital
flows. As Figure 1.1 shows, average gross external positions are about five times the
gross domestic product (GDP) for major industrialized economies (G7 countries)
and grew from 1/3 to more than 2/3 of the GDP for emerging economies (BRIC’s).
Furthermore, Figure 1.2 shows not only large, but also heterogenous external po-
sitions across emerging and advanced economies, often referred in the literature as
1
“two-way” capital flows, (Gourichas and Rey, 2014). This heterogenous pattern
for both the net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the rest of financial capital
starts only after the year 1990, and it explodes after 2000. In fact, emerging and
developing economies are net importers of foreign direct investment while being net
exporters of financial capital. Furthermore, advanced countries such as the United
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Figure 1.2: “Two-way” capital flows
The exorbitant size of financial markets rises policymakers and investor’s con-
cerns on portfolio composition between risky assets (equity and FDI) and safe-assets
(bonds). Debt-induced financial integration may have di↵erent implications on ag-
gregate macroeconomic outcomes and financial stability, compared to FDI-induced
financial integration. More importantly, small variations in the stock market prices
and in the exchange rates imply large wealth transfers across financially integrated
countries with heterogenous foreign assets (Gourichas and Rey, 2014). Valuation
e↵ects account for an increasing part of the dynamics of external positions of many
countries.3 For example, the large accumulated current account deficits in the US
1For further reading see Ju and Wei (2010), Ghironi et al., (2005),and Gourichas and Rey (2014)
2Data have been borrowed from Lane Milessi and Ferreti (2007) Wealth of Nations Dataset,
updated in 2017.
3See Benigno (2009), Devereux and Sutherland (2010), Gourichas and Rey (2014) and Rey
(2015).
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should have been resulted in a deterioration of their net international investment
position. However, the US has experienced continuous capital gains on net external
positions over the last few decades, out-weighting the current account deficits (see
Figure 1.3). In fact, the cumulative current account deficit for the US is about
60% of GDP, while NFA represents 40% of GDP. Thus, valuation e↵ects in the US
represent a capital gain of about 20% of GDP. We find similar pattern for other
advanced economies such as UK, while the reverse is found for emerging economies



























































Figure 1.3: The importance of valuation e↵ects.
In relation with these empirical facts, several important questions cannot be
fully answered using the standard open-economy New Keynesian model, which
abstracts from the crucial transmission mechanisms of gross capital flows and
valuation e↵ects. Specifically, what are the e↵ects of large and heterogenous gross
external positions for aggregate fluctuations? and, what are the factors behind
the size and the composition of portfolio positions in emerging countries? In any
symmetric two-country model, the households optimal position on foreign assets is
equal in both countries, so that net bond and net equity positions must be zero,
3
and two-way capital flows cannot arise. We particularly describe two-way capital
flows as the case in which net asset position are non-zero. Thus, there must be
some asymmetries that explain the financial relationships between advanced and
emerging market economies, which are clearly non-balanced. This paper tries to
give some light to these questions by investigating the role of structural asymmetries
in a novel two-country New Keynesian model with endogenous portfolio choice of
FDI-equities and bonds. Furthermore, the standard open economy model links NFA
dynamics with just current account, since valuation e↵ects can not be measured
( NFAt = CAt). Hence, does the standard-open economy model under-(over)
estimate the NFA dynamics? We provide a comparison between the standard model
and our portfolio model, in which the  NFAt = CAt ± V ALt, to show that, in
fact, valuation e↵ects are the key component when we quantitatively measure NFA
dynamics.
The model builds on the New Keynesian literature related to Woodford (2003),
Gaĺı and Monacelli (2005, 2008), Christiano et al., (2010), and its extension to the
open economy context of endogenous portfolio choice initiated by Devereux and
Sutherland (2009, 2010, 2011) and Tille et al., (2010, 2014). Each country can be
described by a medium-scale fully-fledged New Keynesian model in which agents
are allowed to consume domestic and foreign goods and optimally purchase financial
assets, such as sovereign bonds and FDI-equity. Each economy features home good
bias, Calvo (1983)-style pricing mechanisms, incomplete financial markets and a
set of real and nominal exogenous shocks. Particularly, the environment in each
economy is very close to that of Smets and Wouters (2007), except for some frictions
not relevant to this study, like physical capital accumulation, wage rigidities and
consumption habits.
The introduction of both home good bias and nominal frictions in the model are
key to better understand the trade-o↵ between trade and portfolio diversification.
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The intuition relies on the fact that household consumption risks are determined
not only from shocks to a country’s home production, but also to output of its
main trading parters. The weight on the hedging against foreign shocks depends
on the degree of trade openness (i.e., home good bias). In order to hedge against
a foreign output shock, that reduces the relative price for foreign goods boosting
home imports, the loss arisen from the reduction in demand for local goods could
be outweighed by the gain on dividends from foreign equity holdings. Therefore,
holding foreign assets serves as a hedge to overcome idiosyncratic foreign risks,
which are intensified with trade openness. Introducing nominal frictions in the
production market would therefore slow down the price adjustment process and
the consumption switching e↵ect, a↵ecting directly the optimal choice in portfolio
assets.
The contribution of this study is at least threefold; First, we develop a novel the-
oretical framework to provide the main structural determinants of gross portfolio
positions and capital flows behavior in emerging countries. We obtain three key
results. First, we find that in the asymmetric case in which the emerging economy
faces higher volatility in the technology and interest rate shocks than the advanced
economy, two-way capital flows arise. Also, in the case in which the emerging econ-
omy fiscal shock is less volatile and the advance economy one. This result goes in
line with the empirical evidence about business cycles in advanced economies being
approximately half as volatile than those in emerging countries or poor countries
(Garcia-Cicco, 2010). Further, adding a higher degree of nominal rigidities in the
home economy, increases the two-way capital flows pattern.4 Second, the model
shows an optimal home equity bias, which is close to the empirical evidence for
advanced and emerging countries (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013). Specifically, results
suggest that those countries facing higher degree of nominal rigidities, stronger
4Gagnon (2009) suggests that emerging countries present less flexible nominal prices than ad-
vanced countries, using Mexico-US data.
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home good bias and higher business cycle volatilities tend to have a higher degree
of home equity bias. Third, our results confirm the existence of a key transmission
mechanism between international trade and international portfolio diversification,
in which agent consumption preferences over foreign goods directly a↵ect the
selection of optimal portfolio choice, since they both represent sources to diversify
domestic economy risks. In fact, the more open the goods market preferences, the
more diversified the portfolio. We find this result for both parameters governing
foreign good markets preferences, the elasticity of substitution between local and
foreign goods and the home good bias. These results are also found in Milesi-Ferreti
(2008) and Heatcothe and Perri (2013).
Second, this paper provides a theoretical framework that simulates an economically
integrated world of two asymmetric countries to study the international business
cycle. This setting allows to measure the behavior of gross trade, portfolio flows
and valuation e↵ects, along with the rest of the standard macroeconomic variables.
We quantitatively analyze business cycles dynamics for these variables to demon-
strate how optimal portfolio diversification helps households smooth down income
volatility. The overall performance of the financially integrated model is compared
with a financial autarky version to show how NFA dynamics di↵er once we open
up international financial markets and valuation channel starts operating. In fact,
we show how the NFA is under (over) estimated in the autarky model, and that
valuation e↵ects are the key determinant of its dynamics.
Third, our theoretical framework provides an starting point for the analysis of
portfolio composition and size between two asymmetric countries. Its empirical
application would serve policymakers to quantify these matters in an diaphanous
manner. In a near future, it is expected that the share of emerging countries in
international capital markets continues to grow at rapid rates. Thus, policy makers
in those economies should be aware of the necessity to foresee the prominent role
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of capital markets in international financial intermediation and to figure out their
e↵ects on macroeconomic outcomes. Moreover, we have shown that both trade and
portfolio together bring about crucial implications on aggregate macroeconomic
fluctuations and financial stability, and they should be embraced as an essential
part of the macroeconomist tool box in many emerging economies central banks.
The rest of the paper is organized in seven sections: Section 2 describes re-
lated literature. Section 3 lays out a two-country New Keynesian model with
international trade in goods, equities and bonds. Section 4 explains the portfolio
choice solution method. Section 5 uncovers which asymmetries matter and to what
extent they matter to determine portfolio positions in emerging economies. Section
6 analyses business cycles for gross portfolio variables and it compares the portfolio
model with a financial autarky version. Section 7 concludes with some remarks on
further research.
1.2 Connections to the related literature
Important progress in structural macroeconomic modeling has been achieved
since the late 1990s, as reflected in the vast amount of papers on New Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (NK DSGE) models. There has also been
improvement in generalizing the initially closed-economy NK DSGE models to
study the international transmission of shocks and policy design in open economies,
giving rise to New Open-Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM, Obstfeld and Rogo↵,
1995). Moreover, there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on net foreign
assets and current account balance analysis (Obstfeld and Rogo↵ (1995), Corsetti
and Peseti (2001), Corsetti et al (2008, 2014), Kollmann (2002, 2006) Gaĺı and
Monacelli (2005, 2008), among others).
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The majority of these open-economy models restrict the number of financial assets
available in the economy. They mostly rely on financial market structures based on
Arrow-Debreu securities, which implies assuming complete asset markets and that
households are able to fully hedge against country specific income shocks. More
recent literature has begun to analyze open economy models in which financial
markets are incomplete, mainly by limiting the number or the type of assets
available in the economy or by limiting the functions of the financial market.5 Ju
and Wei (2010) remark that while there is a well-settled literature on horizontal
FDI and the gains of multinationals (Helpman et al., (2004)) capital flows across
the categories of financial capital and FDI have not received much attention in the
literature. Another standard assumption, both in closed and open economy models,
is to take the representative household as the owner of the firm.
NOEM and NK DSGE models have become standard elements of the macroe-
conomists’ toolbox, in fact, nowadays they are used in research departments in
many central banks. Nonetheless, the powerful spillover channel created by inter-
national financial markets has not been routinely incorporated into these models,
so that they are not very useful tools to fully analyze the overall macroeconomic
e↵ects of heterogenous gross capital flows across countries. Nevertheless, a new
strand in the literature has emerged to fill this gap, the open economy financial
macroeconomics literature. Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) provide an extended
revision on this strand of the literature. In general, the aim of these papers is
to explain the factors behind the diversification puzzle (home equity bias) by
introducing the portfolio choice of equity assets into the standard open economy
model. Gourichas and Coeurdacier (2016) show that many of the earlier results
on the determinants of equity bias are not robust to the introduction of domestic
5By including more stochastic shocks we ensure that despite the presence of more assets, finan-
cial markets are still not complete, so that there is more scope for hedging than in a one-single
asset framework.
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and foreign bonds, whether nominal or real. In fact, they find that equity home
bias arises when non-financial income risk is negatively correlated with equity
returns, after controlling for bond returns. Our paper contributes to the open
economy financial macroeconomics literature by providing a fully structural open
economy DSGE model with endogenous portfolio choice of both FDI-equity and
bonds to analyze various interesting questions related with capital flows in emerging
economies.
There are a few two-country general equilibrium models which incorporate en-
dogenous portfolio choice of equity and bonds, in an open economy framework
(Devereux and Sutherland (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), Tille et al., (2010, 2014), Engel
and Matsumoto, 2009, and Coeurdacier et al., (2010, 2015, 2013)). Until recently,
there was no suitable computable method to solve portfolio choice in the context
of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. However, there has been some
developments in macroeconomic modeling to deal with portfolio choice solution and
gross capital flows dynamics.
Devereux and Sutherland (2007) solve the equilibrium portfolio choice in a two-
country endowment model. They propose a new perturbation based method to
solve for constant portfolio choice. Moreover, in 2010 and 2011, they extend their
methodology to solve time-varying portfolios under di↵erent general equilibrium
frameworks. At the same time, a second solution method is proposed in Tille and
Wincoop (2010, 2014) to examine how current account and net foreign assets react
to changes in savings. Their framework is based on a symmetric two-country general
equilibrium model with physical capital accumulation and international trade in
equities. Both solution procedures are novel but their mathematical foundations
are already established in the literature, in particular the work of Samuelson (1970),
Judd (1998), and Judd and Guu (2001). Samuelson (1970), is the first to establish
that in order to derive the N -order component of the portfolio, it is necessary to
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approximate the portfolio problem up to order N+2. The important innovation
in Devereux and Sutherland’s work is that they find that to derive the N order
accurate solution for portfolio, the portfolio optimality conditions need to be
approximated only up to N+2 order. The rest of the non-portfolio optimality and
equilibrium conditions need only to be approximated up to N+1, which simplifies
the solution considerably.
This model is similar to the one of Engel and Matsumoto (2009), which may
be considered a starting point for sticky-price portfolio models in a fully integrated
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. They develop a model charac-
terized by complete financial markets to analyze the factors determining portfolio
choice in equilibrium. A key di↵erence is that while they solve equilibrium portfolio
shares, in the model presented here, we allow portfolio shares to vary over time
in response to shocks. Moreover, their model features complete financial markets
and they assume two symmetric countries, while I focus on the role of country
asymmetries in shaping portfolio choice in the context of incomplete financial
markets.6
This model is also close to Devereux and Sutherland (2009), in the sense that
they incorporate portfolio choice dynamics in a structural general equilibrium
model of two asymmetric countries. However, their focus is on risk sharing proper-
ties of three di↵erent financial market structures, (i.e., autarky, complete markets
and asymmetric financial markets). Their framework uses one-single good con-
sumption which price level is determined by a simple money rule characterized by
a “velocity shock” to money demand. The model presented in this study, assumes
6Another minor di↵erences are that they use one period in advance price setting mechanism,
while I use the more standard Calvo(1983)-type pricing mechanism, and that they use money-in-
the utility function while this paper takes endogenous monetary policy rules which may play an
important role in shaping portfolio choice as shown in Devereux et al., (2014).
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di↵erentiated consumption goods which are internationally traded and it provides a
richer framework in which price and exchange rate fluctuations have sizable e↵ects
on country external positions.
Further, our model is related with Senay and Sutherland (2019). These au-
thors study the link between household portfolio allocation and optimal monetary
policy using an incomplete markets model in which multiple financial assets are
tradable at the international level. In fact, they show that the presence of multiple
assets may imply that optimal monetary polity serves as a stabilization tool for
the exchange rate gap obtained in more simplistic theoretical frameworks. While
financial market integration is found to have e↵ects on monetary policy, our paper
focuses on asymmetries in the monetary policy rules that create di↵erent household
portfolio allocation across countries.
Our model is also close to Courdacier et al.,(2010). They show that a realis-
tic home equity bias arises when capital accumulation, shocks to the e ciency of
physical investment, and international trade in stocks and bonds are introduced in
the model. Furthermore, these authors also provide a quantitative analysis of the
model implications on foreign asset dynamics and international capital flows. While
their focus is on exploring the di↵erent explanations for the home equity bias, the
main objetive of this paper is to understand the role of country asymmetries in
explaining capital flows between advanced and emerging countries.
This paper is also related to a number of studies analyzing business cycles in
emerging countries. Mainstream research takes into account market failures and
monetary policy roles when characterizing economic fluctuations in emerging and
developing countries. Nevertheless, there has been a new strand in the literature
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which argues that emerging market business cycles can be replicated using the
neoclassical model with no distortions. Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) argue that
the Real Business Cycle model (RBC) can characterize well the lost decade in
Argentina in the 1980s. Moreover, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) suggest that an
RBC model driven primarily by permanent shocks to productivity can very well
explain the business cycles in developing countries. These authors are aware about
the fact that shocks infringing upon emerging countries are quite numerous and
of di↵erent types but they argue that the combined e↵ect of all di↵erent shocks
can be modeled as an aggregate shock to total factor productivity with a large
non-stationary component. In addition, they show that the neoclassical model is
an adequate framework for analyzing the transmission of such shocks in emerging
economies.
The theoretical predictions of our model confirm previous empirical and theo-
retical findings about the positive link between international trade and portfolio
choice. Obstfeld and Rogo↵ (2000) explained how production market frictions
decrease portfolio diversification when markets are open to trade, even in the cases
in which there is full risk diversification. Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2008) show a
strong positive correlation between bilateral equity holdings and bilateral trade
in goods and services, specially evident for emerging-market economies. They
further analyze gross variables separately, and find that gross exports e↵ects are
larger in some model specifications but gross imports are more significant in the
emerging-markets sample. Heathcote and Perri (2013) find similar conclusions in
relation with the positive trade e↵ects on portfolio diversification. These authors
solve closed-form portfolio choice in an extended version of the seminal model
developed by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). They find qualitatively and
quantitatively predictions regarding the level of diversification and trade that are
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useful to assess cross-country portfolios in developed countries. In their theoretical
sensitivity analysis, they find that common values determining the elasticity of
substitution across local and foreign goods, predict high values for home equity
bias, which is also vaticinated in the present paper. In fact, they o↵er an empirical
analysis that strongly confirms that patterns on portfolio diversification are driven
by patters of trade.
1.3 Financial Integration Model
1.3.1 The framework
There are two economies in the model that are referred as home (domestic)
economy and foreign economy.7 There is free international trade in goods and
financial capital assets (equity and bonds), where equity assets are claims on
firms profitability and bonds are claims on each country currencies. Labour is not
mobile across economies. Physical capital accumulation is not modeled. Regarding
the exogenous variables, for each economy there are three AR(1) processes for
technology, government spending and monetary policy shocks.
Following Coeurdacier and Rey (2013), economies are assumed to have equal size
for two reasons. On the one hand, the focus of this paper is on the role played
by economic structure asymmetries, neutralizing any e↵ect driven by the size of
countries. On the other hand, the focus is not the financial integration of small
open economies, but asset flows between advanced and emerging economies, which
7Foreign economy is not explicitly displayed here, since it is identical to the one presented in this
section, with the specific notation of an asterisk (*). See the Appendix for a detailed description
of all variables, parameters and model equations.
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account for a large part of the total volume of transaction since 1990.
1.3.2 Households
There is a continuum of households in each economy indexed by j within the
unit interval. Representative households maximizes the following lifetime utility





where  t is a time-varying discount factor and the instantaneous utility function











Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), an endogenous discount factor is as-
sumed to ensure a stationary wealth distribution in the linearized approximated
dynamic model.8 In particular, the discount factor is a function of aggregate con-
sumption determined as follows
 t+1 =  t(1 + Ct)
 ⌫ (1.3.2)
The rest of structural parameters from household preferences are the risk aversion
parameter (  > 0) and the inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity (  > 0). Let Ct
be a CES composite consumption index defined by
Ct ⌘
h










8 They propose five di↵erent ways to induce stationarity in an open economy model. We choose
the endogenous discount factor for simplicity.
14
where CH,t and CF,t are bundles of consumption of home and foreign goods respec-

















Hence, the parameter ↵ 2 [0, 1] is inversely related to the degree of home bias
in preferences.9 Moreover, parameter ✓ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods from the viewpoint of domestic consumer, and
✏ > 1, denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within the
same economy. Standard open macroeconomics models normally sets ✏ > ✓. The
optimal choices of domestic and imported goods are











The consumption-based price indices that correspond to the above specifications of










where PH,t is the price index for domestically produced goods also expressed in
domestic currency and PF,t is the price index for foreign produced goods expressed
in domestic currency. Producer price index inflation is described with ⇡H for home
economy, ⇡⇤
F
for foreign economy in foreign currency units. While ⇡ refers to CPI
inflation in the domestic economy, and ⇡⇤ to CPI inflation in the foreign economy
in foreign currency.
9If price indexes for domestic and foreign goods are equal (as assumed in the steady state
equilibrium), the model parameter ↵ corresponds to the share of domestic consumption allocated
to imported goods.
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The Household Budget Constraint
Households consume bundles of goods (Ct) which can be domestically produced
(CH,t) or produced abroad (CF,t). They acquire equity shares to decide their
participation in either domestic and foreign firms and they may buy or sell either
domestic or foreign government bonds.
As suppliers of labor services, they obtain a real wage (wt) from their hours worked
(Nt). As financial capital owners, they obtain total returns from last period equity
and bond holdings. The budget constraint of the domestic household, expressed in









































for t = 1, 2, 3, ...,
where Vt refers to domestic equity value, V ⇤t to foreign equity value, Dt refers
to domestic firm dividends, D⇤
t
denotes foreign firm dividends. SH,t refers to the
share of domestic equity held by domestic households and SF,t refers to that of
foreign equity. Moreover, BH,t and BF,t are, respectively, the amounts of domestic
and foreign government bonds purchased by the domestic household in period t to
be reimbursed in t + 1 and it refers to the gross nominal interest rate of domestic
bonds, and i⇤
t
is that of the foreign bonds. Finally, Qt denotes the real exchange







where Et is the nominal exchange rate also in foreign currency terms. Note that Pt
and P ⇤
t
refer to CPI level of each country.
We shall assume that total government expenditure is exogenous and is sub-
ject to an stochastic process. In particular, government purchases are set to 25% of
the output in steady state, ḡ = 0.25Ȳ , and itś short-run fluctuations are determined






where 0 < ⇢G < 1 and ✏G
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The first order conditions lead to the following expected return of domestic



































where ⇡t+1 refers to domestic CPI inflation level, ⇡H,t+1 to domestic producer price
inflation level, and the same applies for ⇡⇤
t+1 and ⇡
⇤
F,t+1. In addition, the Euler




The optimality condition for equity and bonds are, respectively,
Et[C  t+1rEF,t+1] = Et[C  t+1rEH,t+1] (1.3.14)
Et[C  t+1rBF,t+1] = Et[C  t+1rBH,t+1] (1.3.15)





In order to implement Devereux and Sutherland’s solution procedure, the household
budget constraint needs to be rewritten in terms of net foreign asset position. Do-
mestic agent portfolio holdings of domestic assets (↵H,t) and foreign assets (↵F,t) are
written as the product of the asset value in domestic currency units (qa,t) and the
volume of assets they hold (SH,t,SF,t for equities and BH,t,BF,t for bonds). Formally,
11Where   is a fixed parameter obtained from the steady-state resolution of the model.
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↵EH,t refers to domestic agent holdings of domestic equity, ↵EF,t refers to domestic
agent holdings of foreing equity, ↵BH,t refers to domestic agent holdings of domestic











Thereby, the net foreign asset position becomes





denote foreign agent holdings of domestic equity and domestic
bonds respectively.
Moreover, we define the net bond and net equity position as follows,
NBAt ⌘ ↵BF,t + ↵BH,t (1.3.18)
NEAt ⌘ ↵EF,t + ↵EH,t (1.3.19)
As in Devereux and Sutherland (2010), domestic equity is assumed to be the refer-
ence asset. Besides, a three-element vector with the excess return on financial assets
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relative to it is defined
rx,t ⌘ [rBH,t   rEH,t, rBF,t   rEH,t, rEF,t   rEH,t] (1.3.20)
Another vector is introduced to measure real holdings of financial assets
↵t 1 ⌘ [↵BH,t 1,↵BF,t 1,↵EF,t 1] (1.3.21)
Using (1.3.17), (1.3.18) and (1.3.19), the domestic budget constraint can be rewritten
Ct + (ḡ)e
Gt +NFAt = wtNt +Dt + rx,t↵t 1 + rEH,tNFAt 1; (1.3.22)
Valuation E↵ects
Standard international macroeconomics uses the following country’s Balance of
Payments (BoP) definition, in which the left-hand side of the equation refers to the
current account and the right-hand side to the capital account
 NFAt ⌘ CAt
It states that changes in the net foreign asset position ( NFAt) are equivalent to
the current account (CAt). In our portfolio model, these two terms di↵er in the
capital gains and losses from pre-existing asset and liability positions, when stock
price and exchange rate fluctuate. Following Devereux et al., (2010), the following
approximation is assumed
CAt ⇡ wtNT   Ct   (ḡ)eGt +Dt + (rEH,t   1)NFAt 1 (1.3.23)
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which combined with the budget constraint (3.20) leads to the following re-definition
of the change in net foreign assets, including a measure of the valuation e↵ects
 NFAt ⌘ CAt + (r0xt↵t 1)| {z }
Valuation E↵ects
(1.3.24)



















where the first term refers to exports and the second one to imports. Note that RPt
(RP ⇤
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The Financial Autarky Model
In financial autarky, no financial assets are traded internationally. Ct is the com-
posite index of domestic and foreign bundles of goods, so that international goods









for t = 1, 2, 3, ...,
Thus, the Balance of Payments is  NFAt ⌘ CAt and CAt = NXt
1.3.3 Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate-goods producers indexed over the unit
interval. They operate in a monopolistically competitive industry and seek to max-
imize their profits. In this setup, there is no physical capital. Each firm produces a
unique di↵erentiate good and earns some monopoly profit. The amount of output
produced of the representative jth firm, Yt(j), is subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz demand
constraint (3.4) and to a technology function with the following form,
Yt(j) = exp(At)Nt(j) (1.3.29)
where Nt is the amount of labor employed by the representative firm, and At follows






with a coe cient of autocorrelation 0 < ⇢A < 1 and white-noise innovation, ✏A
t
.
It is worth to notice that At factor involves any idiosyncratic source that changes
marginal product of labour.
Price stickiness is modeled a la Calvo (1983). There is a fixed probability of
either re-setting the price optimally or maintaining it from last period. In this way,
a fraction of (1  ⌘) randomly selected firms set optimal prices each period, with an
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individual firm’s probability of re-setting in any given period being completely inde-
pendent of the time elapsed since it last re-optimized its price. In comparison with
the flexible price setting, now adjusting price firms will recognize that the optimal
price chosen has a probability of remaining e↵ective for a random number of periods
so that they will account for expected future marginal costs, instead of looking at the
current level only. Nevertheless, by setting ⌘ ! 0 the model e↵ectively represents
the special case of flexible prices. Many portfolio choice models assume flexible
price setting. This model features nominal rigidities in order to have a role for
monetary policy and shocks in determining gross external positions and dynamics.12
Let us assume that the representative domestic firm receives the Calvo signal
to set the optimal price in period t. Then, the choice of the price ¯PH,t(j) is





























where upper case letters denote nominal variables. ⇥ is the stochastic discount
factor to evaluate its dividend stream. This domestic firm discount factor is not the
same as for domestic households because the firm is owned by domestic and foreign
12Also, it may be the case that financial globalization influences inflation, which is studied in
Devereux, Senay and Sutherland, 2014.
13 Real magnitudes from the firm-optimization problem are expressed in domestically produced
units,(i.e., nominal terms divided by the producer price index PH,t). Since the real wage (wt) and
dividends (dt) are expressed in CPI units in the household problem (i.e., divided by Pt), to be




agents. Thus a weighted combination of the home and foreign discount factors is
utilized as in Devereux and Sutherland (2010).14





wt = mct(j)exp(At) (1.3.32)
where mct(j) is the firm-specific real marginal cost (Lagrange multiplier associated
to the constraint), which turns to be equal to aggregate marginal cost.
The first order condition on the price ¯PH,t(j), combined with (1.3.30), results in the



















where 0 < ⌘ < 1 is the Calvo probability.
Under the assumed price-setting structure, dynamics of domestic producer price


























14See the Appendix for the full definition
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which has been derived from the aggregation across the following market condition
for the individual firm







where CH,t(j) corresponds to domestic demand for domestic goods and C⇤H,t(j) for-
eign demand for domestic goods, which comes from the optimal allocation of home-
produced goods for foreign agents.



















refers to the foreign share of domestic equity, and S⇤
F,t
would refer





1.3.5 Monetary policy rules
The nominal interest rate (it) is determined through a reaction function describ-
ing monetary policy decisions made by the domestic central bank.16 In contrast
with some open-economy literature, where monetary policy is introduced by as-
suming that some monetary aggregate follows an exogenous stochastic process, the
literature of New Keynesian assume that the short-term interest rate is the instru-
ment of that policy. The size and composition of country portfolios will depend
on the structure and stochastic environment of the model, including the properties
of the monetary rules. There is therefore an interaction between policy choice and
portfolio choice, which has been studied by Senay and Sutherland (2016). In this
paper, the authors discuss the e↵ects of di↵erent financial market structures, in-











16A simplified version to that of Fernandez-Villaverde (2006) is used.
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cluding autarky, on monetary policy. Formally, the country specific inflation-based









where µ⇡ > 1 to satisfy the Taylor principle for determinacy. A symmetric inflation
targeting is assumed between the two economies. A CPI-inflation targeting rule is
selected instead of producer price inflation rule, since the central bank is aimed to







with a coe cient of autocorrelation 0 < ⇢R < 1 and white-noise innovation, "R .
1.4 Portfolio choice solution method
The model is a set of 46 equations providing solution paths for all the en-
dogenous variables from both economies.17 There are 20 endogenous variables
rEH,t, rEB,t, it, Ct,  t,⇥t, wt, Nt, CH,t, CF,t, Dt, Vt,mct, ⇢̃, RPt, ⇡t, ⇡H,t, SSt, PDt, Yt
for the domestic economy and other 20 completely analogous from the foreign
economy. In addition, there are 6 variables shared for both economies, Et, Qt,
NXt, CAt, NFAt, V ALt. Regarding the exogenous variables, for each economy
there are three AR(1) processes for technology, government spending and interest
rate shocks.
New Keynesian models are typically solved by taking log-linear approximation
around a non-stochastic steady state. However, optimal portfolios cannot be
17See Appendix for a detailed description of variables, parameters and model equations.
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uniquely pinned down in a non-stochastic steady state. As Devereux and Suther-
land (2008) state “The reason is that there is no natural point around which to
approximate the model. It is because the steady state is free-risk, there is no un-
certainty, so any portfolio allocation would be valid.” Actually, in a non-stochastic
world all portfolio allocations are equivalent and can be regarded as valid equilibria.
Up to a first-order Taylor approximation, the expected returns on financial assets
have no di↵erence, they are perfect substitutes, so portfolio dynamics are not
pinned down either. Risk is the only fact that would made assets distinguishable,
but neither the non-stochastic steady state nor a first order approximation capture
the di↵erences in the risk characteristics of assets.
Devereux and Sutherland (DS)’s methods are limited because they rely on local
approximations around the non-stochastic steady state, and they are valid around
the point of approximation, which is problematic when there are large deviations
away from this point. To avoid this, global solution methods are being increas-
ingly chosen to solve medium-scale models. Rabitsch et al. (2015) compare the
performance of the DS method with a global solution method. They find that the
DS method works very well when focusing on short horizons, especially true when
assets returns are similar, whether countries are symmetric or asymmetric. I follow
DS solution method for two reasons; First, it is close to standard approximation
methods used in New Keynesian and DSGE models. Second, it can be applied
to a broad range of environments with complete and incomplete financial markets
models that incorporate a potentially large number of shocks and/or financial
assets.
In a two-economy model with portfolio choice, there is a set of portfolio optimality
conditions and a set of equations defining the rest of the model. The solution of
both set of equations will give a vector of the real portfolio holdings solution for each
asset traded. For the steady state portfolio to be well defined, also called zero-order
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portfolio, we need the second-order approximation of the portfolio equations and
the first-order approximation of the rest of the model equations. The non-stochastic
steady state of the model set of equations determines the approximation point for
the non-portfolio variables (see the Appendix for the steady state solution). Then, a
combination of the second-order approximation of the portfolio optimal conditions
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Equations (1.4.1) and (1.4.2) together with the first-order approximation of the
rest of the model equations will yield the zero-order portfolio holdings solution. DS
methods show that to obtain the first-order portfolio solution, in which true portfo-
lios are allowed to move over time, the portfolio equations need to be approximated
to the third-order and the non-portfolio equations up to second-order.
1.5 Quantitative results and discussion
The objective of this section is to search for structural asymmetries in our
two-economy model, that can be potential explanations for the empirical evidence
on positive net bond positions and negative net equity positions in emerging
economies. The model solution delivers equal values for each asset holding when the
two economies are calibrated symmetrically. Thus, both net equity and net bond
position are equal to cero, and two-way capital flows cannot arise. In consequence,
there must be some structural asymmetries between the two economies that create
non-zero net positions. We test alternative parameter values in the home economy,
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as we consider it to be a representative emerging economy, while the foreign econ-
omy is used as control group and its parameter values are fixed at the benchmark
levels which mainly describe advanced economies.
A two-step procedure is followed to isolate those cases in which several asym-
metries between the two economies coexist at the same time. First, individual
e↵ects of each parameter asymmetry are considered, on both gross and net portfolio
positions, to identify which asymmetry alone is able to generate the pattern of
two-way capital flows. Second, all the asymmetries are put together into the
model to simulate a world-economy with both emerging and advanced countries.
In this sense, the overall e↵ect of all asymmetries on portfolio choices can also be
measured. We consider potential asymmetries from variations in the parameters
characterizing the structural part of the model in the emerging economy. Thus,
we test alternative values for the home goods bias (↵), nominal price rigidity (⌘)
and the Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity for home and imported consumption goods
(✓).18 We also consider variations in the parameter values defining the exogenous
component of the model. Particularly, we consider asymmetries from variations in
the standard deviations of the innovation of the technology shock, Std("A), fiscal
shock, Std("G), and monetary shocks, Std("R), in the emerging economy.
1.5.1 Parameter calibration
Table 1 reports the parameter values for the baseline calibration, where we high-
light those parameters subject to asymmetries and their corresponding values for the
baseline calibration. Values are set at their standard levels from related literature
18All parameters within the model have been tested, such as the degree of market competitiveness
(i.e., Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution between varieties, ✏ ) and the weight on inflation from
Taylor rule monetary policy, µ⇡. They turn out not to have any significant e↵ect on the pattern
of equilibrium portfolio. Results are not provided in the paper due to the lack of space, but they
are available upon request.
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(Devereux and Sutherland, 2009; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Aguiar and Gopinath,
2007; and Gaĺı and Monacelli, 2005).
Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Concept Emerging (Advanced Economy)
  Steady state discount factor 0.99 (0.99)
  Elasticity of consumption marginal utility 1 (1)
  Elasticity of labor marginal disutility 2(2)
µ⇡ Inflation weight in Taylor Rule 1.5 (1.5)
✏ Elasticity b/varieties within the same country 6 (6)
⇢A Technology shock persistence 0.94 (0.94)
⇢G Fiscal shock persistence 0.85 (0.85)
⇢R Monetary shock persistence 0.8 (0.8)
ḡ Steady-state public spending over output 0.25 (0.25)
Asymmetric parameter values(*)
↵ Share of domestic consumption to imported varieties 0.35-0.4-0.41 -0.45 (0.4)
✓ Elasticity of substitution b/ H and F varieties 1.3-1.5-1.55 -1.9 (1.5)
⌘ Calvo probability of price stickiness 0.56-2/3-0.72 -0.74 (2/3)
Std("R) Monetary shock volatility 0.2%- 1%- 2% (1%)
Std("A) Technology shock volatility 0.2%- 1.1%-1.13 - 2% (1.1%)
Std("G) Fiscal shock volatility 5%- 10%- 15% (10%)
(*) Symmetric calibration values for the emerging economy in bold font and asymmetric calibration values in
italics.
A period in the model corresponds to one quarter, which is consistent with
the literature on business cycles. The discount factor parameter is chosen so that
the annualized steady-state real interest rate is 4%. The elasticity of consumption
marginal utility is set to have the logarithmic case (  = 1) and the elasticity of the
marginal disutility of labour is set to 2, for a Frisch labour supply elasticity of 0.5.
For the symmetric simulation, home bias parameter is set to 0.4 which is standard
in open economy models (Gaĺı and Monacelli, 2005). The elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign produced varieties is set at 1.5 as suggested by Backus et
al. (1992). We vary these two parameters (↵, ✓) in order to match qualitatively the
net bond and net equity position in the emerging economy. Also, following Smets
and Wouters (2007), Calvo probability parameter equals 2/3, which implies an av-
erage duration of optimal prices at 3 quarters (9 months). For the asymmetric case,
we set the Calvo-probability for the home (emerging) economy to a higher value
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(⌘ = 0.72), since it is shown that emerging markets (for example, Mexico) tend
to have less flexible prices than more advanced countries, (Gagnon, 2009). Also,
we chose it because it delivers the two-way capital flow pattern found in emerging
economies.
Finally, the parameters for the persistence of the exogenous shocks are set to values
found in the literature, in which the technology shocks are clearly more persistent
(0.94) than either the fiscal shocks (0.85), or monetary shocks (0.8). The standard
deviations of the innovation of the shocks are calibrated to provide a reasonable vari-
ance decomposition, in which the total variability of domestic output, is explained
by technology shocks (44%), fiscal shocks (36%) and monetary shocks (17%). The
remaining 3% variability comes from the e↵ects of foreign economy shocks. We mod-
ify the standard deviation of the innovation of the technology shock in the emerging
economy. Numerous empirical studies provide values for output volatility that are
on average twice as large in emerging markets compared to developed countries
(Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007).19
1.5.2 Results on equilibrium portfolios and discussion
We solve portfolio equilibrium positions for the emerging economy using the
solution procedure outlined in Section 4.20 These portfolio positions have an impact
on the responses of the rest of the endogenous variables to exogenous shocks and
also introduce valuation e↵ects. Households select whether to invest more or less
in each asset (e.g., portfolio position size), and they also choose whether to hold
“long” or “short” positions (e.g., portfolio position sign). In order to diversify risks,
19Also, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017, Chapter 1) provide a detailed description of business
cycle facts around the world with special interest in emerging and poor countries.
20 Devereux and Sutherland (2011) provide an example of closed form solutions of these ↵   s
using a simpler framework. Nevertheless, the relatively large model used in this study cannot
deliver analytical solutions, and it is solved using Devereux and Sutherland (2011) solution method
for more generalized models.
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households choose optimal holdings of assets with the highest relative return in
order to smooth down the negative e↵ects in case of a decrease in their relative
disposable income.
Particularly, the symmetric calibration leads to the following solution for holdings
of domestic and foreign bonds: ↵B,H = 0.79 and ↵B,F =  0.79, respectively. This
result makes the net bond asset position, defined in Eq. 3.18 as NBA ⌘ ↵B,H+↵B,F ,
be equal to zero. The solution for holdings for domestic and foreign equity are
↵E,F = 3.76, and ↵E,H =  3.76, respectively. Again, the net equity position,
defined in Eq. 3.19 as NEA ⌘ ↵E,H + ↵E,F , is zero. It is worth recalling that
portfolio choice is measured in terms of output, so bond holdings represent around
80% of output and equity holdings are 3 and 3/4 times larger than output. Thus,
two-way capital flows cannot arise in the symmetric setting because it delivers
the same value for each portfolio holding with opposite signs. In consequence,
there must be some structural asymmetries between the two economies that create
two-way capital flows (i.e., NEA < 0 and NBA > 0).
In the asymmetric calibration, the size of each asset position is heterogenous
across the two countries giving rise to non-zero net asset positions, while the
“long-short” position choice on asset composition remains unchanged. We focus
on those asymmetries with larger e↵ects on portfolio holdings (see Figure 1.5)
and we compute both the NBA and NEA in Figure 1.4. In general, our results
indicate that households in the emerging economy go ‘long’ (‘short’) in domestic
(foreign) bonds since its respective excess return co-moves negatively (positively)
with relative disposable income. On the equity side, households optimally choose
to hold a positive (negative) position in foreign (domestic) equity, since its return
co-moves negatively (positively) with disposable income, conditional on the rest of
the assets returns.
33






Calvo Probability (η )
Net Bond Asset (NBA)
Net Equity Asset (NEA)






Home good bias (α)






Home preferences (θ) 





















Figure 1.4: Net bond asset position and net equity position in the emerging economy under
alternative parameter calibrations.
Nominal price rigidities
First, equilibrium asset holdings are illustrated for distinct grades of price stickiness
in the emerging economy. As Obstfeld and Rogo↵ (2000) highlight, the presence
of frictions in the production markets directly a↵ects the portfolio choice. Figure
1.4 —upper left diagram–, demonstrates that two-way capital flows arise when
the emerging economy su↵ers from higher nominal rigidities than the advanced
economy. In fact, a 0.05 basis points gap between the domestic and the foreign price
stickiness (⌘   ⌘⇤ = 0.05), causes a 20% change in net asset positions over output.
This result goes in line with the empirical evidence of emerging countries with
positive net bond positions and negative equity positions, assuming that emerging
countries face a higher degree of nominal rigidities.
To better understand this result, let us take a look at the relationship between each
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asset position and price rigidities in Figure 1.5 —upper panel–. Particularly, the
maximum level in domestic bond holdings is higher, in absolute value, than that of
foreign bond holdings, when local prices are only a bit more rigid than those in the
foreign country. The size in assets (domestic bonds) surpasses the size in liabilities
(foreign bonds), making the net bond position positive in the emerging economy.
Domestic bond returns co-move negatively with relative income, thus higher nomi-
nal price rigidities in the emerging economy make domestic bonds to be a relatively
better hedge than the rest of the financial assets. Furthermore, price rigidities in
the emerging economy reduce equity holdings from advanced economies since the
correlation between disposable income and foreign equity returns is diminished.
We find that an economy with greater price stickiness reduces considerably foreign
equity long positions, making net equity position to be negative, and increases
domestic bond long positions, making net bond position to be positive.21 ’ 22
Household consumption preferences
Second, there is an essential positive relationship between trade and portfolio
diversification (Heatcothe and Perri, 2013). Thus, we are interested in testing this
empirical prediction in a more complex and realistic model. For this reason, we
compute gross and net portfolio positions for di↵erent values of the parameters
controlling agent preferences over foreign markets. Particularly, the elasticity of
substitution between local and foreign goods and the home good bias parameter.
21Price rigidities issues in the context of macroeconomic modeling are key part of the vast DSGE
literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Fernandez-Villaverde, 2006). Nevertheless, studies assessing
the empirical validity of such hypothesis using micro-data are scarce. The majority of these few
papers have been focused in developed economies. Hence, analyses on emerging and/or developing
countries are rare and country-based. As one representative example, Gagnon (2009) focuses on
the relationship between inflation and consumer price setting by examining a large data set of
Mexican consumer prices. He finds that overall, the Mexican prices appear less flexible than the
U.S. ones for comparable inflation rates.
22We compute the escenario in which interest rate shocks are cancelled out in both economies in
order to isolate nominal rigidities e↵ects from those coming from the iteration of nominal rigidities
and monetary policy functions (Devereux et al., 2014). Under this situation, domestic bond hold-
ings and foreign bond holdings present the exact same pattern with opposite sign, so that NBA
and NEA positions do not vary when nominal price rigidities change. Equity holdings are not
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium asset positions in the emerging economy under alternative parameter
calibration.
On the one hand, Figure 1.4–central left diagram– shows that two-way capital flows
emerge when consumption good bias in the emerging economy is smaller than that
in the advanced economy, particularly for ↵ > 0.4 and ↵⇤ = 0.4. In fact, the higher
the home consumption bias (lower ↵), the smaller the overall portfolio position (see
Figure 1.5). On the other hand, positive net bond position and negative net equity
position appear in the case in which households demand over foreign goods is more
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elastic in the emerging economy than the advanced economy (see Figure 1.4 —lower
left panel–). Figure 1.5 displays a positive relationship between each portfolio
position and ✓, reflecting the fact that a more elastic consumption of domestic
goods relative to foreign goods, increases the overall size of the economy portfolio
position. These results indicate that in those cases in which household preferences
are biased towards domestically produced goods, external portfolio positions are
smaller than their foreign counterparts. Our results confirm the key transmission
mechanism between international trade and international financial markets, found
in Heatcothe and Perri (2013). Consumption preferences over foreign goods directly
a↵ect the selection of optimal portfolio choice, since they both represent sources
to diversify domestic economy risks. In fact, the higher the home good bias, the
higher the equity bias.
Business cycle volatility
Third, business cycle volatility in emerging and in advanced markets is found to be
relatively di↵erent.23 Thus, we compute the portfolio equilibrium e↵ects of intro-
ducing asymmetries in the standard deviations of the innovation of the exogenous
shocks in the emerging economy, Std("A), Std("G), Std(✏R). Figure 1.5 illustrate
a positive relationship between bond holdings and higher standard deviation of
technology and monetary policy shocks, while a negative relation with higher fiscal
shocks volatility. Moreover, domestic households choose a larger position in foreign
equity holdings for higher volatility of supply shocks, while a smaller position for
higher volatility in demand and monetary shocks. The fact that emerging economy
volatility of the technology shock is higher than the advanced country one, makes
disposable income to be more correlated with returns on domestic equity than
on foreign equity. Thus, the increase in domestic equity liabilities surpasses the
23Kydland and Zarazaga (2002), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Schmitt-Grohe (2017, Chapter
1) present examples for business cycle facts in emerging markets to be at least double than those
in advanced countries.
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increase in foreign equity assets, so that net equity position turns negative. In fact,
Figure 1.4– right panel–, exhibits that in those cases in which the emerging economy
faces more volatility in the technology shock than the advanced economy, two-way
capital flows arise. Further, we find that two-capital flows arise also under the
situation in which the volatility of fiscal shocks is higher in the advanced economy.
Home equity Bias
Fourth, regardless of the tremendous growth in cross-border financial transactions,
international portfolios remain biased towards domestic assets.24 We utilize our
framework to understand the e↵ects of each asymmetry on the home equity bias,
which can be solved using Devereux and Sutherland solution method. In fact,
we confirm the empirical evidence suggesting that emerging markets have less
diversified portfolios than advanced countries, and that they present more stable
home equity bias, 0.9 and 0.67, respectively.25 Although the aim of our paper is not
to obtain asset positions that match exactly these empirical findings, it does provide
some key insights in order to analyze the role of asymmetries in the degree of home
equity bias. Figure 1.6 provides the solution for home equity bias across di↵erent
values for the selected parameters and the standard deviations of the innovation of
the shocks in the emerging economy. There are three principal results. First, there
is positive relationship between price rigidities and home equity bias. This result
goes in line with the empirical evidence on emerging countries having higher home
equity bias and higher degree of nominal price rigidities (Gagnon, 2009). Second,
the more restricted the international goods preferences are, the higher the home
equity bias. In addition, these results suggest that home good bias and less elastic
demand for imported goods lead to a stronger home equity bias. Third, the home
24This feature is known in the literature as the equity home bias. Heathcote and Perri (2002),
Coeurdacier et al, Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) and Gourichas and Coeurdacier (2016) review
various explanations of this international macroeconomic puzzle that range from hedging motives
in frictionless financial markets to the role of transaction costs and informational asymmetries.
25Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)
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equity bias in the emerging economy remains fairly stable around 0.77, in all cases,
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Figure 1.6: Home equity bias in the emerging economy under alternative parameter calibration.
Overall e↵ect of asymmetries on portfolio allocation
Finally, once the e↵ect of each relevant asymmetry on the pattern of portfolio po-
sition has been examined, the focus now is on the overall e↵ect of all asymmetries
together in order to understand which asymmetries are the most powerful in ex-
plaining portfolio allocation. The choices of asymmetric parameter values are the
following: Calvo probability (⌘ = 0.72 and ⌘⇤ = 2/3), home good bias (↵ = 0.41 and
↵⇤ = 0.4), and household preferences over foreign goods (✓ = 1.55 and ✓⇤ = 1.5).
Let us pay particular attention to the more realistic case in which the emerging econ-





=1.1%). In this situation, the emerging economy buys home bonds to the
amount of 1.26 (over output) and sells advanced economy bonds to the amount of
0.95 (over output), which results in a positive net position in bonds of 30% of output
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(NBA = ↵B + ↵⇤B > 0). On the equity side, the emerging economy sells domestic
equity to the amount of 4.07 times output, and buys 3.77 times output in advanced
economy equity, which results in a negative net position in equity of 30% of output
(NEA = ↵E + ↵⇤E < 0). Under this scenario, two-way capital flows emerge. This
result goes in line with the empirical evidence showed in the introduction about
FDI-equity inflows from advanced to emerging economies surpass bond-inflows from
emerging economies to advanced economies (Rey, 2015).
1.6 Business cycle analysis with gross capital
flows
In this section, business cycle dynamics of the gross portfolio variables are studied
in the asymmetric calibration that simulates the interaction between emerging and
advanced countries.26 The aim of this section is to analyze the business cycle of two
asymmetric countries in which gross capital flows are endogenous and international
asset markets are incomplete. The dynamic behavior of gross portfolio variables is
related with their steady-state equilibrium position. Actually, both the size and the
sign of equilibrium portfolio choice play an important role in shaping gross portfolio
short-term dynamics. The  -vector describes the first-order movements (absolute
deviation with respect to their steady-state values) in the emerging economy holdings
following Devereux and Sutherland (2010),
↵̂a,t = ↵a,t   ↵̄a (1.6.1)
26The choices of asymmetric parameter values are the following: Calvo probability (⌘ = 0.72 and
⌘⇤ = 2/3), home good bias (↵ = 0.41 and ↵⇤ = 0.4), agent preferences (✓ = 1.55 and ✓⇤ = 1.5).






↵a,t  ↵̄a ⇡  1NFAt+ 2Ât+ 3Ĝt+ 4R̂t+ 5N̂Rt+ 6V̂t+ 7R̂P t+ 8 13⇥̄ (1.6.2)
where a-subscripts may refer to domestic equity, domestic bonds, foreign equity and
foreign bonds. ⇥̄ contains those purely predetermined variables with insignificant
e↵ects on gross asset dynamics. While the number of rows in the gamma vector
describes financial assets, the number of columns depends on the number of purely
predetermined variables. Conclusively, this section provides a comparison between
the financial integrated model and the financial autarky case. Furthermore, we
provide a description of the decomposition of portfolio flows into volume and prices
in the Appendix.
1.6.1 Impulse-response functions for portfolio variables
Figure 1.7 illustrates the impulse-response functions of portfolio-related variables
to a 1% standard deviation technology shock in the emerging economy. As produc-
tivity rises and marginal cost decreases in the emerging economy, optimizing firms
reset their prices to a lower level, and there is a real depreciation that boosts net
exports. The central bank reduces the policy rate in response to lower inflation.
Hence, the real interest rate falls, and consumption increases. Thus, firms produce
more in response to higher demand, and output increases. In this situation, the
realized return on the emerging economy bond increases less than that of the ad-
vanced economy, subplot (2), and the return on equity rises more relative to that
of the advanced economy, subplot (4). Nevertheless, the shock is persistent and the
realized returns are equalized after one period.
Emerging economy households experience an overall capital loss due to their
pre-existing bond position (i.e., long in domestic bonds and short in foreign bonds).
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Figure 1.7: Impulse-response function following a technology shock in the emerging economy.
Since both bond returns increase, agents face a rise in the value of home bond assets,
but also a rise in the value of their liabilities on foreign bonds, subplot (1). In this
case, the small capital gain on domestic bonds is out-weighted by the loss produced
in foreign bonds. At the same time, households also address a capital loss due to
their pre-existing equity position (i.e., short in domestic equity and long in foreign
equity). The increase in foreign equity assets value is out-weighted by the increase in
domestic equity liability value. Consequently, the change in NFA drops abruptly in
the first period, even-though net exports are positive, as it is shown in subplot (5),
which displays the main components of the NFA.27 This decrease in NFA is reflected
in large negative valuation e↵ects coming from pre-existing portfolio positions and
from the negative net income transfers. Households in the emerging economy adjust
on each portfolio position by increasing their position in those assets providing cap-
27Note that  NFAt   CAt = V ALt and CAt = NXt +NIRt (NetIncomeReceived)
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ital gains, such as local bonds and foreign equity, while decreasing their position in
those assets providing capital losses, such as foreign bonds and local equity, subplots
(1) and (3). Nevertheless, the emerging economy still pays higher dividends to the
advanced economy households, so than net income received is negative.
We conduct an exercise by comparing the symmetric and the asymmetric model
parameterizations to see the e↵ect of the most relevant asymmetries (Calvo proba-
bility and the Std(✏A)) in shaping business cycle dynamics of portfolio flows between
emerging and advanced economies. There are two interesting results when analyzing
the impulse-response functions following a technology shock in the emerging econ-
omy.28 First, households in the emerging economy would receive a higher capital
gain on their domestic bond position in those countries facing more nominal prices
rigidities (⌘ = 0.72 and ⌘⇤ = 2/3), just because they optimally chose a larger posi-
tive position (see Figure 1.6). Nonetheless, domestic bond returns are expected to
be smaller in the presence of higher nominal rigidities, which reduces the potential
gain. In general, it is shown that a higher degree of nominal rigidities increases port-
folio positions, and thus, capital flows are more dynamic. Second, results show that
in those cases in which the emerging economy faces a higher volatility on the tech-
nology shocks than the advanced economy, (Std(✏A) = 2% and Std(✏A⇤) = 0.09%),
capital flow dynamics are smoother than in the opposite case, in which the emerging
economy faces a lower volatility (Std(✏A) = 0.04% and Std(✏A⇤) = 0.09%). This is
mainly due to the fact that, when the volatility of the technology shock moves to
a higher level, the e↵ect on portfolio dynamics of model predetermined variables is
lower. Further, this results suggest that the higher volatility in emerging countries
business cycles may explain why they are less financially integrated. 29
28Quantitative results on the IRF-comparison between the symmetric and the asymmetric setting
are available upon request.
29Similar understanding can be used to analyze portfolio variables responses to the fiscal and
monetary shock under alternative calibration for the Calvo probability and the standard deviation
of the innovation of exogenous shocks in the emerging economy.
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Figure 1.8 describes the impulse-response functions following a 1% standard devia-
tion fiscal shock in the emerging economy. As government purchases increase in the
emerging economy, optimizing firms reset their prices to a higher level in respond
to a higher demand. There is a real appreciation in the emerging economy that
decreases domestic consumption and net exports. Because CPI inflation increases,
the central bank in the emerging economy sets nominal interest rate to a higher
level, making the return on the emerging economy bond fall less relative to that of
the advanced economy, subplot (2). Therefore, the realized return on both domestic
and foreign equity also fall.
Households in the emerging economy have a long position in domestic bonds and
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Figure 1.8: Impulse-response function following a fiscal shock in the emerging economy.
they lose value on these assets. Since they go short on foreign bonds they receive
a financial gain through the reduction of their liabilities which out-weights previous
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loss. Thereby, they receive an overall capital gain on their bond position. On the
equity side, the capital gain coming from their short domestic equity position is
almost entirely out-weighted by the capital loss coming from their long position in
foreign equity. Overall, emerging economy households experience a capital gain due
to their pre-existing portfolio choice which leads to an initial improvement in the
NFA position, subplot(8). Nonetheless, all financial asset returns are expected to
increase in the following period, which produces a small capital loss followed by an
overall capital gain, due to the adjustment of capital flows, subplots (1) and (3).
The responses of  NFA and the current account di↵er due to this valuation e↵ect
on the pre-existing portfolio, which it is shown to be positive. Optimal portfolio
choice helps to smooth down consumption, since the negative e↵ects produced after
a positive demand shock are balanced out with the positive valuation e↵ects coming
from their optimal position in foreign assets.
Next, we discuss the e↵ects of a monetary shock in the emerging economy. Fig-
ure 1.9 provides the impulse-response functions to a 1% standard deviation mone-
tary policy shock in the Taylor-type monetary policy rule of the central bank from
the emerging economy. Higher nominal interest rates push domestic households to
postpone their consumption since expected inflation responds slowly due to price
rigidities and the real interest rate goes up. The increase in the nominal interest
rates also appreciates the nominal currency in the emerging economy making goods
less competitive for the advanced economy, leading to a decrease in exports. There
are two opposing forces which a↵ect the foreign economy. The advanced economy
experiences an increase in its competitiveness relative to the emerging economy due
to the real appreciation of their currency, their overall consumption should increase
and so their demand for domestic goods. The decrease in aggregate consumption
in the emerging economy a↵ects the demand of foreign goods, which leads to a de-
crease in foreign output. Realized return on domestic bond increases, thus domestic
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Figure 1.9: Impulse-response function following a interest rate shock in the emerging economy.
agents asset holdings value increase, as reflected in subplots (1) and (2). Foreign
bond return drops in response to a decrease in the foreign CPI-level.
Households in the emerging economy holding negative pre-existing positions in
foreign bonds, experience a capital gain. Domestic agents face a reduction on their
foreign equity assets value, since its realized return drops. Again, emerging economy
households experience an increase on their domestic equity liabilities, due to their
short position. Despite the small capital gain on the bond equity side, these house-
holds experience an overall capital loss on their pre-existing equity position. The
drop in NFA is out-weighted by the positive e↵ects on their net income received from
the equity side. In this case, portfolio deteriorates even more the external position
after an interest rate shock in the emerging economy.
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1.6.2 A comparison to financial autarky
This subsection compares the portfolio choice model with the case of financial
autarky. The autarky case may be seen as the standard open economy model in
which households are allowed to trade internationally in domestic and foreign goods
markets, but international financial markets are closed and there are no possible
valuation e↵ects (see Eq. 1.3.28).30 It is clear to see how the external position
of a country may be under(over)-estimated in the standard open-economy model
in which the valuation channel is closed and NFA is determined only by current
account dynamics. Thus,  NFAt = NXt. In the portfolio model, valuation e↵ects
are a key component of NFA dynamics and they emerge when stock prices and
exchange rate fluctuate. Whether these e↵ects are positive or negative depends
on the gross external position in each financial asset, which has been calculated
in previous section. Furthermore, net dividends received are also part of the NFA
dynamics, and can be calculated in the portfolio model, so that  NFAt = NXt ±
NIR ± V ALt. Figure 1.10 presents the impulse-response functions for key open-
economy variables to a 1% standard deviation technology, fiscal and interest rate
shock in the emerging economy, respectively in each row.
First row analyses the case of a positive technology shock in the emerging economy.
Both models predict an increase in the emerging economy net exports due to the real
exchange depreciation. In the standard model, the change in NFA is directly linked
to the current account dynamics and it does not capture valuation e↵ects nor net
income received. Thus, it predicts an increase in the NFA as a response to a positive
innovation to the technology shock in the emerging economy. However, the portfolio
model shows that stock price fluctuations create a negative valuation e↵ect derived
30We use the asymmetric calibration for the emerging and the advanced economy described in
previous subsection. Results for the symmetric case-comparison are available upon request.
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Figure 1.10: Impulse-reponse functions for the emerging and advanced economies with either
international portfolio choice (P) or financial autarky (AU).
from the net external position in the emerging economy, which is positive in bonds
and negative in equity. Also, exchange rate fluctuation creates positive valuation
e↵ects (Column 4, Figure 10). In fact, the negative position in equity implies also
negative net income received, decreasing even more the NFA in the portfolio model.
In this way, the standard open-economy model overestimates the external position
of the emerging country in relation with the portfolio model which includes the
valuation channel. Moreover, in the opposite case in which the emerging economy
would have a negative net bond position and a positive net equity position, the
valuation e↵ect would be positive, and NFA would increase even more than in the
autarky model. Thus, it is key to take into account gross capital positions on each
48
asset since they determine whether a country gains or loses on its external position
with its main financial partners.
Second row analyses the case of a positive fiscal shock in the emerging economy.
Real exchange rate appreciation leads to a decrease in the emerging economy net
exports. Thus, the autarky model predicts negative NFA. However, the exchange
rate fluctuation creates a positive wealth transfer from the advanced economy to
the emerging economy due to their net external position on bonds and equity.
Moreover, net dividends received are positive. Dividends of the advanced economy
firms are larger than those of the emerging firms due to stock and goods price
di↵erentials. The emerging economy external position in equity is larger than that
of the advanced economy, so that that the dividends’ value received surpasses the
value paid to the advanced economy. Overall, the portfolio model shows positive
NFA suggesting that the autarky model under-estimates the external position in
the emerging economy.
Finally, the lower-panel analyzes the case of an interest rate shock in the emerg-
ing economy. Again, the di↵erence between the two models lies in the valuation
e↵ects derived from pre-existing portfolio holdings. Net exports decrease in both
models due to real exchange rate appreciation in the emerging economy. Equity
price di↵erentials create negative valuation e↵ects on the net equity position of the
emerging economy, making the NFA drop even more in the portfolio model than in
the autarky case. However, the portfolio model shows a faster NFA recovery due
to the positive net income received. While the instant negative e↵ect of an interest
rate shock in the NFA is worse in the portfolio model, it recovers faster than in the
autarky case.
We have shown how NFA dynamics di↵er from standard open-economy model pre-
dictions once we open up international financial markets and valuation channel starts
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operating. These results confirm the relevance and reinforce our motivation to study
gross capital flows instead of aggregate NFA in general equilibrium models when the
research focus is on international economic integration and open-economy issues.
1.7 Conclusions
The relevance of portfolio composition in terms of FDI and bonds is directly
related to the scale in gross capital flows because the di↵erent types of flows provide
heterogenous implications for macroeconomic and financial stability. This paper
shows that introducing endogenous portfolio choice in an otherwise standard model
is quite important since the external position of a country may be under(over)-
estimated in the standard open-economy model in which the NFA is determined
only by current account dynamics (net exports). Our model solves for gross asset
positions in FDI and bonds, and quantitatively measures the valuation e↵ects. In
fact, we show that valuation e↵ects are a key part of NFA dynamics, and emerge
when exchange rate and stock prices fluctuate ( NFAt = CAt ± V ALt). Further-
more, we deeply analyze the structural determinants of non-zero equity and bond
positions which ultimately determine the sign of valuation e↵ects. We show that
structural asymmetries in the nominal price rigidities and trade openness maybe a
potential explanation of the two-way capital flows pattern in emerging countries.
Moreover, we find that higher volatility in the innovations of the technological and
the interest rate shocks, and lower volatility in the innovation of fiscal shocks, also
creates positive net bond positions and negative equity position in the emerging
economy. The empirical application of this theoretical model is the next step in
our research agenda. In fact, Casares and Del Villar (2018) extend the benchmark
theoretical model by including nominal frictions in the wage adjustment processes
and consumption habits. Their focus is to study the NFA position between Canada
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and the US over the last few decades.
There are many venues to extend the baseline model and analyze other portfolio re-
lated issues. The increasing role for emerging economies in global financial markets,
suggests that emerging markets financial institutions should be prepared to compete
at the global level. Particularly, should emerging economies develop a better local
capital markets in order to absorb the expected increase in the demand for credit
access and the demand for a wider variety of financial assets?. In fact, there could
many implications for monetary policy and financial stability programs. The more
capital flows to emerging countries, the larger the spill-over e↵ects. Under this sce-
nario, there is a need to better understand the actual complexity of international
financial market transmission mechanisms and their implications on international
monetary coordination. Heterogeneity across households in their access to financial
assets is ignored through this paper and it could be an interesting path to follow in
order to analyze wealth and income e↵ects of financial integration across countries.
Furthermore, the analysis of global imbalances in an environment of endogenous
portfolio choice is also left out for future research.
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A. Description of model variables and parameters
Those variables in capital letters are measured in nominal terms while lower
case letters represent variables measured in consumption bundles.
Model variables
↵t vector of financial assets real holdings.
↵EH,t home agent domestic equity holdings, ↵⇤EH,t foreign agent holdings.
↵EF,t home agent foreign equity holdings, ↵⇤EF,t foreign agent holdings.
↵BH,t home agent domestic bond holdings , ↵⇤BH,t foreign agent holdings.
↵BF,t home agent foreign bond holdings , ↵⇤BF,t foreign agent holdings.
SH,t home agent domestic firm ownership, S⇤H,t foreign agent domestic firm owner-
ship.
SF,t home agent foreign firm ownership, S⇤F,t foreign agent foreign firm ownership.
BH,t home agent domestic bonds volume, B⇤H,t foreign agent domestic bonds volume.
BF,t home agent foreign bonds volume, B⇤F,t foreign agent foreign bonds volume.
rx,t vector of excess returns on financial assets.
rEH,t is the return on domestic equity in domestic consumption bundles.
rEF,t is the return on foreign equity in domestic consumption bundles.
rBH,t is the return on domestic bond in domestic consumption bundles.
rBF,t is the return on foreign bond in domestic consumption bundles.
NXt are net exports.
CAt is the current account.
V ALt are valuation e↵ects.
NFAt are net foreign assets.
Et is the nominal exchange rate.
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Qt is the real exchange rate.
it is the nominal interest rate and i⇤t the foreign country one.
rt is the real interest rate and r⇤t the foreign country one.
Yt is the aggregate output and Y ⇤t the foreign country one.
Ct is the aggregate consumption and C⇤t the foreign country one.
CH,t is the domestic consumption of domestically produced goods.
CF,t is the domestic consumption of foreign produced goods.
C⇤
H,t
is the foreign consumption of domestically produced goods.
C⇤
F,t
is the foreign consumption of foreign produced goods.
 t is the agent discount factor and  ⇤t the foreign country one.
⇥t is the firm discount factor and ⇥⇤t the foreign country one.
wt is the real wage and w⇤t the foreign country one.
Nt are labour hours and N⇤t the foreign country one.
Dt are dividends and D⇤t the foreign country one.
Vt is the value of domestic equity and V ⇤t the foreign country one.
mct is the marginal cost and mc⇤t the foreign country one.
Pt is the home CPI price level in domestic currency units.
PH,t is the home producer price level in domestic currency units.
P ⇤
H,t
is the home producer price level in foreign currency units.
P ⇤
t
is the foreign CPI price level in foreign currency units.
P ⇤
F,t
is the foreign producer price level in foreign currency units.
PF,t is the foreign producer price level in domestic currency units.
⇡t is the home CPI inflation level in domestic currency units.
⇡⇤
t
is the foreign CPI inflation level in foreign currency units.
⇡H,t is the producer price inflation level in domestic currency units.
⇡⇤
H,t
is the home producer price inflation level in foreign currency units.
⇡⇤
F,t
is the foreign producer price inflation level in foreign currency units.
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⇡F,t is the foreign producer price inflation level in domestic currency units.
¯PH,t(j) is the home optimal price level in domestic currency units.
⇢̃ is the optimal price and PPI price level ratio.
RPt are relative prices (
PH,t
Pt
) and RP ⇤
t








SSt is a price dispersion term and SS⇤t the foreign country one.
PDt is another price dispersion term and PD⇤t the foreign country one.
cgt is consumption growth.
cdt is consumption di↵erential.
"G fiscal shock, "⇤G foreign country one.
"A technology shock, "⇤A foreign country one.
"R interest rate shock,"⇤R foreign country one.
Model parameters
  Elasticity of marginal utility of consumption
  Frisch Labour supply elasticity.
  Labour supply function steady state parameter.
⌫ Discount factor steady state parameter.
✏ Elasticity between varieties within the same country.
↵ Share of domestic consumption to imported goods.
↵equity Steady state share of foreign firm ownership allocated to domestic agents.
✓ Elasticity of substitution between varieties produced at home and foreign.
⌘ Calvo probability of price stickiness.
µ⇡ Inflation weight Taylor Rule.
ḡ Public spending % over output in steady state.
⇢A Productivity shock persistance.
⇢G Government shock persistence.
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⇢R Monetary shock persistence.
✏r Monetary shock volatility.
✏A Productivity shock volatility.
✏G Government shock volatility.
B. The model equations
The model is a set of 48 equations providing solution paths for the do-
mestic and foreign variables. There are 20 domestic endogenous variables
rEH,t, rEB,t, it, Ct,  t,⇥t, wt, Nt, CH , CF , Dt, Vt,mct, ⇢̃, RPt, ⇡t, ⇡H,t, SSt, PDt, Yt and
foreign endogenous variables are completely analogous. There are 8 common
variables in both economies, dERt, Qt, NXt, CAt, NFAt, V ALt, cgt, cdt. Regarding
the exogenous variables; for each economy there are three AR(1) processes for
technology, government spending and monetary policy shocks.




































































The following [16] equations describe domestic economy, and the for-
eign economy is described with the corresponding analogous functions
[16x2]
Endogenous discount factor




⇥t = (1  ↵equity) t + ↵equity ⇤t (EQ12)






























































Yt(PDt) = exp(At)Nt (EQ19)
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The following [6] unique equations describe the Balance of Payments
( Foreign economy uses the same variables with opposite sign)
Budget constraint in terms of NFA
Ct + (ḡ)e


















CAt ⇡ wtNT   Ct   (ḡ)eGt +Dt + (rEH,t   1)NFAt 1 (EQ29)
Valuation e↵ects
V AL =  NFAt   CAt ⌘ (r0xt↵t 1) (EQ30)
where the vector of excess return is the following
rX,t ⌘ [rBH,t   rEH,t, rBF,t   rEH,t, rEF,t   rEH,t]





















The system of steady state functions that solves the following steady state vari-
ables mc, i, r,  ,⇥, Y, C, CH , CF , w,N, V,D,NX is the following. Note that the for-
eign country system of equations and variables is analogous. Assuming steady-state







i = 1    (SSB2)
Real interest rate
r = i (SSB3)
Parameter from endogenous discount factor
µ =   log( )
log(1 + C)
(SSB4)
Firm endogenous discount factor
⇥ = (1  ↵equity)  + ↵equity ⇤ (SSB5)
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Production function
Y = N ; (SSB6)
Goods market clearing
C = Y  NX   ḡY (SSB7)
Net exports
NX ⌘ 0 (SSB8)
Domestic consumption of domestically produced goods
CH = (1  ↵)C (SSB9)
Domestic consumption of foreign produced goods
CF = (↵)C (SSB10)
Real Wage
w = mc (SSB11)
Labour supply





Aggregated dividends domestic firms
D = Y   wN (SSB14)
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D. Decomposition of gross assets and liabilities movements
The introduction of endogenous portfolio choice not only permits a detailed
investigation about gross dynamics of each financial asset available (e.g., b↵EF,t,
b↵EH,t,b↵BH,t and b↵BF,t), but it also allows the decomposition of gross assets and lia-
bilities movements into price and volume movements. In order to do so, it is worth
to mention that up to a first-order Taylor approximation, the following relationships
hold
b↵EF,t = qEF,tSF ⇥ ˆqEF,t + ˆSF,t (1.7.1)
b↵EH,t = qEH,tSH ⇥ ˆqEH,t + ˆSH,t (1.7.2)
b↵BH,t = qBH,tbH ⇥ ˆqBH,t + ˆbH,t (1.7.3)








QtV ⇤t is the value of foreign equity, qEH,t =
PHt
Pt
Vt that of do-
mestic equity, qBH,t = (rt) 1 is the value of the domestic bonds and qBF,t = Qt(r⇤t )
 1
is the value of the foreign bonds. All values are measured in domestic consumption
bundles. SF,t describes the the foreign firm share allocated to domestic households,
and SH,t that of domestic firm ( i.e., 0 < St < 1). bH,t and bF,t describe holdings of
domestic and foreign bonds.Those variables denoted with a hat (e.g., X̂) describe
their first-order dynamics and those with an overline (e.g., X) represent their
steady-state values. Figure 1.11 shows the impulse-response functions for asset
prices and volume following a technology, government spending and interest rate
shock in the emerging economy. Foreign equity portfolio variation not only comes
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from the increase in foreign equity price but also on the adjustment through the
increase in foreign equity volume as shown in Plot 1 and 2. The impulse-response
functions to a government spending shock in the emerging economy are displayed in
subplot (2). The decrease in foreign equity asset not only comes from the reduction
on equity price but also from the drop in foreign equity volume, as it is shown in
Plot 3 and 4. Same logic applies to the interest rate shock.
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Foreign Equity flows Volume
Figure 1.11: Impulse-response functions for asset prices and volumes.
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Chapter 2
A portfolio-choice macro model to
analyze the recent gross capital
flows between Canada and the US
with Miguel Casares Polo
2.1 Introduction
During the last few decades, both gross capital and trade flows across countries
have reached unprecedented levels. Canada and the US are known to have the
world’s largest bilateral trade relationship.1 This link is generally characterized
by a high Canadian net trade surplus, which reached a peak value of 7.8 billions
of US dollars in 2008. After the 2008 financial crisis, trade surplus in Canada
has been gradually reduced and it has punctually become even negative in 2016.
1Policymakers of OCDE countries (especially, the US, the UK and EU countries) and emerging
countries (especially, China) are nowadays merged into controversial debates on the global econ-
omy’s uncertain trajectory, increasingly protectionist trade policies and a need for strengthened
global institutions. Thus, Canada and the US economies provide natural examples that are vital
to understand how economic integration thorough trade and foreign capital a↵ects macroeconomic
aggregates, financial stability and business cycle synchronization.
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Regarding financial transactions, Canadian overall Net Foreign Asset (NFA) position
has been traditionally negative until 2015, when it turned positive for the first time
in decades (see Figure 2.1). The evolution of Canadian NFA is vastly dominated
by the capital flows with the US because it accounts for the largest share in total
position. Moreover, the negative US position outweights all positive positions with
the rest of the world. As net exports have declined while the variations in NFA have
been typically positive, there have been significant valuation e↵ects on Canadian
assets and liabilities that explain the upwards trend in the NFA position of Canada
with the US.
Both net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Portfolio Equity (PE) account
for the largest shares in the contributions for Canadian NFA. Their overall sizes
have increased dramatically since 1990.2 We have built a quarterly time series that
results from adding up net FDI and net PE of Canada with respect to the US, which
it has shown an upwards trend to reached almost 1.25 times Canadian GDP in 2017
(see Figure 2.1). Meanwhile, the quarterly balance of Canadian net Portfolio Bonds
(PB) with the US has been always negative, since Canada bond liabilities are way
larger than Canada bond assets held in the US. Thus, the Canada-US foreign asset
relationships present a “reversed two-way” capital flows pattern. Generally, a “two-
way pattern” refers to the case in which emerging economies net bonds positions
are positive and their net equity positions are negative with respect to advanced
economies. After 2011, the gap between net equity and net bond position starts
increasing in Canada, as Figure 2.1 clearly shows. This means that US investors
buy equity from emerging countries while they sell US-equity to other advanced
countries, such as Canada. In addition, US investors sell domestic US-bonds to
2Canadian holdings of FDI and PE in US firms have increased from representing 50% and 20%
of Canadian GDP, respectively, in 1990 to almost 180% and 200%, respectively, in 2018.
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emerging countries while they buy bonds from other advanced countries, such as
Canada.3
With the motivation of studying these empirical findings, we propose a two-
economy optimizing model with endogenous gross trade and financial assets. The
model is going to be calibrated to reproduce fluctuations macroeconomic variables
from Canada and the US over the period between 1990 and 2018. Our approach
is based on the open-economy New Keynesian literature related to seminal papers
such as Smets and Wouters (2002) and Gaĺı and Monacelli (2005), and its extension
to incorporate endogenous portfolio choice initiated by Devereux and Sutherland
(2009, 2010 and 2011) and Tille et al. (2008 and 2010). In general, models that
incorporate portfolio choice into two-country general equilibrium frameworks, are
highly theoretical and small in size. Hence, they do not contain enough elements,
such as nominal and real frictions both at the local and at the international level,
to provide realistic business cycle fluctuations for macroeconomic variables that are
related in an open economy environment. Another important advantage of our
model is that variations in the NFA position are pinned down not only by current
account fluctuations but also due to valuation e↵ects, which we have found to be
key in explaining the increase in Canadian NFA.
Therefore, the first contribution of our paper on the modeling side is to introduce
a wide set of nominal and real frictions into a medium-scale fully-fledged two-country
New Keynesian model with endogenous gross trade and portfolio variables. This
paper builds on Del Villar (2018), who provides a two-country New Keynesian model
with portfolio choice of equity and bonds, nominal price rigidities following Calvo
(1983)’s fixed probabilities, home good bias, and incomplete financial markets to
study the factors behind heterogenous capital flows across emerging and advanced
countries. We extend her benchmark model by including nominal wage rigidities á
3We left out for future research the analysis of “reverse” international capital flows between US
and other advanced countries.
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Figure 2.1: Net Foreign Asset positions for Canada (1990-2018)
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la Calvo (1983), price and wages indexation rules, consumption habits on household
preferences, and additional exogenous processes to account for the business cycle
synchronization across Canada and the US.
The second contribution of our paper is to provide a quantitative analysis on the
overall model performance and on its ability to explain the highlighted empirical
facts for the recent evolution of the Canada NFA position. This paper is the first
that calibrates the parameters of the model with actual data from Canada and the
US. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed model performs reasonably well
in explaining business cycle statistical moments of Canada, the US and their degree
of cyclical synchronization.4 Besides, our model allows for valuation e↵ects channel
through portfolio choices that significantly a↵ect the dynamics of the NFA balances.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews selec-
tion of related literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the two-country New
Keynesian model describing the optimizing programs of domestic households and
firms. Section 4 brings the parameter calibration. Section 5 presents the business
cycle analysis of impulse response functions to evaluate the propagation channels of
the shocks of the model and their international e↵ects. Section 6 searches for the
determinants of the increase in the NFA position of Canada with the US and their
reversed two-way capital flows. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the main
results of the paper.
2.2 Selective literature review
Since the late 1990s, there have been additional elements included to the New
Keynesian model to introduce the behavior of the exchange rate and the interna-
4Schmitt-Grohé (1998) highlighted that the positive responses of Canadian output, employment,
investment, exports, imports and terms of trade to positive shocks in the US cannot be explained
using the standard international business cycle model.
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tional transmission of shocks in open economies. After the the seminal paper by
Obstfeld and Rogo↵ (1995), this framework coined the name New Open-Economy
Macroeconomics (NOEM). These models generally focus the attention on net for-
eign assets and current account dynamics and not on the gross asset flows.5 The
main extensions derived in the literature aim at characterizing the price of exported
and imported goods by implementing producer (or local) currency pricing, homoge-
nous pricing (or pricing to market) and sticky (or flexible) prices. Other extensions
focus the attention on the international risk sharing properties to discuss optimal
monetary policy and economic policy coordination. Nonetheless, there is a growing
empirical literature that studies the increasing significance of the valuation e↵ects
channel created by large and heterogenous gross capital flow movements across coun-
tries (Gourichas and Rey, 2007 and 2014). Still standard NOEM models abstract
from gross capital flows which ultimately help to understand NFA dynamics and
the international transmission of shocks through financial markets. There are just a
few general equilibrium models which incorporate endogenous portfolio choice in an
open economy framework because, until recently, there was no suitable computable
method to solve portfolio choice in the context of DSGE models. In this regard,
both Devereux and Sutherland (2008, 2010 and 2011), and Tille et al. (2008 and
2010) have developed novel methods to facilitate portfolio model solution within
general equilibrium frameworks.6
The bulk of research within the NOEM literature has been highly theoretical and
based on small-stylized models such as Ghironi (1999) or Justiniano and Preston
(2004). The small size of these models at the local and the international dimensions
of the economy, does not permit an empirical test of the main implications of these
5Other important contributions to the NOEM literature are Corsetti and Peseti (2001), Koll-
mann (2002) and Gaĺı and Monacelli (2005).
6See Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) for an extended literature revision on Open Economy Fi-
nancial Macroeconomics. Also, for portfolio choice studies see Engel and Matsumoto (2009), and
Coeurdacier et al. (2010 and 2013).
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models for a relatively wide range of macro-aggregates. Nowadays, many Central
Bankers in industrialized economies use extensions to the NOEM model that include
more realistic features to facilitate the empirical check, such as nominal rigidities,
capital accumulation with adjustment cost and traded and non-traded sectors, al-
though most of them still lack of endogenous portfolio choice.7 Given the empirical
evidence on the increasing size of international financial markets (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2008), it is quite important to incorporate not only trade but also gross
capital flows within the open-economy setting of our model.
Finally, our model is also fed with the vast literature on cross-country busi-
ness cycle synchronization. Generally, output and other macroeconomic variables
are found to be positively correlated across industrialized countries. Kose, Prasad,
and Terrones (2003) provided evidence that trade and financial market integration
increase the output correlation pattern across countries. Schmitt-Grohe (1998) sug-
gests that the majority of international real-business-cycle models cannot account
for the synchronized fluctuations observed in the data and international trade alone
does not explain the well-evidenced cross-country co-movements of the macroeco-
nomic variables at business cycle frequency. In particular, she highlights that the
positive responses of Canadian output, employment, investment, exports, imports
and terms of trade to positive shocks in the US cannot be explained using the stan-
dard international business cycle model. To overcome this di culty, our calibrated
model delivers a positive cross correlation (+0.56) between the quarterly growth of
GDP in the home (Canada) and foreign (US) economies. Miranda-Agrippino and
Rey (2015) find that US monetary policy is a main driver for global business cyles
and we replicate the same monetary policy rule for the US and Canada. Mumtaz
7Examples of two (or multi-country) models at monetary and financial institutions are Laxton
and Pesenti (GEM-Global Economy Model at the IMF, 2003), Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (SIGMA
at the Federal Reserve Board, 2003), Benigno and Thoenissen (Bank of England, 2003), Murchison,
Rennison and Zhu (Bank of Canada, 2004), Adolfson et al. (Riksbank, 2005), and Kortelainen
(Bank of Finland, 2002).
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et al. (2011) indicate that international co-movements within regions account for
most aggregate fluctuations, which justifies assuming simultaneous technology or
monetary shocks for both the US and Canada.
Our model addresses some of the limitations of previous theoretical and empirical
literature by providing a medium-scale fully-fledged open economy New Keynesian
model with endogenous gross trade and gross capital flows, to empirically analyze
Canada and US bilateral economic relationships during the last few decades.
2.3 Two-country New Keynesian model
The model incorporates two economies that are referred as either the home or
the foreign economy.8 Free international trading among them takes place in markets
for consumption goods and financial assets. There are domestic markets for labor
services. Financial assets are of two types: equity issued by either domestic or foreign
firms with a variable return determined by the dividend and bonds issued by either
the domestic or the foreign governments that yield a risk-free interest rate. There
is a flexible exchange rate toe equalize purchasing power and central banks operate
their monetary policy by implementing a Taylor (1993)-type monetary policy rule.
Both sticky prices and sticky wages introduce nominal rigidities to capture real
e↵ects of demand-side shocks.
2.3.1 Households
Let each economy contain a continuum of households indexed by j 2 [0, 1]. The
preferences of a representative infinitely-lived j household at time t are expressed
in an intertemporal utility function whose arguments are a consumption index ct(j)
8The foreign economy will not be explicitly displayed here because it is structurally identical
to the one presented in this section. See the Appendix for a complete description of all the model
variables, parameters and equations.
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and labour hours worked, nt(j). External consumption habits are determined by the
parameter 0 < h < 1 which measures the influence of lagged aggregate consumption,
ct 1, on smoothing household-level consumption. The instantaneous utility function
in period t takes the following form
U(ct(j), nt(j)) =
(ct(j)  hct 1)1  




where   > 0 is the risk aversion parameter,   > 0 is the inverse of Frisch labor
supply elasticity, and  > 0 is a scale parameter that weighs labor disutility with
respect to total utility.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003),  t is an endogenous discount factor
to ensure a stationary wealth distribution in the linearized approximated dynamic
model.9 In particular, the discount factor is a function of aggregate consumption
determined as follows
 t+1 =  t(1 + ct)
 & (2.3.2)
where & > 0 is a discount rate parameter. Due to identical preferences and symmetric
equilibrium, household-level and aggregate consumption are equal, ct(j) = ct. The
consumption bundle, ct(j), is represented by a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)’s consump-
tion index composed by baskets of home consumption goods, cH,t, i.e. produced by
home (H) firms, and foreign consumption goods, cF,t, i.e. produced by foreign (F )
firms and purchased (imported) by domestic households
ct ⌘
h










where ✓ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods from the viewpoint of a domestic household and 0 < ↵ < 1 is inversely related
9They propose five di↵erent ways to induce stationarity in an open economy model. We choose
the endogenous discount factor for simplicity.
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to the degree of home bias in preferences.10 For simplicity, we assume identical Dixit-

















with ✏ > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within
the same economy. The optimal choices of domestic and imported goods imply the
standard demand functions











where PH,t is the price for domestically produced goods expressed in domestic cur-
rency (Producer Pride Index, PPI) and PF,t is the price for foreign produced goods
expressed also in domestic currency. The consumption-based price aggregation that










and the rate of inflation from the CPI in period t therefore is ⇡CPI
t 1 = Pt/Pt 1   1.
The model allows for household heterogeneity on the labor services provided
to firms and sticky wages, following Erceg et al. (2000). Thus, the representative
j-type household faces the following Dixit-Stiglitz labour demand constraint that








10If price indices for domestic and foreign goods are equal (as assumed in the steady state
equilibrium), the model parameter ↵ corresponds to the share of domestic consumption allocated
to imported goods.
80
where Wt(j) is the nominal wage earned by the type of labor supplied by household
j, Wt and nt are the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate nominal wage and labor, respectively,
and ✓w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between di↵erentiated labor services.
Income is obtained from selling labour services in the market and from last-period
portfolio holdings payments. There is a lump-sum tax charged by the government
to the household. The uses of household income are purchases of consumption
goods, net purchases of equity shares from home and foreign incumbents, and net
purchases of domestic and foreign government bonds held during next period. The
budget constraint imposed in period t for a representative household expressed in
nominal terms





)SF,t 1 + BH,t 1 + etBF,t 1   Taxt =
Ptct + VtSH,t + etV
⇤
t
SF,t + (1 +Rt)




where Vt refers to domestic equity value, V ⇤t to foreign equity value, Dt and D
⇤
t
refer, respectively, to domestic and foreign firm dividends, SH,t refers to the share of
domestic equity held by domestic households and SF,t refers to that of foreign equity.
BH,t and BF,t are the amount of domestic and foreign government bonds purchased
by the domestic household in period t to be reimbursed in t+1. Rt refers to nominal
interest rate set by the central bank in the domestic economy, R⇤
t
that of the foreign
economy and et is the nominal exchange rate expressed in foreign currency. Using










)SF,t + BH,t + etBF,t   Taxt =
Ptct + VtSH,t+1 + etV
⇤
t
SF,t+1 + (1 +Rt)











and the aggregate real wage, wt =
Wt
Pt
, in the previous expression brings the budget






















































measured in terms of domestic bundles of consumption goods. Using the definition





, with the rational expectation
operator evaluated in period t, Et, and the Fisher relation that introduces the ex ante
real interest rate, 1 + rt =
1+Rt
Et(1+⇡CPIt+1 )
, for both the domestic and foreign economies,


































SF,t+1 + (1 + rt)
 1 BH,t+1
Pt+1







To simplify notation, we suggest taking variables on lower-case letters to refer to the
real value of those variables in upper case letters measured as units of the domestic
consumption bundle. For example, dt =
Dt
Pt
. Applying such notation rule through










)SF,t + bH,t + qtbF,t   taxt =
ct + vtSH,t+1 + qtv
⇤
t
SF,t+1 + (1 + rt)




The representative household will maximize intertemporal utility subject to budget
constraints as the one in period t, (2.3.9), and labor supply constraints as the one
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in period t, (2.3.6). Hence, the household will compute first order conditions to
determine the optimal choices of consumption, ct, the specific nominal wage, Wt(j),
the ownership shares of both domestic equity, SH,t+1, and foreign equity, SF,t+1, the
purchases of both domestic bonds, bH,t+1, and foreign bonds, bF,t+1.
Sticky wages are introduced also as in Erceg et al. (2000), assuming that there
is only a proportion 1  ⌘w of households who can set optimally the nominal wages
according to the Calvo (1983)-type fixed probability scheme. The remaining ⌘w
share of the households will have to follow a weighted-indexation rule on lagged CPI
inflation and steady-state CPI inflation. For an adjustment to take place in period
t, the indexation factor is
(1 + idxw
t
) = (1 + ⇡CPI
t 1 )
w(1 + ⇡ + "W
t
)1 w
which includes the weight parameter 0 < w < 1 and a wage-push AR(1) shock,
"W
t
= ⇢W "Wt 1 + u
W
t
with white-noise innovations uW
t
⇠ N(0,  uW ). The first order
condition on the optimal choice of the nominal wage brings a relative wage as a






























where ⇡w gives the quarterly rate of nominal wage inflation and both   and ⇠,
respectively, denote the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility
of labour for the households that can set the optimal wage in period t. From the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of nominal wages,
Wt =
h



















There is a continuum of producers of di↵erentiated consumption goods that
operate under monopolistic competition and seek to maximize their profits. They
are indexed in the unit interval, so as to have the representative i firm where i 2 [0, 1].
In this setup, there is no physical capital and the amount of output produce depends
on labor employed and a technology shock. Let us denote PH,t(i) as the price set by
the representative domestic (home) firm i in period t, and PH,t as the home producer





























It should be noticed that firm dividend is measured in real terms as bundles of
the consumption goods produced by all domestic firms. This is a di↵erent unit of
measure from the bundle of all consumption goods for domestic households (which
would also include imported goods produced by foreign firms). Therefore, it is con-
vinient to introduce the relative prices as the ratio of the price index of domestically
produced goods (Producer Price Index, PPI), denoted as PH,t, and price of bundles
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. The aggregation across the
continuum of firms and the relative price definition, (2.3.10), result in the following
























and incorporates an AR(1) productivity shock, "A
t






⇠ N(0,  uA). Using this production function and the Dixit-Stiglitz











































which can be plugged in (2.3.11) to reach the final expression for the aggregate div-














Each firm sets the price of a unique di↵erentiate good and earns some monopoly
profit. We include price stickiness following Calvo (1983)-type rigidity for price
adjustments. In this way, a fraction of (1  ⌘p) randomly selected firms set optimal
prices each period, with an individual firm’s probability of re-setting in any given
period being completely independent of the time elapsed since it last re-optimized
its price. For cases when the firm cannot setthe optimal price, the price indexation
factor takes this specific form
(1 + idxp
t+k) = (1 + ⇡
PPI
t+k 1)
p(1 + ⇡ + "P
t+k)
1 p
that combines adjustments to lagged producer price inflation, ⇡PPI
t
= PH,t/PH,t 1 
1, the steady-state price inflation, ⇡, and the AR(1) price-push shock, "pt = ⇢p"
p
t 1+
upt with white-noise innovations u
p
t ⇠ N(0,  up).
Assuming that the Calvo signal allows optimal pricing, the representative firm



































where ⇥t+k+1⇥t+k is the stochastic discount factor between period t + k and period t +
































11The domestic firm discount factor is not the household’s inter-temporal marginal rate of sub-
stitution since the firm is owned by domestic and foreign agents, thus a weighted combination of
the home and foreign discount factors is utilized as in Devereux and Sutherland (2010)
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◆ is the real






















Nominal interest rate (Rt) is determined through a reaction function describing
Taylor (1993)-type monetary policy decisions made by the the central bank
1+Rt =
⇣














where µ⇡ > 1 is the policy coe cient for responses to CPI inflation, µy > 0 is the pol-
icy coe cient for response to output growth, 0 < µR < 1 is the smoothing coe cient
for gradual adjustments of the nominal interest rate and there is also an AR(1) mon-
etary policy shock "R
t
= ⇢R"Rt 1 + u
R
t
with white-noise innovations uR
t
⇠ N(0,  uR).
The constant term serves to pin down the steady-state rate relationship between
nominal interest rate, real interest rate and inflation, 1 +R = (1 + r) (1 + ⇡).
A similar rule, with specific policy coe cients, is assumed for the monetary
policy of the foreign economy.
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2.3.4 Government
Finally, lump-sum transfers of the government are financed by selling bonds to
local and foreign households. In turn, the government budget constraint becomes
in aggregate output terms. Note that rt refers to real interest rate.










where public spending gt is exogenously determined. Particularly, deviations from












t with white-noise innovations u
g
t ⇠ N(0,  ug) and, following Smets and
Wouters (2007), a cross e↵ect coming from the innovations of the technology shock.12
2.3.5 Equilibrium conditions and the balance of payments
For a representative j good produced in the domestic economy, the market clear-
ing condition is
yt (i) = cH,t (i) + c
⇤
H,t
(i) + gt (i)
The optimal choices of the home di↵erentiated consumption good, decided by do-
















12A innovation to the technology shock would result in a higher autonomous spending through
either capital accumulation or net exports from the rest of the world excluding the foreign economy.
Both elements are ignored in the model setup and could be captured by the cross correlation
between technology innovations and variations in the exogenous component of aggregate spending.
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Meanwhile the government purchases the same amount of all domestically produced
goods. Implementing the aggregation across domestically-produced goods, we obtain
the aggregate goods market clearing condition






where cH,t corresponds to domestic demand for domestic goods and c⇤H,t foreign
demand for domestic goods (domestic exports), gt is the amount of government pur-
chases of domestic bundles, PDt is the price dispersion defined above, and PD⇤t is the




























refers to the foreign share of domestic equity, and S⇤
F,t
would refer









which combined with the production function, yt(i) = e"
A
t nt(i), and the Dixit-Stiglitz
demand constraint, yt(i) = (PH,t(i)/PH,t)















Finally, let us discuss the key ingredients of the balance of payments for the domestic
economy: the net exports from trading in the goods market and the net foreign
assets position from trading in the financial markets. Exports for domestic firms are
decided by foreign households. Recalling the choice of foreign goods, (2.3.4), and









where using the definition of the real exchange rate, qt = etP ⇤t /Pt, and relative









Imports are decided by domestic households as an inverse function of its relative
price, (see cF,t in (2.3.4)), which means





The trade balance of consumption goods determines net exports
NXt = ext   imt
For the trading of financial assets, we define the net foreign asset holdings in period
t from the joint contribution of equity and bonds,
NFAt ⌘ [↵EF,t + ↵BF,t   ↵⇤EH,t   ↵⇤BH,t]
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where ↵EF,t = qtv⇤tSF,t+1 is the foreign equity holdings of the domestic house-
holds (expressed in domestic bundles through the real exchange rate), ↵BF,t =
(1 + r⇤
t
) 1 qtbF,t+1 is the amount of foreign bond holdings of the domestic households
(also expressed in domestic bundles), ↵⇤
EH,t
= vtS⇤H,t+1 is the amount of domestic
equity purchased by foreign households and ↵⇤
BH,t
= (1 + rt)
 1 b⇤
H,t+1 is the amount
of domestic bonds owned by foreign households. The reference asset will be domes-
tic equity and the asset holdings of domestic households at the end of period t  1






















Moreover, the return di↵erentials with respect to domestic equity used to determine





















































which includes the di↵erential, with respect to the domestic equity return, of returns
from foreign equity (first row), domestic bonds (second row) and foreign bonds (third
row). As carefully proved in the technical appendix, we could combine the household
budget constraint, the government budget constraint, equilibrium conditions of the
asset markets and the definitions of rx,t 1 and ↵t 1 to obtain the following dynamic













dj + dt   gt   ct + r0x,t↵t 1
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Moreover, the valuation e↵ects can be defined from the return di↵erentials and the
gain in the market value of lagged NFA










in a way to extracted from the expression of NFA above to have the link between













NFAt 1   (gt + ct) + V ALt
The variation of NFA can be explained from two sources:












NFAt 1, and total domestic expenditures both from the public and the pri-
vate sectors, gt+ ct which in national accounting terms would proxy for net exports,
and
ii) the valuation e↵ects that results from changes in the value of net asset holdings
expressed in domestic currency.
The complete set of dynamic equations of the model and can be reviewed in
the technical appendix. The model can be solved numerically using the stoch simul
routine in Dynare. Even though the model is introduced in its original (non-linear)
form, the numerical methods taken for obtaining the solution form use first-order
approximations. The calibration of the model parameters is discussed next.
2.4 Calibration
The two-economy model is calibrated to represent Canada as the home economy
and the US as the foreign economy. One time period in the model corresponds to one
quarter, which is consistent with the short-run analysis of business cycle fluctuations.
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A symmetric calibration is initially assumed for both economies due to their high
degree of economic integration and the similarities in the institutional framework and
market regulation. Nevertheless, some of the parameters take country-specific values
in order to accommodate di↵erences in economic outcomes. The selection criteria
for the asymmetric parameter calibration is twofold. First, we calibrate a subset
of parameters to match long-run data properties individually observed in either
US or Canada data. Second, the parameters that shape the stochastic elements
of the model are specified at values that fairly replicate some of the business cycle
patterns documented from either the US or Canada. In particular, we will look at
second-moment statistics of real GDP growth, price inflation, wage inflation and the
nominal interest rate. The data considered correspond to quarterly observations for
the period 1990:1 to 2018:2, expressed in per capita terms of the population older
than 16 years and seasonally adjusted. The values for the baseline model calibration
are reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
The parameters that characterize household preferences have been set identi-
cally for both economies. Thus, we use the values of the elasticities on consumption
marginal utility,  , and hours marginal disutility,  , found for the US in the esti-
mated DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) for both the US and Canada.
Likewise, the consumption habits parameter, h, takes the value reported by Smets
and Wouters (2007). The weight of the hours disutility contribution to the overall
utility takes the value that results in a normalized labor n = 1 in the steady state
solution of the model for Canada.
The discount factor parameter & has a substantial impact on the steady-state
real interest rate, r. Thus, it also plays a crucial role on the steady state value of
firm equity (⌫ = d/r, where v is equity and d is firm dividend in steady state) and
the net foreign asset position. Since the historical average of net foreign assets of
Canada with respect to the US is negative, we have decided to calibrate & at di↵erent
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values for Canada and the US. Our target has been the average net foreign assets
over GDP for Canada in its trading with the US from 1990 to 2018. We make it
correspond to the steady-state ratio NFA/y in the model. After the calibration,
& = 0.0075 and &⇤ = 0.0059, the model delivers NFA/y =  0.65 close enough to the
mean value of -0.63 observed in the data displayed in Figure 2.1. The steady-state
real interest rate in the model is common for both economies at r = r⇤ = 0.0033, an
annualized rate of 1.32%.
Table 2.1. Parameter calibration. Non-stochastic elements.
Canada US
Elasticity of consumption marginal utility   = 1.39  ⇤ = 1.39
Consumption habits h = 0.71 h⇤ = 0.71
Elasticity of hours marginal disutility   = 1.92  ⇤ = 1.92
Weight of hours disutility  = 6.78  ⇤ = 6.78
Discount rate parameter & = 0.0075 &⇤ = 0.0059
Labor productivity A = 1.0 A⇤ = 1.26
Elasticity of substitution across domestic goods ✏ = 6.0 ✏⇤ = 6.0
Elasticity of substitution across labor services ✓w = 3.0 ✓⇤w = 3.0
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods ✓ = 1.5 ✓⇤ = 1.5
Home good bias ↵ = 0.36 ↵⇤ = 0.26




Calvo probability for price stickiness ⌘p = 2/3 ⌘⇤p = 0.85
Calvo probability for wage stickiness ⌘w = 0.75 ⌘⇤w = 0.5
Weight of price indexation on lagged inflation p = 0.2 ⇤p = 0.2
Weight of wage indexation on lagged inflation w = 0.2 ⇤w = 0.2
Inflation coe cient in monetary policy rule µ⇡ = 1.5 µ⇤⇡ = 1.5
Output coe cient in monetary policy rule µy = 0.5/4 µ⇤y = 0.5/4
Smoothing coe cient in monetary policy rule µR = 0.9 µ⇤R = 0.9
The production technology ignores capital accumulation and a linear function
relates employment to output produced. Since the average per capita real GDP has
been 18% higher in the US than Canada, we have decided to set labor productivity
A as a country-specific value that matches the average Canada/US ratio in the
steady-state solution of the model. Setting A = 1.0 and A⇤ = 1.26, the steady-state
solution of the model implies y/y⇤ = 0.85, which is precisely the inverse value of
1.18.
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The internal elasticities of substitution in the goods market (demand for con-
sumption goods, ✏) and in the labor market (supply for labor services, ✓w) are set
are standard values from the DSGE literature for both the US and Canada. Thus,
we fix ✏ = ✏⇤ = 6.0 to imply a 20% steady-state mark-up of prices over the marginal
cost, and ✓w = ✓⇤w = 3 to have a wedge between the real wage and the marginal rate
of substitution of 50%. It is known that the estimation of the intra-temporal elas-
ticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, ✓, is quite controversial
(Justiniano and Preston, 2004; Adolfson et al., 2004). Most of the existing theoret-
ical papers use a value of 1.5, as suggested by Backus et al. (1992). We follow this
criterion for both Canada and the US and give ✓ = ✓⇤ = 1.5.
The home goods bias parameter is set at ↵ = 0.36 in Canada and at a lower
value ↵⇤ = 0.26 in the US. It should be noticed that a lower ↵ implies a stronger
preference for domestic good relative to foreign goods. We have introduced this
asymmetry to render a positive net exports for Canada with the US. The data show
a mean value of Canadian net exports to the US equivalent to 3% of Canadian GDP
over the sample period 1990-2018. Our steady-state solution gives nx/y = 0.03.
The mean value of Canadian exports to the US and Canadian imports from the US
over Canadian GDP are also replicated in the steady state solution of the model
with ex/y = 0.22 and im/y = 0.19.
The steady state share of government expenditures over GDP is calibrated at
g/y = 0.41 in Canada and, slightly lower in the US, g⇤/y⇤ = 0.38. Our model
abstracts from capital accumulation and net exports with the rest of the world.
Thus, g/y and g⇤/y⇤ take higher value than the empirical average values for Canada
and the US, since the numerator captures all factors determining output that are
model-exogenous, including investment and net exports with the rest of the world.
The steady-state solution of the model brings c/y = 0.56 and c⇤/y⇤ = 0.65 which
provides a good matching to the actual ratios observed in Canada and the US, and
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brings a higher share over GDP in the US than in Canada (67% versus 56% on
average from 1990 to 2018).
The monetary policy parameters are set at identical values for the US and
Canada. Both the inflation and output coe cients are the ones recommended in
the original Taylor (1993) rule, µ⇡ = µ⇤⇡ = 1.5 and µy = µ
⇤
y
= 0.5/4, whereas the
smoothing parameter is at µR = µ⇤R = 0.9 to reproduce the long inertia and slow
adjustments of policy rates set by the Fed and the Bank of Canada. This assumes
a high degree of monetary coordination and it is consistent with the leading role
for monetary actions and global fluctuations that has been found empirically by
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015).
The remaining parameters have been calibrated looking at the characteristics of
the quarterly fluctuations observed in the data. In particular, we have paid attention
to the series of (per capita) real GDP growth, producer price inflation (from the
GDP implicit price deflator), nominal wage inflation and the nominal interest rates
displayed in Figure 2.2 and with second-moment statistics reported in Table 2.3.13
The numbers displayed in Table 2.3 indicate that price inflation is less volatile (lower
standard deviation) and more persistent (higher autocorrelation) in the US than in
Canada. Thus, we have assumed more price rigidities in the US and set a Calvo
probability for the foreign economy at ⌘⇤
p
= 0.85, whereas the domestic economy
(Canada) takes a substantial lower value ⌘p = 2/3. No autocorrelation is assumed
for the price-push shocks of both economies to keep the inflation autocorrelation
low. The lagged inflation component of the price indexation rule is fixed at a small
value for both economies p = ⇤p = 0.2 also to avoid excessive inflation inertia in
the model. On the comparison shown at Table 2.3, it can be observed that model
simulations provide a good fit of Canadian inflation volatility (standard deviation)
13The time series of the US nominal interest rate correspond to the shadow interest rate elabo-
rated by Wu and Xia (2016) to bring the e↵ects of unconventional monetary policy in the quarters
of the zero lower bound constraint. A detailed description of the time series taken from the data
is available in the technical appendix.
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but US inflation volatility is significantly lower in the data (both from PPI and CPI
inflation). Moreover, the model overestimates the inflation inertia, as it embeds a
price rigidity structure that inherently results in high autocorrelation for inflation.
Similar comments can be mentioned for the US inflation.
Regarding wage inflation, we introduce asymmetric behavior on wage setting.
The Calvo probability for wage stickiness is set at the standard value ⌘w = 0.75 in
Canada (average duration of wage contract at one year) and at a lower value in the
US, ⌘⇤
w
= 0.5 (average duration of wage contract at half a year). Such di↵erentiated
calibration is motivated by the empirical evidence reported in Table 2.3, where wage
inflation in Canada is less volatile (lower standard deviation) and more persistent
(higher coe cient of autocorrelation) than in the US.14 Wage indexation on lagged
inflation is weak both in Canada (w = 0.2) and in the US (⇤w = 0.2) to generate
low wage inflation inertia but still accommodate for the e↵ects of wage-push shocks
entering the wage indexation rule.
Figure 2.2: Quarterly macroeconomic fluctuations in Canada and the US, 1990-2018
14Our sticky-wage model cannot replicate the negative autocorrelation of US wage inflation,
which comes explained by the erratic fluctuations observed after 2008 (see Figure 2.3).
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Regarding the calibration of the generating processes for the exogenous variables
(see Table 2.2), the technology shock and the monetary policy shock are common for
both economies (global shocks). This helps to obtain a business cycle synchroniza-
tion and it gives a positive correlation between output growth of both the domestic
economy (Canada) and the foreign economy (US) in the model at 0.52, close to the
number found in the data, 0.56. The coe cient of autocorrelation of the technology
shock is the usual value, 0.95 and the autocorrelation of the monetary policy shock
is low at 0.35, close to the estimated number reported by Smets and Wouters (2007).
The standard deviation of the innovations to technology and monetary shocks are
decided to match the variability of output growth observed in the data and also
to obtain reasonable shares of the impact of these shocks on the long-run output
growth variance decomposition.15
Table 2.1: Parameter Values. Stochastic elements
Canada US
Technology shock, standard deviation of the innovation, %  uA = 0.89
Technology shock, coe cient of autocorrelation ⇢A = 0.95
Monetary policy shock, standard deviation of the innovation, %  uR = 0.17
Monetary policy shock, coe cient of autocorrelation ⇢R = 0.35
Public spending shock, standard deviation of the innovation, %  ug = 1.05  ⇤ug = 1.41
Public spending shock, coe cient of autocorrelation ⇢g = 0.9 ⇢⇤g = 0.9
Public spending shock, cross correlation with tech. innovations ⇢gA = 0.6 ⇢⇤gA = 0.6
Price-push shock, standard deviation of the innovation, %  up = 0.3  ⇤up = 0.09
Price-push shock, coe cient of autocorrelation ⇢p = 0.0 ⇢⇤p = 0.0




Wage-push shock, coe cient of autocorrelation ⇢W = 0.0 ⇢⇤W = 0.0
The public spending shock features long inertia for both Canada and the US
(coe cient of autocorrelation at 0.9 in both cases), and a higher volatility on the
15In the calibrated model, technology shocks explain 40% of output growth variability for Canada
and 14% for the US. Monetary policy shocks take a share of 23% of Canadian output growth
variance decomposition and 24% of that of the US output growth.
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innovations for the US in order to match the standard deviation of output growth
observed in the data. The price-push shocks have no serial correlation to prevent the
price inflation autocorrelation from rising. The standard deviation of the price-push
innovations are calibrated at the values that give a good fit to the price inflation
volatility observed in Canadian data. The standard deviation of US price shocks is
just 30% of that set for Canada in order to replicate the relative observed variability
of Canada and US inflation. As the wage-push shocks, they are not serially correlated
because of the lack of persistence of wage inflation in the data and the innovations
volatility is greater in the US also to approximately match the observed relative
standard deviations.
Table 2.2: US-Canada descriptive statistics and their model-based values with base-
line calibration
Canada US
Data Model Data Model
Second-moment statistics
Standard deviation of GDP rate of growth, % 0.68 0.67 0.60 0.59
Standard deviation of PPI inflation, % 0.74 0.61 0.22 0.53
Standard deviation of CPI inflation, % 0.64 0.56 0.62 0.54
Standard deviation of wage inflation, % 0.66 0.65 0.94 1.05
Standard deviation of the interest rate, % 0.94 0.30 0.69 0.31
Cross correlation across output growth 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.52
Cross correlation between PPI inflation and output growth 0.26 -0.41 -0.03 -0.06
Cross correlation between CPI inflation and output growth -0.26 -0.34 0.16 -0.11
Cross correlation between wage inflation and output growth -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.14
Cross correlation between the interest rate and output growth -0.24 -0.23 0.11 -0.16
Autocorrelation of output growth 0.56 0.33 0.40 0.14
Autocorrelation of PPI inflation 0.36 0.74 0.52 0.89
Autocorrelation of CPI inflation 0.25 0.79 0.20 0.87
Autocorrelation of wage inflation 0.19 0.35 -0.23 0.34
Autocorrelation of interest rates 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.89
Finally, let us discuss the calibration of the asset holdings that enter the NFA
equation to account for the valuation e↵ects. The standard solution method, based
on first-order approximations, cannot pin down a unique solution path for each port-
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folio asset holdings (e.g., ↵EH,t, ↵EF,t, ↵BH,t and ↵BF,t for the domestic economy).16
The focus of this paper is to understand the factors behind a large increase in the
Canadian NFA, given the specific position of Canada in each financial asset with
the US. In fact, in the data (taking the period 1990-2018), the average US bond
holdings owned by Canadian investors represent 17% of Canadian GDP, the average
Canadian bond holdings owned by US investors is 83% of Canadian GDP and US
equity holdings owned by Canadian investors account for 145% of Canadian GDP.
These facts are used to fix the values of asset holdings as the following proportions to
steady-state domestic output: ↵EF = 1.45yss, ↵BH =  0.83yss, and ↵BF = 0.17yss.
2.5 Impulse-response functions
Next, we are going to discuss the propagation channels from changes in the
exogenous variables to their e↵ects over the endogenous variables. The calibrated
model incorporates eight shocks and, due to space restrictions, we will analyze here
the dynamic e↵ects of five of them: a technology shock (Figure 2.3), a monetary
policy shock (Figure 2.4), a public spending shock (Figure 2.5), a price-push shock
(Figure 2.6), and a wage-push shock (Figure 2.7). In the case of the technology and
monetary shock, the exogenous variation would be simultaneously a↵ecting both
the home (Canada) and foreign (US) economies as examples of global shocks. The
other three cases (fiscal, price and wage shocks) represent innovations that initially
enter the home (Canada) economies. The specific shocks to the foreign economy
(US) are not discussed here but the e↵ects for the domestic economy (Canada) can
somehow be anticipated by the responses of the foreign economy to domestic shocks
in Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. Furthermore, the contribution of the non-displayed
shocks to the variance decomposition of Canadian variables is very small (lower
16See the Appendix for a more detailed explanation.
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than 5% for output growth, price inflation, wage inflation and the nominal interest
rate).
Figure 2.3: Impulse-response functions following a (global) technology shock
Figure 2.3 plots the responses to a one standard deviation technology shock,
which would increase labor productivity by 0.89% simultaneously in the home econ-
omy (Canada) and the foreign economy (US). The fraction of firms that receive the
Calvo signal to set the optimal prices will decide a lower price and they will observe
a higher demand for consumption goods. As more fractions adjust optimally the
price in Canada than in the US, the PPI inflation rate falls further in Canada. The
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rates of CPI inflation report more similar declines across the two economies because
they incorporate the prices of foreign goods (imports). The central banks will re-
duce the nominal interest rate in reaction to lower CPI inflation falls (and despite
the output growth). The real interest rate increases as the expected inflation slides
down below the steady state rate. Exports and imports increase for both economies
because international trading rises with higher household income and the taste for
both domestic and foreign goods. Canadian net exports turn positive: taking ad-
vantage of the real exchange rate depreciating due to lower inflation in Canada than
in the US. Wage inflation falls in both cases because of the decline in the marginal
rate of substitution between hours and consumption. The fraction of households
that can set their optimal wage will prefer a lower wage that increases their labor
supply. As there are more firms setting a lower wage in the US than Canada (lower
Calvo probability assumed in the calibration), wages fall more sharply in Canada.
In turn, the real wage will be higher in Canada than in the US, while firm dividends
will be higher in the US than in Canada.
The e↵ects of a global monetary policy shock are displayed in Figure 2.4. An
interest-rate shock that identically enters the monetary policy rule (2.3.15) for the
home economy (Canada) and the analogous rule for the foreign economy (US) can
represent the scenario of a higher cost of borrowing that emerged in the advance
economies during the financial crisis of 2008. The shock results in a an increase
of the nominal interest rate of 12.5 basis points (0.5% increase of the annualized
nominal interest rate). The real interest rate reports a larger increase (close to 30
basis points) due to the expected deflation that the contractionary shock generates.
As household demand for consumption goods falls, firms demand less labor and cut
production downwards. Thus, the real wage falls and the fraction of firms that can
optimize on price setting would decide to charge a lower price. Nominal interest
rates, consumption and real interest rates report similar responses for both Canada
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Figure 2.4: Impulse-response functions following a (global) interest rate shock
and the US. However, wage inflation and the real wage would have a more severe
adjustment downwards in the US than in Canada. With a lower Calvo probability
for wage rigidity, there will be a larger fraction of US households that would set
a lower wage as they wish to supply more labor in response to a decrease in the
marginal disutility from labor. The di↵erences in the response of wage inflation
makes the real wage fall significantly in the US whereas it barely moves down in
Canada. The dividends of US firms become higher taking advantage of the lower
cost of production, whereas Canadian firms see initially small profit reduction.
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Firms price inflation (PPI) report similar declining patterns in US and Canada,
with a more severe fall in the US due to the larger reduction in the marginal cost of
production (and despite having less firms adjusting prices optimally). In turn, CPI
inflation gets reduced slightly further in the US than in Canada. Regarding inter-
national trade, both Canadian exports and imports fall with the global recession.
Moreover, Canadian net exports are negative because exports fall deeper than the
reduction of imports. The reason for the negative current account e↵ect in Canada is
its real exchange rate appreciation (lower value) which comes along from the higher
relative CPI prices in Canada. As a consequence, the US takes advantage of the
external Canadian demand to reduce the negative impact of the monetary shock.
The recession is milder in the US than in Canada as it is showed in the comparison
of the output responses displayed in Figure 2.4.
The e↵ects of a country-specific public spending shock in Canada can be seen in
Figure 2.5. As the autonomous component of aggregate demand rises firms increase
their sales and demand more labor. The cost of production increases in Canada
and the fraction of firms that can set the optimal price will move it upwards. The
rate of PPI inflation rises. The increase of home prices make Canadian households
substitute domestic goods for US goods. Subsequently, the CPI inflation reports
an initial drop at the time of the shock that is quickly corrected with the e↵ect of
higher prices of domestic goods.
The public spending shock has crowding-out e↵ects on both domestic consump-
tion and net exports. As the real interest rate increases, consumption reports a fall
with a trough value observed five quarters after the shock of size equivalent to 1/6
of the impact on aggregate output. Meanwhile, the real exchange rate appreciates
and net exports are negative jointly caused by the fall in exports and the increase
of imports.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse-response functions following a Canadian spending shock
The e↵ects transmitted to the foreign (US) economy are mildly expansionary
through external demand. Canadian imports are US exports that increase the de-
mand for US goods. In turn, the responses observed in the US are higher output
produced by firms, some price and wage inflation, higher nominal and real inter-
est rates, and some crowding-out e↵ect on consumption. All the responses have a
significantly smaller size than the ones found for Canada.
Figure 2.6 provides the responses of a price-push shock that only hits the home
economy. The fraction of Canadian firms that cannot set the optimal price will
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Figure 2.6: Impulse-response functions following a Canadian price-push shock
charge a higher selling price as they apply the indexation rule. The e↵ects of the
inflation shock on aggregate output are of reversed sign between the home economy
(Canadian output falls) and the foreign economy (US output rises). As prices of
Canadian producers increase the two endogenous components of aggregate demand
(consumption and net exports) react with falls. The drop in domestic consump-
tion is due to the preference for future consumption (savings) as households see
the higher interest rates set by the central bank in reaction to the inflationary
episode. Meanwhile, the real exchange rate appreciates with higher producer prices
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in Canada than in the US and net exports move downwards. Since households of
both economies substitute between domestic and foreign goods, Canadian exports
fall and their imported goods from the US increase.
The e↵ect on wage inflation is very little. Following the impact of less labor
employed in their marginal disutility, Canadian households decide to set lower wages
while US households prefer higher wages. In both economies, the real wage falls
because of higher inflation, especially in Canada where the impact of the inflation
shock is primarily received. Firm dividends in Canada increase substantially because
of higher firm revenues (higher selling prices) and lower costs of production (lower
real wage).
Finally, the propagation of a Canada wage-push shock can be examined in Figure
2.7. Those Canadian households who cannot decide the optimal nominal wage adjust
it upwards in the implementation of the wage indexation rule. Wage inflation rises
and both the real wage and the cost of production move up. The pool of Canadian
firms that can revise the price optimally respond to the higher cost of production
charging higher prices. Producer inflation rises and the central bank announces a
higher nominal interest rate as prescribed by the Taylor (1993)-type rule (2.3.15).
The Canadian real wage goes up and firm dividends su↵er a significant decline as a
consequence of the larger cost of labor.
The real exchange rate appreciates due to the relative increase of Canadian
CPI, and consumers substitute Canadian goods for US goods. As exports fall and
imports rise, Canadian net exports move down and the aggregate demand drops.
Moreover, consumption of domestic goods describes a u-shape downwards pattern in
reaction to higher expected real interest rates (from the initial decline). The overall
e↵ect on output is also characterized by a u-shape plot. As for the foreign (US)
economy, there is some price inflation and output growth caused by the Canadian
wage shock. The boost of external demand (imports of Canadian households from
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Figure 2.7: Impulse-response functions following a Canadian wage-push shock
US firms increase) explains that US output rises. As for inflation, there is a pass-
through e↵ect from the price of Canadian imported goods to the US price index
(CPI). This e↵ect eventually rises the nominal and real interest rates, which bring
a fall of US consumption in a similar pattern to that of Canadian consumption.
2.6 The reversed two-way capital flows
This section takes the model to discuss the determinants, specifically, of the
recent evolution in the Net Foreign Asset (NFA) position of Canada with respect to
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the US. As documented above (see Figure 2.1), there have been “reversed two-way”
capital flows between Canada and the US from 2012 to 2018:
- FDI and the net Portfolio Equity position of Canada with respect of the US
describes an upwards trend that moves the initial -50% of GDP in 2012 to more
than 100% of GDP in 2018.
- The net Portfolio Bonds position remains on the negative sign and the unbal-
ance keeps growing over the 2012-2018 period to reach the size of Canadian GDP
Since the quantitative implications for NFA are larger in the upwards move of net
equity holdings than the downwards move of net bond holdings, the NFA position of
Canada with respect to the US switches from being markedly negative upwards to
close to the zero level. These capital flows took place along a significant reduction of
Canadian net exports with the US, which started after the financial crisis of 2008.17
Therefore, valuation e↵ects should explain the variations observed in the position of
the Canadian NFA with the US.
As the model cannot directly show fluctuations of gross capital flows due to the
identification issues on asset holdings, we will analyze the return di↵erentials for the
international multi-asset portfolio to discuss the determinants of the reversed two-
way phenomenon. Hence, let us introduce the e↵ective rates of return obtained in the
four assets available for the home/foreign households. These will be di↵erent from
the ex ante expected returns that show up in the first order conditions. Obviously,
the no arbitrage condition requires that ex ante all the returns get equalized in the
portfolio choice. The evolution ex post may determine strategic decisions on how
to reallocate asset holdings. Such e↵ective returns on Canadian bonds, US bonds,
Canadian equity and US equity (all of them expressed in terms of Canadian currency
17Between 1998 and 2007, Canadian net exports with the US represented on average 5.2% of
Canadian GDP. From 2008 to 2017, this number has fallen to 1.7%. In the second quarter of 2016,
there was even a current account deficit for Canada with the US equivalent to -0.28% of its GDP.
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The di↵erences between ex ante and ex post returns emerge from the wedge created
between expected inflation and actual inflation and from the evolution of the real
exchange rate that would imply some gains or losses when conducting international
transactions. Our conjecture to explain the portfolio asset substitutions that would
























NFAt 1  (gt + ct)+V ALt > 0
(2.6.2)
where the valuation e↵ects, V ALt, are determined by return di↵erentials and
gains/losses from the lagged NFA position



















each one of the eight shocks of the model, and Table 2.4a reports the values obtained
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in the responses of these returns. Meanwhile, the responses of both NFA and valua-
tion e↵ects for the home economy (Canada) had been plotted in the corresponding
last boxes of Figures 2.3 through 2.7 and numerically documented, for all shocks, in
Table 2.4b.18
The global technology shock brings an economic expansion and pushes up the
annualized returns on both equity (around 3.5%) and bonds (around 2.25%) above
the steady-state real rate of return (1.32%). The equity return rises because firm
dividends are boosted by a lower marginal cost of production. The real return
of bonds also rises in this case due to the household consumption smoothing that
increases saving through the demand for bonds. In the comparison across asset
types, Figure 2.8 displays and Table 2.4a reports that equity investments turn more
profitable than purchasing bonds both in the US and Canada. Such equity premium
is 1.06% in Canada and 1.34% in the US. The return di↵erentials across countries are
barely noticeable at first eyesight on Figure 2.8. As Table 2.4a documents, numbers
are small, slightly favorable to Canadian bonds (4 basis points) and US equity (23
basis points), but their order of magnitude would not probably justify the massive
capital flows observed in the data. The NFA position plotted in Figure 2.3 indicates
that there are initially net losses on Canadian asset holdings which are reversed
towards net gains five quarters after the shock and even move onto the positive
side from the tenth quarter after the shock onwards. Valuation e↵ects are positive
at the quarter of the shock because the bond returns fall below the equity return
and Canadian bonds are owned by US citizens. One quarter after the shock, the
valuation e↵ects turn negative because the return di↵erentials vanish and the market
value of Canadian foreign debt with the US rises. After four quarters, Canadian NFA
18It should be noticed that the valuation e↵ects are obtained in the calibrated model for fixed
asset holdings at ↵EF = 1.45y, ↵BH =  0.83y, and ↵BF = 0.17y, which implies a negative e↵ects
from the excess return of home (Canada) bonds. As Canadian bonds are owned by US households,
an increase in the interest rate of Canadian bonds would bring negative valuation e↵ects for the
Canadian NFA position.
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starts rising because valuation e↵ects disappear and there are positive net exports.
The response of Canadian NFA twelve quarters after the shock is positive (+0.067)
as Table 2.4b reports.
Hence, it could be argued that a positive global shock brings the conditions for
two-reversed capital flows with two limitations: the return di↵erentials are quanti-
tatively small and the positive response of NFA is found with lag of approximately
2.5 years.
Figure 2.8: Responses of the rates of return, annualized
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As displayed in Figure 2.8, the global monetary (interest-rate) shock, that si-
multaneously occurs in Canada and the US, has a positive impact on the return of
bonds and a severe and negative e↵ect on the equity return. Both firm dividends and
equity value fall as interest rates increase. The rates of return are similar for Canada
and the US with little di↵erences in bond premia (see Table 4a). The interest rate
of the Canadian bond rises to 1.81% but falls 9.8 basis points below that of the US
bond. Equity returns turn clearly negative in both economies (near -6%), and the
fall of Canadian equity is 34 basis points deeper than US equity. The equity return
di↵erentials may explain the Canadian purchases of US equity observed in the data,
but the US purchases of Canadian bonds is not supported by the return di↵erential
favorable to the US bond. Thus, we cannot conclude that a global monetary shock
explains the reversed two way capital flows observed from 2012 to 2018.
The valuation e↵ects after a global interest-rate shock are displayed in Figure
2.4 and reported in Table 2.4b. The immediate e↵ect is positive because the market
value of the existing debt with the US falls (and despite the higher cost of the interest
service of Canadian debt owned by US households). One quarter after the shock
NFA begins to fall substantially and continuously over the next fifteen quarters
of so. The reasons for this net borrowing to the US is the trade deficit (negative
Canadian net exports) and the negative valuation e↵ects caused by the recovery of
the market value of US debt. Twelve quarters after the shock, the Canadian NFA
position accumulates a decline of -1.15% units relative to the steady-state level of
output.
A specific public spending shock in Canada results in a interest rate spread for
the Canadian bond respect to the US bond (see Figure 2.8). In annualized percent




is close to 0.42%. This might explain net purchases of
Canadian bonds out of sales of US bonds. This is one way of the capital flows
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Table 2.3: Responses of asset returns to shocks,
Table 2.4a. Responses of asset returns to shocks,
Canada US Di↵erentials















Canada/US tech. shock 2.283 3.345 2.242 3.578 0.041 0.233
Canada/US mon. shock 1.810 -5.973 1.908 -5.629 -0.098 0.344
Canada fiscal shock 1.420 0.954 1.004 0.902 0.416 -0.052
US fiscal shock 1.103 0.891 1.583 0.878 -0.480 -0.013
Canada price shock 0.920 0.951 0.941 0.912 -0.021 -0.039
US price shock 1.250 1.228 1.236 1.262 0.014 0.032
Canada wage shock 0.921 0.795 1.058 0.832 -0.137 0.037
US wage shock 1.282 1.187 1.227 1.079 0.055 -0.108
Table 2.4: Responses of Canadian NFA to shocks,
Table 2.4b. Responses of Canadian NFA to shocks, % of output
Quarter of the shock 4 quarters after the shock 12 quarters after the shock
Canada/US tech. shock 0.099 -0.138 0.067
Canada/US monetary shock 0.107 -0.601 -1.148
Canada fiscal shock -0.048 -0.128 -0.201
US fiscal shock 0.014 0.013 0.004
Canada price shock -0.034 -0.106 -0.105
US price shock 0.019 0.011 0.003
Canada wage shock -0.000 0.001 -0.118
US wage shock -0.043 -0.012 -0.034
documented in this paper. The other way –net purchases of US equity– cannot be
anticipated by the return di↵erential of this Canadian public spending shock. Equity
returns fall both in Canada and in the US, with a little gap favorable to Canadian
equity (3.9 basis points). The extra payo↵s of Canadian bond returns to US owners
explains the valuation e↵ects that make Canada NFA move downwards at the time of
the shock. In the following quarters, the Canadian net borrowing position continues
because of its current account deficit with the US. The persistence of such negative
next exports accumulates an overall negative e↵ect of -0.2% of steady-state output
twelve quarters after the shock.
If the public spending (fiscal) shock takes place in the US economy, the results
bring return di↵erentials favorable to the US bond and the Canadian equity (see
Table 2.4a). Therefore, if the shock took a negative realization (fiscal contraction),
the return di↵erentials would satisfy (2.6.1) for the empirical test of the Canada/US
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capital flows. As displayed in Figure 8, the gap between bond returns is significant
(0.48%), but the distance between equity return is tiny (as Table 2.4a informs it is
just 1.3 basis points). So, although we could argue that (2.6.1) holds for a US fiscal
contraction the Canada/US equity flows that generates would not be large because
of the small return di↵erential. The response of the Canadian NFA is quantitatively
small (see numbers in Table 2.4b) and of positive sign due to the lending capacity
that emerges from the increase of Canadian net exports with the US. Thus, in
the case of a US fiscal contraction shock the Canada NFA position would take the
opposite downwards direction which cannot meet the movement observed during the
reversed two-way capital flows, implied by (2.6.2).
An inflation shock introduced in the price indexation scheme of Canadian firms
reduces the rates of return of the four available assets. As Figure 2.8 shows and
Table 2.4a informs, there is a simultaneous cut of about 0.4% in the return of bonds
and equity, both from Canada and the US. In Canada, there is a little domestic
equity premium over the domestic bond, whereas the opposite occurs in the US.
Anyway, the shock does not provide significant interest rate di↵erentials neither
across assets nor across economies. It could be mentioned that Canadian equity
yields a lower return than US equity as firms from Canada su↵er the adverse e↵ects
of the shock originated in Canada more than US firms. Meanwhile, the Canadian
bond provides 2 basis points of higher return than the US bond. If the shock
were deflationary (negative realization), the simulated return di↵erentials would
satisfy (2.6.1). When we re-examine the response of Canada NFA position (Figure
2.6), the negative net exports motivate a fall over four quarters after the shock
(valuation e↵ects are small in this case). Accordingly, if the shock were deflationary
on Canadian goods, the current account would register positive values and the NFA
position had increased. We could, thus, argue that a deflationary price push-shock
in Canada could explain the reversed two-way capital flows. However, there are
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two limitations to this argument. First, the quantitative e↵ects found, in terms of
either return di↵erentials or NFA variations, are small. And secondly, actual data
on Canada and US producer price inflation between 2012 and 2018 do not show any
signal of price shocks in Canada relative to the US (see Figure 2.2 for the plots of
the inflation rates and Table 2.5 for their average values).
If the price-push shock hits the US economy, the four asset returns also drop, but
they do it at a lower extent to what they did after a Canada price shock because the
size of shock is smaller.19 The e↵ects are symmetrically reversed from the Canadian
price-push shock. Hence, the return di↵erentials are favorable to Canadian bonds
and US equity (see Table 2.4a). But these numbers are really little. 1.4 basis points
and 3.2 points, respectively, which does not justify the massive capital flows found in
the data. Besides, we have already mentioned that the rates of inflation in Canada
and the US have not been significantly di↵erent over the period. The Canadian
NFA improves due to its increase in net exports and the lack of significant valuation
e↵ects. Numbers reported in Table 4b are again very small and there should be
a huge US price-push shock (e.g., 100 times its calibrated standard deviation) to
explain an increase in NFA of similar size to the one observed in the data.
Moving to wage-push shocks, Figure 2.8 shows a more apparent di↵erentiation
of asset returns. As expected, a wage-push shock reduces the rates of return on
all the assets. The e↵ects are larger after a Canadian wage-push shock because
of the higher wage stickiness calibrated for the Canadian (home) economy. As
documented in Table 2.4a, equity returns fall deeper than bond returns and home
assets report a larger e↵ect than foreign assets. Regarding the return di↵erentials








> 0 after a
Canada wage-push shock and switched signs after a US wage-push shock. Therefore,
19It may be recalled that the shocks have a size equivalent to one calibrated standard deviation
and the baseline calibration assumes that the price-push shock is less volatile in the US than in
Canada to be consistent with the empirical evidence on their relative inflation volatility.
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neither shock satisfies (2.6.1). The e↵ects of wage-push shocks on the Canadian
NFA position are rather small (see last two rows of Table 2.4b). Figure 2.7 plots the
response of Canadian NFA to a Canada wage-push shock. The fall in net exports
brings borrowing needs and explains a decreasing pattern in the NFA position of
Canada with the US. Valuation e↵ects are little. When the wage-push shock hits the
(foreign) US economy, the Canadian net exports rise but there are some negative
valuation e↵ects that dominate. Canada NFA slides downwards to the negative
values reported in Table 2.4b. The negative valuation e↵ects come from the extra
interest-rate payments of Canadian bonds owned by US households and also in the
lower return of US equity held by Canadian households (see last row of Table 2.4a).
Summarizing, we can say that only price-push shocks can be explanatory factors
to the reversed two-way capital flows between the US and Canada that characterized
the rise of the Canada NFA position with the US from 2012 to 2018. All the
remaining shocks fail to jointly satisfy (2.6.1) and (2.6.2). A combination of shocks
may still explain the reversed two-way capital flows. Thus, we twist our strategy to
define the sources of exogenous variability from a prospective look at the data. The
type and size of the shocks are going to be specified from the economic facts that
characterized the US and Canada in the period between 2012 and 2018. This opens
the next subsection.
Replicating the scenario of 2012
The price-push shocks emerge as the candidates to explain the excess returns
and NFA sign observed in the US/Canada capital flows. Are they found in the
data? Looking at Figure 2.2, no substantial change is found in the fluctuations of
either US or Canada producer price inflation. Table 2.5 reports the average values
and, again, numbers are quite homogeneous across samples. Both US and Canada
had some disinflation in the 2012-2018 period compared to the full sample, but the
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Table 2.5: Mean values of selected variables (quarterly, percentage)
Table 2.5. Mean values of selected variables (quarterly,percentage)
Canada US Di↵erence
Full sample, 1990-2018
Output growth 0.30 0.32 -0.02
Price inflation (PPI) 0.49 0.50 -0.01
Wage inflation 0.72 0.82 -0.10
Nominal interest rate 0.88 0.68 0.20
Subsample of increasing Canadian NFA, 2012-2018
Output growth 0.37 0.25 0.12
Price inflation (PPI) 0.36 0.40 -0.04
Wage inflation 0.63 0.53 0.10
Nominal interest rate 0.19 -0.29 -0.48
extent of the disinflation is similar and the di↵erence between Canada and US price
inflation remains small. Since individual shocks cannot account for the stylized facts
that characterize Canada/US capital flows after 2012 (because of either theoretical
or empirical flaws), we have reviewed the circumstances of that time and built a
combination of shocks that may represent the state of the economies at that time:
i) A positive global technology shock: both economies experienced an increase in
total factor productivity in the years after the financial crisis (which might have been
the consequence of a creative destruction that results from the process of business
churning). Cao and Kozicki (2015) from the Bank of Canada and Fernald (2014)
from the Federal Reserve of San Francisco obtain estimates of increasing total factor
productivity after 2009 for, respectively, Canada and the US. A positive technology
shock on both economies of size equivalent to one calibrated standard deviation
(0.89%) is set to capture the global increase in total factor productivity.
ii) Looking at the time series of the nominal interest rate (Figure 2.1), the subpe-
riod of the sample that runs from 2012 to 2018 coincides with massive balance sheet
purchases of the Fed, commonly referred as the Quantitative Easing (QE) poli-
cies.20 Actually, the third round of Quantitative Easing (QE3) was implemented
20The Wu and Xia (2013)’s shadow policy rate capture the impact of asset purchases on the
nominal interest rate below the zero lower bound. It allows for the negative US nominal interest
rates displayed in Figure 2.2.
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during the sample period of upwards trend in the NFA position of Canada with
the US.21 Meanwhile, the Bank of Canada also increased significantly the size of its
balance sheet, with the o cial policy rate at an annualized 1%. We replicate these
monetary expansions with a negative shock entering the Taylor-type policy rule of
value equivalent to one calibrated standard deviation for the US and half of it for
Canada.
iii) Adverse (negative) wage-push shock in the US: the rates of growth of nominal
wages in the US are, on average, lower after 2012 than in the years before and
they also come smaller than the ones observed in Canada. Figure 2 shows two
observations after 2012 with clearly negative values for US wage inflation (one of
them at -2.30% quarterly). Table 5 reports a swap in the average wage inflation
di↵erence from -0.10% in the full sample (favorable to the US) to +0.10% in the
period 2012-2018 (favorable to Canada). Average wage inflation falls in almost 20
basis points in the period 2012-2018 in comparison to the complete period. These
are indications for the existence of an adverse wage push shock in the US. Hence,
we introduce a single negative wage-push shock for the US equivalent to 3 times its
calibrated standard deviation.
iv) The US government ran a fiscal consolidation program in response to the
dramatic increase in public debt after the financial crisis (fiscal cli↵). Thus, public
deficit over GDP got reduced from -6.7% in 2012 to -2.4% in 2016. We introduce
an adverse fiscal shock for the US of size equivalent to two calibrated standard
deviations.
Arguably, the combination of shocks i) to iv) could have been designed in a more
rigorous way. Moreover, there could have been other sources of fluctuations (e.g.,
external demand shocks or risk premium shocks) that have a significant influence
on Canada/US macroeconomic fluctuations. We have taken the list i) to iv) based
21The period of purchases under Q3 is typically considered from September of 2012 to October
of 2014. In December of 2015, the Fed decided to raise the o cial interest rate since 2006.
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on some empirical grounds and our own retrospective intuition about the facts that
took place during the Great Recession.
Figure 2.9 plots the impulse-response functions following a simultaneous combi-
nation of the four shocks defined above. Let us describe what we see and discuss
why we see it. Both economies report a fall in output produced at the time of the
combined shocks, but it quickly goes up to the positive size. In the US, the economic
expansion peaks four quarters after the shocks when output is almost 1% higher than
its steady-state level. In Canada, the e↵ects are much smaller. Such di↵erence is due
to the origin of the shocks: the fiscal (contractionary) shock only takes place in the
US economy, the (QE) monetary shock in the US is twice the size of it in Canada,
and the wage-push shock only enters the US wage indexation norm. The nominal
interest rate moves down from the QE shocks, with a higher cut implemented by
the Fed compared to the Bank of Canada. Wage inflation and the real wage fall
by around 2% in the US (the wage-push shock cuts nominal wages down) whereas
Canadian wages barely change. The lower cost of labor in the US has a significant
implication for the comparison of firm dividends. Although both Canadian and US
firms take advantage of lower interest rates and increasing sales, the US dividend
displays a much higher increase than the Canadian one (14% versus 4%) because
the US real wage drops significantly while the Canadian one reports a moderate
increase. The combined shocks result in a real exchange rate appreciation and a
trade deficit for Canada, where imports rise up to 1.5% while exports falls around
0.5%. As Figure 2.9 also shows, the NFA position of Canada rises persistently due
to the valuation e↵ects (and despite the negative net exports). The positive valua-
tion e↵ects come from two main sources: the Canadian ownership of US equity that
yields a higher return and the reduction in the interest rate payments of Canadian
bonds to US households. These valuation e↵ects determine the upwards trend in
the Canadian NFA position with the US.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse-response functions following a combination of shocks describing
the 2012 scenario for Canada and the US
Table 2.6a provides the asset returns. The combined shocks reduces the US bond
interest rate to a negative value, -0.27%, while the Canadian real interest rate rises
to almost 3%. Hence, the bond return di↵erential is 3.26%. Most of this spread is
due to the impact of unanticipated inflation, which lowers significantly the ex post
real interest rate of the US bond (and it is not captured in the ex ante real interest
rates plotted in Figure 9). This spread can motivate sales of US bonds to purchase
Canadian bonds as actually occurred in the period of the quantitative expansion in
the US (Canada bond outflows to the US). Regarding equity returns, the combined
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shocks bring a positive impact on firm profitability both in the US and Canada.
Both equity returns rise to rates around 8%. The spread in equity returns is small
(0.24%) and favorable to the US. Meanwhile, firm dividends rise significantly more
in the US than Canada (see Figure 2.9). The equity gain is higher for US firms,
because they take advantage of the lower cost of labor that comes with the negative
wage-push shock. Such dividend gap can also explain the purchases of US equity by
Canadian investors (US equity inflows to Canada).
Table 2.6a. Asset returns following shocks in the 2012-18 scenario
Canada US Di↵erentials















Four shocks 2.993 7.928 -0.267 8.168 3.260 0.240
eliminating technology shock 2.529 7.321 -0.720 7.493 3.249 0.172
eliminating QE shocks 2.161 2.871 2.218 3.527 -0.057 0.657
eliminating US wage-push shock 2.761 7.158 -0.807 6.868 3.568 -0.290
eliminating US fiscal shock 2.859 7.766 -0.160 7.946 3.019 0.180
Table 2.6: Responses of Canadian NFA following shocks in the 2012-18 scenario,
percentage of output
Table 2.6b. Responses of Canadian NFA following shocks in the 2012-18 scenario, % of output
Quarter of the shock 4 quarters after the shock 12 quarters after the shock
Four shocks -0.005 0.352 0.870
eliminating technology shock -0.043 0.274 0.743
eliminating QE shocks 0.224 0.137 0.278
eliminating US wage-push shock -0.182 0.328 0.749
eliminating US fiscal shock -0.015 0.317 0.841
As for the Canadian NFA position with the US, Table 2.6b reports a initial tiny
drop followed by a persistent and substantial increase that becomes 0.87% of output
twelve quarters after the shock. Since net exports are negative, the positive variation
of NFA must be accounted for gains in the value of existing assets. The relative
position of bonds and equity determines this positive valuation e↵ects: Canadian
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households own US equity and the Canadian government is being financed by US
households. Since equity returns are higher than bond returns, the valuation e↵ects
have been positive for Canada. Therefore, the combined shocks described above
can explain: i) Canadian capital outflows to purchase US equity, ii) US capital
inflows to buy Canadian bonds and iii) a persistent increase in the NFA position of
Canada with the US. These e↵ects correspond to the stylized facts that describe the
Canada/US capital flows from 2012 to 2018 and jointly satisfy (2.6.1) and (2.6.2).
Finally, let us carry out some robustness checks to distinguish which individual
shocks play a major role in the reversed two-way capital flows. Tables 2.6a and
2.6b collect, respectively, the return di↵erentials and the NFA variations when one
of the contributing shocks is eliminated. The absence of a technology shock would
reduce the returns of all assets and also the spreads would be smaller, but the
conditions stated in (2.6.1) are met. The response of NFA without the technology
shock is qualitatively similar but also small. Hence, the combined shocks without
the technology shock still can explain the reversed two-way capital flows at a smaller
magnitude. If the monetary shocks are eliminated the picture changes dramatically.









and equity returns would be much lower. These changes would reduce significantly
the valuation e↵ects and the NFA position of Canada with the US would only rise
by 0.28% after twelve periods. Hence, monetary shocks are necessary to explain the
reversed two-way capital flows as they play a major role to explain US purchases
of Canadian bonds and a significant increase in the Canada NFA position. The
adverse US wage-push shocks turns also a necessary contributor. If the negative US





. The valuation e↵ects and the variation of the NFA would also be significantly
diminished. Without the contractionary US fiscal shock, the signs of the return
di↵erentials (2.6.1) are satisfied and the evolution of the NFA position is similar to
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the all-shock case. The absence of the US fiscal contraction just reduces, in a minor
way, the quantitative implications of the shocks.
In summary, monetary (QE) shocks and adverse wage-push shocks in the US are
the major contributors to the model-based explanation of the capital flows and the
NFA position of Canada with the US.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper comes motivated by some interesting empirical facts observed in the
asset trading between Canada and the US. There is a reversed two-way capital flows
that characterize the evolution of net foreign assets positions between these two
countries from 2012 to the present time. The US is a net creditor for Canadian
risk-free bonds while Canada has increased significantly the purchases of US equity.
We have built a two-economy structural model with international portfolio choice
and nominal rigidities. The model introduces both sticky prices and sticky wages for
the real e↵ects of monetary and demand shocks. In addition the role of international
trading is crucial for aggregate fluctuations through the impact of net exports on
the determination of the aggregate demand. The portfolio choice setup describes
the household decision of international purchases and sales of bonds and equity. The
general equilibrium model brings a dynamic equation that determines the evolution
of the Net Foreign Asset position across the two economies where valuation e↵ects
matter.
The calibration of the model has initially assumed a symmetric institutional
framework and similar preferences and technology for households and firms. Then,
some asymmetric patterns were introduces to replicate long-run properties and busi-
ness cycle patterns observed empirically in the relationships between Canada and
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the US. The paper finds a reasonably good fit between the model and actual data,
both in terms of long-run ratios and second-moment statistics.
The analysis of impulse-response functions has included both global and country-
specific shocks. A global technology shock turns more expansionary to Canada than
to the US due to its lower inflation and a positive trade balance for Canadian
goods. Likewise, a global monetary (interest-rate) shock brings a larger and more
persistent recession in Canada than in the US due to its higher wage rigidities and
the reduction of Canadian net exports. We have also discussed the implication
of country-specific shocks. A positive shock on government spending results in a
exchange rate appreciation that increases the external demand and aggregate output
of the foreign economy. Either price-push or wage-push shocks originate changes in
relative prices and a substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Aggregate
output falls in the economy hit by the inflationary shock whereas the other economy
observes higher external demand and output produced.
The variability of asset returns has been examined following either global or
individual shocks. The only exogenous perturbation that can explain both the
increase in the NFA position of Canada with the US and the two-way reversed capital
flows is a producer price shock (either a negative shock on Canadian inflation or a
positive shock on US inflation). However, there is no apparent evidence of actual
price inflation shocks in the corresponding period from 2012 to 2018.
So, we have design a combination of shocks that may describe some of the stylized
facts of the 2012-2018 period: a positive global technology shock that raises total
factor productivity after the financial crisis, monetary shocks that capture the QE
stimulus, a contractionary fiscal shock that reflects the US fiscal cli↵ and a negative
shock on US wage inflation consistent with the lower relative wages observed in the
data. It turns out that the e↵ective real interest rate of US bonds turns negative and
creates a substantial spread between the returns of the Canadian bond and the US
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bond. Moreover, equity value rises in the US more than in Canada. These responses
are a correct characterization of the two-way reversed capital flows between the US
and Canada documented after 2012. Furthermore, the model simulation indicates
that the NFA position of Canada with the US rises steadily in the quarters after
the US monetary expansion. Both the monetary shock and the adverse US wage
inflation shock are crucial to key ingredients the two-way reversed capital flows.
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Appendix (for online publication)
I. A detailed description of the equations of the model
The model comprises a set of behavioral equations providing solution paths for
the 58 endogenous variables. Each economy is described with 26 endogenous
variables which for the domestic economy would be ct, cH,t, cF,t,  t+1/ t, nt,
fWt(j), wt, ⇡wt , AW,t, BW,t, gPH,t(j), AP,t, BP,t, ⇡PPIt , ⇡CPIt , RPt, ⇥t+1/⇥t, dt,
vt, mct, PDt, PDDt, PD⇤t , yt, Rt, and rt. Foreign endogenous variables are
completely analogous. There are 6 variables that simultaneously relate or af-
fect to both economies, et, qt, NXt, NFAt, WDt and V ALt. Finally, there
are 8 exogenous variables: 3 country-specific AR(1) processes to autonomous
(government) spending, price and wage indexation rules, along with 2 global
(common) shocks to technology and monetary policy.
The following 26 equations describe only the home economy (foreign-economy
equations are totally analogous):

























= (1 + ct)
 &
Domestic consumption of domestically produced goods
cH,t = (1  ↵)RP ✓t ct
Domestic consumption of foreign produced goods (imports)





Plugging the optimal allocation of both domestic and foreign consump-
tion, cH,t and cF,t, in the aggregate consumption definition, ct ⌘
h









, it is obtained
1 = (1  ↵) (RPt)1 ✓ + ↵ (RP ⇤t qt)
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Relationship between CPI-inflation, ⇡CPI
t


































with these price dispersion measures




























Resources constraint equilibrium condition





















Monetary policy rule a la Taylor (1993)
1+Rt =
⇣






















Uncover interest rate parity condition









































































↵t 1 is defined as a function of asset holdings and return di↵erentials.
II. Derivation of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) dynamic equa-
tion
Let us introduce the variable ↵ for asset holdings where the time subscript
is identified with two letters: either E or B refers to equity and bond assets
respectively, while either H or F refers to origin (issuing) from either the home










)SF,t + bH,t + qtbF,t   taxt =
ct + vtSH,t+1 + qtv
⇤
t
SF,t+1 + (1 + rt)












(1 + r⇤t )
(A2)
↵EH,t ⌘ vtSH,t+1 (A3)
↵EF,t ⌘ qtv⇤tSF,t+1 (A4)
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Meanwhile, the definition of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) implies
NFAt = [↵EF,t + ↵BF,t   ↵⇤EH,t   ↵⇤BH,t] (A5)





, are expressed in terms of the domestic bundle of consumption goods
↵⇤
EH,t









The financial market clearing conditions are, for the equity markets,
SH,t+1 + S
⇤
H,t+1 = SF,t+1 + S
⇤
F,t+1 = 1 (A6)
whereas for the government bond markets
bH,t+1 + b
⇤
H,t+1 = bF,t+1 + b
⇤
F,t+1 = 0 (A7)

















and inserting both (A8) and (A9) in (A5) gives
NFAt = [↵EF,t + ↵BF,t   vt + ↵EH,t + ↵BH,t]
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or, alternatively
NFAt + vt = ↵EF,t + ↵BF,t + ↵EH,t + ↵BH,t (A10)
Next, let us define the returns in domestic consumption bundles
1 + rBH,t ⌘ 1 + rt (A11)
1 + rBF,t ⌘ 1 + r⇤t (A12)















Both the definitions of the holdings, (A1)-(A4), and the returns, (A11)-(A14),
can be combined to find the following key relationships for terms that belong
to the left hand side of the household budget constraint
↵BH,t 1 (1 + rBH,t 1) = bH,t (A16)




↵EH,t 1 (1 + rEH,t 1) = (dt + vt)SH,t (A18)
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↵BF,t 1 (1 + rBF,t 1)  taxt = ct + ↵EH,t + ↵EF,t + ↵BH,t + ↵BF,t,
(A20)

















(1 + rBF,t 1)  1
◆
↵BF,t 1   taxt = ct +NFAt + vt, (A21)
or, alternatively




















Without a loss of generalization, we take the return of domestic equity,
rEH,t 1, as the reference one and both add it and subtract it, multiplied by
(↵EH,t 1 + ↵EF,t 1 + ↵BH,t 1 + ↵BF,t 1), in the previous expression to obtain
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(1 + rBF,t 1)  1
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↵BF,t 1
Using the lagged expression from (A10), and cancelling terms on ↵EH,t 1rEH,t 1,
and grouping terms on ↵EF,t 1, ↵BH,t 1, and ↵BF,t 1, we reach
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x,t 1↵t 1 in the (A22) and connecting terms on both NFAt 1 and
vt 1 yield








































wtnt + dt   ct   taxt + r0x,t 1↵t 1
(A24)
The government budget constraint is









where inserting the bonds market-clearing conditions, bH,t+1 =  b⇤H,t+1 and
bH,t =  b⇤H,t, we have
gt = taxt (A25)
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wtnt + dt   ct   gt + r0x,t 1↵t 1
(A26)














Let us find the change in net foreign assets, 4NFAt = NFAt   NFAt 1,





























Valuation e↵ects, V ALt, correspond to the sum of the return di↵erentials and
the gains in value of previous NFA holdings










which comprises the excess returns that domestic households get of foreign
equity holdings, domestic bond holdings and foreign bond holdings, (adjusted
with real exchange rate variations). Having valuation e↵ects recognized, the

















Data series are retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
main source is OCDE ”Main Economic Indicators - complete database”. Oth-
erwise it is stated.
Y is real GDP obtained as the ratio between the Current Price Gross Do-
mestic Product (Series ID: CANGDPNQDSMEI) and the GDP implicit price
deflator with base year in 2010 (Code CANGDPDEFQISMEI). Original se-
ries presented at annual rates are transformed into quarterly rates. Presented
in per capita terms using Pop is working age population, Aged 15-64, (Series
ID: LFWA64TTCAM647S). Quarters from 1990-1995 are missing from original
source, and they are computed using the linear trend.
W are monthly earnings in manufacturing. Data are presented at monthly rates
and transform into quarterly rate. (Series ID: LCEAMN01CAM189S).
R is the Interest Rates, Government Securities, Treasury Bills. Original data
are presented in percent per annum, monthly and not seasonally adjusted, and
transform into percent per quarter.
⇡ is the quarterly rate of producer price inflation measured as the rate of growth
of the GDP implicit price deflator (P ).
G are governments final consumption expenditures. (Series ID: CANGFCE-
QDSMEI).
NT , EXP and IMP are net exports, exports and imports of goods and services.
Data are taken from Statistics Canada: Table CANSIM 380-0070). Ratio over
Canadian GDP.
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IMP (US) are in theory equal to EXP (CA) see United States data for source.
This data series is converted into Canadian dollars by using the Canadian Nom-
inal Exchange Rate with the United States. We compute NX(US) using these
two variables.
NFA refers to International investment position in Canada in market values,
expressed in quarterly millions of Canadian dollars. We compute Canadian
NFA for the US and for the rest of the world. NFA data are provided by
assets-liabilities basis, and we make use of its main components: Foreign Di-
rect Investment, Portfolio equity and Portfolio Debt. Data series comes from
STACAN Table: 36-10-0485-01 (formerly CANSIM 376-0142).
US
Data series are retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
main source is U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Otherwise it is stated.
Y ⇤ is the real gross domestic product (Series ID GDPC1). These data series are
computed in per capita terms using working age population: Monthly Ratio of
Civilian Labor Force (in thousands of persons 16 years of age and older (Series
ID CLF16OV)) and civilian labor force participation rate in percentage (Se-
ries ID CIVPARTT, it comes from the ’Current Population Survey (Household
Survey))
W ⇤ are Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employ-
ees for Total Private in Dollars per Hour. (Series ID AHETPI. The series
comes from the Current Employment Statistics (Establishment Survey)). Also,
we have computed Median usual weekly real earnings for those employed full
time. Workers 16 years and over. 1982-84 CPI Adjusted Dollars. ( Series ID
LES1252881600Q)
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⇡⇤ is the quarterly rate of producer price inflation measured as the rate of
growth of the GDP implicit price deflator (P ⇤), Series ID: GDPDEF.
G⇤ are Government total expenditures. (Series ID, W068RCQ027SBEA).
R⇤ is the Wu-Xia Shadow Federal Funds Rate obtained as described in Wu and
Xia (2016). Unlike the observed short-term interest rate, the shadow rate is not
bounded below by 0 percent.
NX⇤, EXT ⇤, and IMP ⇤ are US total net exports, exports and imports of goods
and services. (Series ID NETEXP, EXPGS and IMPGS)
EXP (CA) are monthly US Exports of Goods by free Along side Ship Basis to
Canada (Not Seasonally Adjusted in millions of US dollars, Series ID EXPCA).
This data series is converted to quarterly basis to be consistent with the model.
IMP (CA) are monthly US Imports of Goods by Customs Basis from Canada
(Not Seasonally Adjusted in millions of US dollars, Series ID IMPCA).
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IV. The dynamics for portfolio holdings for valuation ef-
fects
We have endogenously incorporated the portfolio choice for asset holdings. A
first step in the process would be to recall the home economy budget constraint




































Following Devereux and Sutherland (2009,2011) we need to solve a first order
Taylor-approximation of our model, so that the term r0




in which the bar refers to steady state value and the hat to first order deviation
with respect to the value in the steady state solution. Since there is no risk
in steady state, the di↵erential in the rates of return are 0, that is r̄x = 0.
Thus, the second term disappears r̄x0 ˆ↵t 1. Then, up to first order, the only way
portfolio holdings a↵ect the overall performance of the model is through its
steady state value in the first term, ↵̄. Moreover, the solution for the steady state
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portfolio holding vector, can take any value because there is no unique solution
for this term in the steady state. Since there is no risk in equilibrium, any
asset allocation would be valid. Furthermore, since we are empirically testing
our theoretical model to the case of Canada and the US, we already have the
values for the ↵̄-vector from the historical rations observed in the data. Those







with Roberto Ezcurra Orayen
3.1 Introduction
Although globalization is by no means a new phenomenon, during the last few
decades its importance has reached unprecedented levels. This explains why
the consequences of globalization have attracted so much attention in recent
years (Rodrik, 2011; Stiglitz, 2018). While economic integration is considered
to improve aggregate economic growth both at the world and at national level
(Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004; Dreher, 2006), the focus
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of the current debate is on the distributional e↵ects of globalization. In order
to shed light on this point, numerous studies have examined the impact of
economic integration on interpersonal inequality (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2004;
Wade, 2004; Milanovic, 2005; Dreher and Gaston, 2008). Less is known about
how globalization a↵ects spatial inequality, defined as income inequality across
regions within a country. Nevertheless, this issue is potentially relevant, as it
is likely that globalization will shape the spatial distribution of income within
countries, leading to the emergence of winning and losing regions.
Most existing empirical analyses on the connection between globalization and
spatial inequality are based on single-country case studies (e.g. Zhang and
Zhang, 2003; Chiquiar, 2005; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Rivas, 2007), which has
probably to do with the scarcity of regional comparable data across countries.
However, there are also several contributions that consider the spatial impact
of globalization in various countries. The vast majority of these cross-country
studies investigate the relationship between globalization and spatial inequality
using measures of the degree of trade openness (Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2012; Ezcurra
and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2014; Hirte et al., 2017) or FDI (Lessmann, 2013). From
a policy perspective, the link between these variables and spatial inequality
is clearly important, as it provides information on the role that these dimen-
sions of economic integration play in this context. Nevertheless, the degree of
trade openness or the amount of FDI do not allow one to capture the spatial
impact of other aspects of economic integration such as the extent of capital
controls or changes in portfolio investment. Accordingly, the e↵ect of the degree
of economic integration observed in earlier contributions may be a↵ected by the
omission from the analysis of these other components of economic globalization.
Bearing this in mind, and in a quest for empirically well-founded stylized facts,
the present paper aims to provide a comprehensive study of the relationship
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between economic globalization and spatial inequality. To that end, we adopt
a broader perspective than in previous analyses on this topic and examine in
a systematic way the consequences that actual economic flows and existing
restrictions have on spatial inequality.
To the best of our knowledge, only Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013) have
thus far considered the multidimensional nature of the process of economic
globalization in this context. Using data for 47 countries, these authors find
a positive association between an aggregate index capturing di↵erent aspects
of economic globalization and spatial inequality. This result is potentially im-
portant. Nevertheless, Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013) do not adequately
address the possible endogeneity of globalization, which is particularly impor-
tant to establish a causal link between the degree of integration with the rest of
the world and spatial inequality. In the present paper we employ two strategies
to tackle this issue. The first strategy is to include in the analysis country fixed
e↵ects in order to control for those time-invariant factors a↵ecting both spatial
inequality and globalization, such as geographical features. This is the first im-
portant di↵erence between our paper and Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013).
While fixed e↵ects estimation is useful in removing the influence of long-run
determinants of both spatial inequality and globalization, it does not necessar-
ily estimate the causal e↵ect of the degree of integration with the rest of the
world on spatial inequality. For this motive, unlike Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose
(2013), our second strategy to address potential endogeneity problems is to use
an instrumental variables approach. To this end, we construct an instrument
for economic globalization based on the degree of integration in neighbouring
countries.
Furthermore, the 47 countries considered by Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013)
are mainly middle- and high-income countries, which means that their study
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does not take into account the impact of globalization on low-income countries.
In order to dismiss the possibility that the results of the analysis could be af-
fected by selection bias, in this paper we use a new dataset on spatial inequality
recently constructed by Lessmann and Seidel (2017) and based on the informa-
tion provided by satellite images of nigh-time luminosity. The employment of
this novel dataset allows us to examine the connection between regional income
disparities and economic globalization in a sample of 142 countries over the
period 1992-2012.
Our results reveal a strong causal e↵ect of the degree of economic integration
with the rest of the world on spatial inequality, indicating that the advances
in the process of globalization currently underway contribute to significantly
increasing regional income disparities. This confirms that globalization leads
to the emergence of losing and winning regions within countries, and that the
group of losing (winning) regions tends to be made up of low-(high-)income
regions. This finding has to do with the regressive spatial impact of actual
economic flows, while existing restrictions on trade and capital do not exert
a significant e↵ect in this context. Our findings are robust to the inclusion
in the analysis of di↵erent covariates that may be correlated with both spatial
inequality and globalization, and are not driven by a specific group of influential
countries. Likewise, the observed relationship between economic integration
and spatial inequality does not depend on the measures used to quantify the
magnitude of regional income disparities within the various countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction,
section 2 provides the theoretical framework on the link between economic
globalization and spatial inequality. Section 3 presents the measures used to
quantify the incidence of economic integration and spatial inequality in the
sample countries. In section 4 we describe the results of the empirical analysis.
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The robustness of our findings is checked in section 5. Section 6 o↵ers the main
conclusions from the paper.
3.2 Theoretical framework
There is a vast literature devoted to examining from a theoretical perspective
what happens within countries when trade barriers are removed between coun-
tries. Most of this literature focusses on the impact of international trade on the
reallocation of resources and production factors across industries and on the dis-
tribution of firm types within countries (Brülhart, 2011). Nevertheless, the last
three decades have seen the appearance of numerous theoretical contributions
that seek to shed light on what occurs with the spatial distribution of economic
activity within countries when trade with the rest of the world becomes less
costly. This increasing interest on the spatial dimension of trade liberalization
is closely related to the development of the so-called “new economic geography”
(NEG). Previously, only the neoclassical urban systems models had attempted
to incorporate into international trade theory the within-country spatial di-
mension (e.g. Henderson, 1982; Rauch, 1991). The urban systems models are
based on the assumption of perfectly competitive markets with exogenous scale
economies at the regional level, but in these contributions the changing in-
ternal geographies are not related to any welfare-relevant dimension of spatial
inequality (Brülhart, 2011; Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2013). Unlike the ur-
ban systems models, the NEG school allows for monopolistically competitive
markets and endogenous regional scale economies. Within this framework, the
NEG conceptualizes the e↵ect of economic integration on the spatial distribu-
tion of income in terms of changes in cross-border access to markets that a↵ect
the interactions between agglomeration and dispersion forces, which ultimately
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contributes to determining the dynamics of the location of economic activity
across the di↵erent regions within a country.
Nevertheless, the numerous NEG studies published since the appearance of the
seminal paper by Krugman (1991) often provide contradictory and ambiguous
conclusions regarding the impact of trade liberalization on spatial inequality
(Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2012). Depending on the assumptions adopted on the disper-
sion forces, international trade can either increase or decrease regional income
disparities. For example, Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) propose a model
where trade liberalization, with unchanged internal transport costs, leads to
regional convergence due to the existence of urban congestion costs. The same
conclusion is obtained by Behrens et al. (2007) using the model of monopolis-
tic competition developed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) in which the increasing
intensity of local competition acts as a dispersion force. However, other pa-
pers closer to the original Krugman (1991) model such as Monfort and Nicolini
(2000) or Paluzie (2001) achieve the opposite result. In these studies the dis-
persion force generated by the immobility of some workers (“farmers”) across
regions ultimately implies that trade openness favours spatial divergence. In
turn, Fujita et al. (1999, chap. 18) find that trade liberalization gives rise to
the spatial concentration of individual sectors in a model assuming the exis-
tence of sector-level agglomeration forces but no sector-level dispersion forces.
In fact, the uncertainty on the impact of international trade on spatial inequal-
ity remains in those papers that consider an heterogeneous intra-national space
in which some places o↵er cheaper access to foreign markets than others (e.g.
Alonso Villar, 1999; Brülhart et al., 2004) or have better factor endowments
(e.g. Haaparanta, 1998).
So far we have focussed on the spatial implications of trade liberalization. Nev-
ertheless, as pointed out in the introduction, the degree of trade openness is not
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the only dimension of economic globalization relevant for spatial inequality. In
particular, international capital flows may also a↵ect the spatial distribution of
income across the regions within a country. In fact, the standard neoclassical
theory predicts that capital should flow to poorer regions where the marginal
return of the investment is higher. According to this argument, international
capital flows may contribute to reducing regional income disparities. In practice,
however, there are numerous examples showing that international capital flows
tend to benefit mainly the most prosperous regions, which often have better
institutions and better access to foreign markets (e.g. Zhang and Zhang, 2003;
Nunnenkamp and Stracke, 2008; Wei et al., 2009). Therefore, it is di cult to
determine a priori the impact of international capital flows on regional income
disparities.
The previous discussion reveals that the theoretical literature does not provide
a conclusive result on the spatial implications of economic globalization. As
shown above, this is a complex relationship and attempting to explain how
economic integration a↵ects the spatial distribution of economic activity within
countries implies to take into account multiple factors and mechanisms that
often work in opposite directions. In these circumstances, empirical research is
key to shedding light on the nature of the link between economic globalization
and spatial inequality. For this reason, the rest of the paper is devoted to
investigating this issue in a cross-section of countries with di↵erent levels of
economic development.
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3.3 Measuring spatial inequality and economic
globalization
The analysis of the link between globalization and spatial inequality requires
to quantify the degree of economic integration in the various countries. To do
this, most previous studies on this topic have resorted to various measures of
trade openness and FDI as proxies for the incidence of economic globalization
(Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2012; Lessmann, 2013; Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2014;
Hirte et al., 2017). As discussed above, this approach is useful to examine the
impact of changes in trade and/or FDI flows on regional income disparities,
but it ignores the spatial implications of other aspects of economic integration
potentially important in this context, such as the extent of capital controls or
variations in the amount of portfolio investment. This leads to a partial and
incomplete view of economic globalization. In order to overcome this problem, in
the present paper we follow the approach adopted by Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-
Pose (2013) and use as our measure of globalization the 2017 version of the
KOF index of economic integration constructed by Dreher (2006) and updated
by Dreher et al. (2008). This index is one of the components of the KOF index
of globalization which also includes information about the social and political
dimensions of integration. The KOF index has been widely used in the literature
on international economics to capture di↵erent aspects of the consequences of
the process of globalization.1
The KOF index of economic globalization is a composite indicator that takes
into account the multidimensional nature of economic integration. The index is
constructed by means of a principal component analysis using the eight variables
1A comprehensive list of papers using the KOF index of globalization can be found at
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. See also the survey paper by Potrafke (2015).
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displayed in Table 3.1.2 These variables, which capture di↵erent features of
economic globalization, are employed to obtain two subindices. The first one
measures the relevance of actual economic flows from the information provided
by trade openness, FDI and portfolio investment across countries, expressed
in all cases as a percentage of national GDP. This subindex also considers
income payments to foreign nationals and capital to proxy for the extent that
a country employs foreign labour force and capital in its production processes.
The second subindex includes existing restrictions on trade and capital using
hidden import barriers, mean tari↵ rates, taxes on international trade (as a
share of current revenue), and a measure of capital controls based on data drawn
from Gwartney et al. (2016). The overall index of economic globalization, which
is our proxy for the degree of economic integration throughout the paper, results
from aggregating the data on actual economic flows and restrictions (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Components of the KOF index of economic globalization.
Indices and variables Weights
Actual economic flows [50%]
Trade (percent of GDP) (21%)
Foreign direct investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (28%)
Portfolio investment (percent of GDP) (24%)
Income payments to foreign nationals (percent of GDP) (27%)
Restrictions [50%]
Hidden import barriers (22%)
Mean tari↵ rate (28%)
Taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue) (26%)
Capital account restrictions (24%)
Source: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
In order to estimate the relevance of spatial inequality within the various coun-
tries, we need regional data on income and population. Although national sta-
2For further details on the method of calculation used to obtain the index, see
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.
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tistical o ces, the OECD or Eurostat provide this kind of data for the majority
of developed countries, lack of regional information in middle- and, especially,
low-income countries represents an important barrier for the analysis. This limi-
tation is particularly relevant if, as in our case, one aims to examine the spatial
e↵ect of economic integration at the global level, since during the last two
decades numerous developing countries have implemented important reforms
to open their economies to world markets (Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2014).
In order to overcome this problem of data availability, in the present paper we
use a new dataset on spatial inequality recently constructed by Lessmann and
Seidel (2017). These authors employ satellite night-time lights data to predict
regional income per capita for 180 countries over the period 1992-2012. The
method used by Lessmann and Seidel (2017) is based on estimating the rela-
tionship between night-time lights and income using existing regional income
data. The results obtained are employed in a second step to calculate income
predictions at the regional level using for each country the highest administra-
tive division defined by the GADM project.3 The employment of this dataset
is particularly useful in our setting, as it allows us to include in the analysis a
considerably higher number of countries than in Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose
(2013), the only earlier study that has so far considered a comprehensive defini-
tion of economic globalization in this context (see the introduction for further
details).
We use the dataset constructed by Lessmann and Seidel (2017) to compute the
magnitude of spatial inequality within the various countries. To that end, we
3The reliability of the regional income predictions based on luminosity data is confirmed by
various robustness tests performed by Lessmann and Seidel (2017, pp. 128-131). Interestingly, the
results of these authors suggest that their predictions are more appropriate for an analysis of
real income di↵erentials within countries than observed income data, which are usually based on
nominal values.
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pjtpkt|yjt   ykt| (3.3.1)
where yjt and pjt are respectively the (predicted) income per capita and pop-




Gini index is a measure of dispersion widely used in the literature on income
inequality. Its advantage over other potential alternative measures is that it is
independent of scale, and it satisfies the population principle and Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle (Cowell, 1995; Lessmann and Seidel, 2017). Furthermore, this
inequality measure takes into account the di↵erences in population size across
the regions in a country, which is particularly important in the present context.
This issue has traditionally been overlooked by the literature on regional con-
vergence, despite the fact that omitting population size significantly biases our
perceptions of spatial inequality (Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2013; Lessmann,
2014).
3.4 Empirical analysis: Does economic global-
ization a↵ect spatial inequality?
3.4.1 The model
In this section we examine the relationship between economic globalization and
spatial inequality in 142 countries over the period 1992-2012.4 To that end, we
4The list of countries included in the analysis is ultimately determined by data availability to
calculate the KOF index of economic globalization. In particular, in order to facilitate comparison,
countries with missing data for some of the two subindices of economic integration mentioned in
the prior section were removed from the analysis. See the Appendix for further details.
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estimate the following model:
Iit = ↵i +   logGit +  
0
Xit +  t + "it (3.4.1)
where Iit is the measure of spatial inequality in country i and year t, Git is the
KOF index of economic globalization described in section 3.3, and Xit denotes
a set of variables that control for additional factors that are assumed to have an
influence on regional income disparities. In turn, ↵i stands for country-specific
e↵ects, while  t are year dummies common to all countries. Finally, "it is the
corresponding error term. The coe cient of interest throughout the paper is  ,
which measures the e↵ect of economic integration on spatial inequality.5
At this point it is important to note that the inclusion of country fixed e↵ects
represents an important di↵erence between this model and that considered by
Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013) in their previous study on the link between
economic globalization and spatial inequality. Country fixed e↵ects allow us to
control for those time-invariant factors relevant in this context, removing from
the analysis any potential bias emerging from the heterogeneity in territorial
levels across countries (Lessmann and Seidel, 2017). Furthermore, country fixed
e↵ects also account for di↵erent geographical features which may be related to
spatial inequality. This is the case, for example, of a country’s total area. Larger
countries are often characterized by greater spatial heterogeneity than smaller
countries, which tend to be more homogeneous and compact (Williamnson,
5Taking into account that the study period is relatively short, our empirical approach exploits
the variation in annually repeated cross-country data in order to maximize the number of observa-
tions, thus thus reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables and improving the e ciency
of the estimates (Baltagi, 2001). An alternative strategy would be to divide the time span under
analysis into five-year periods (Lessmann and Seidel, 2017; Hirte et al., 2017). Although this latter
approach may be preferable to minimize the potential e↵ects of the business cycle (Lessmann,
2014), the employment of five-year periods comes at the cost of ignoring valuable information on
changes in both spatial inequality and economic globalization within any given five-year interval. In
any case, Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the main results of the paper remain qualitatively
unaltered when we divide the study period into five-year periods to estimate model (3.4.1).
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1965; Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2017). Likewise, within-country geographi-
cal heterogeneity may a↵ect the spatial distribution of income. In fact, spatial
inequality has often to do with the existence of physical constraints to mobility,
as more topographically uneven countries tend to experience a greater spatial
concentration of economic activity (Ramcharan, 2009). Importantly, many of
these geographical factors are also likely to be correlated with globalization
(Frankel and Romer, 1999; Hirte et al., 2017), which implies that removing the
country fixed e↵ects from model (3.4.1) may lead to biased and inconsistent
estimates.
3.4.2 Baseline results
The first three columns in panel A of Table 3.2 show the results obtained when
various versions of model (3.4.1) are estimated by OLS using heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Column 1 considers a parsimo-
nious specification in which our measure of spatial inequality, the population-
weighted Gini index, is regressed on the indicator of economic globalization
and country and time fixed e↵ects. In column 2 we also include the level of
GDP per capita as an additional control, since spatial inequality and eco-
nomic globalization may both be related to the level of economic development
(Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alesina et al., 2016).6 In fact, adopting the Kuznets’
(1955) approach to a spatial framework, some studies suggest that the link be-
tween regional income disparities and economic development may be non-linear
(Williamson, 1965; Lessmann, 2014). That is, as progress in economic devel-
opment takes place, spatial inequality first increases, before systematically de-
creasing in the ensuing stages of development. Nevertheless, this process of
6 The sources and definitions of all the control variables used throughout the paper are presented
in the Appendix.
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regional convergence does not continue indefinitely and spatial inequality may
again increase at very high levels of economic development (Lessmann, 2014;
Lessmann and Seidel, 2017). The result would be a N-shaped trend in spatial
inequality. Bearing this in mind, in column 3 we consider a cubic functional
relationship between spatial inequality and GDP per capita.
Table 3.2: Economic globalization and spatial inequality: Baseline results.
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Dependent variable is Spatial inequality
Economic globalization 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.029** 0.030** 0.041**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
GDP per capita -0.002 0.160*** -0.005** 0.342***
(0.001) (0.042) (0.002) (0.093)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.017*** -0.041***
(0.005) (0.012)
(GDP per capita)3 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.141 0.142 0.163
Countries 142 142 142 142 142 142
Observations 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918
Panel B First stage for Economic globalization
Economic globalization 0.944*** 0.905*** 0.709***
in neighbouring countries (0.171) (0.162) (0.147)
GDP per capita 0.125*** -4.018***
(0.025) (1.007)
(GDP per capita)2 0.516***
(0.114)
(GDP per capita)3 -0.021***
(0.004)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 62.96*** 51.01*** 34.09***
F statistic excluded instrum. 30.43*** 31.12*** 23.40***
R-squared 0.459 0.471 0.485
Countries 142 142 142
Observations 2,918 2,918 2,918
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the population-weighted Gini index. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant
at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
The results displayed in the first three columns in panel A of Table 3.2 show
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that the coe cient of the KOF index of economic globalization is in all cases
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that those countries whose
economies are more integrated with the rest of the world tend to experience
greater levels of spatial inequality, which is in line with the findings obtained
by Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013) for a considerably smaller number of
countries than that considered in the present paper. It is important to note
that the inclusion of GDP per capita in the list of regressors of model (3.4.1)
does not reduce the e↵ect of economic globalization on regional income dis-
parities –in terms of coe cient size and its statistical significance (columns 2
and 3). This seems to indicate that the degree of economic integration a↵ects
spatial inequality beyond its potential impact through the level of economic de-
velopment. Furthermore, our estimates do not support the existence of a linear
relationship between GDP per capita and regional income disparities (column
2), but are consistent with the presence of a N-shaped trend (column 3), con-
firming the results of Lessmann (2014) and Lessmann and Seidel (2017).
As mentioned in the introduction, fixed e↵ects regressions do not necessarily
identify the causal e↵ect of economic globalization on spatial inequality. Indeed,
it is possible that Cov(logGit, "it) 6= 0 because of the potential reverse impact
of spatial inequality on the spread of globalization. The existence of di↵erences
in development terms across the regions of a country may foster the adoption
of public policies designed to improve the relative situation of lagging regions,
including infrastructure projects, regional transfers or formal fiscal equalization
schemes. As well as a↵ecting the spatial distribution of income within national
borders, this kind of policies may also have an influence on the intensity of eco-
nomic flows between the country in question and the rest of the world (Hirte et
al., 2017). Moreover, high levels of spatial inequality may contribute to increas-
ing the risk of political instability and internal conflict (Deiwiks et al., 2012;
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Ezcurra and Palacios, 2016), which may in turn a↵ect the spread of globaliza-
tion (Martin et al., 2008). In addition to this reverse causality problem, there
may be time-varying omitted determinants of spatial inequality correlated with
the degree of economic integration. Finally, the values of the KOF index of
economic globalization may be a↵ected by measurement errors.
All of these problems could be solved if we had a suitable instrument for glob-
alization. Such an instrument must not be correlated with the error term in
model (3.4.1), but account for the cross-country variation in the incidence of
globalization. Due to the nature of the KOF index of globalization, finding an
exogenous source of variation is not an easy task. Fortunately, we can follow
the strategy adopted by Ezcurra and Manotas (2017) and use as instrument the
(weighted) average of the incidence of globalization in neighbouring countries.
To calculate this average, the values of the globalization index are weighted
by a spatial weights matrix, W , which describes the spatial interdependences










if i 6= j
(3.4.2)
where dij is the geographical distance between countries i and j, which in itself
is strictly exogenous. As can be checked, W is row standardized, so that it
is relative and not absolute distance which matters. As discussed in Ezcurra
and Manotas (2017, p. 2599), the rationale for using this instrument is based
on the idea that geography and spatial interdependence are important factors
for the spread of globalization, which is consistent, for example, with many
theoretical models proposed in the context of the NEG school (e.g. Krugman,
1998; Fujita and Thisse, 2002). In fact, numerous studies find that economic
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flows are more likely between neighbouring countries, as transport costs increase
with geographical distance and neighbouring countries are in general culturally
similar (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004; Disdier and Head, 2008; Klasing,
2013).
The various arguments discussed above suggest that a country’s level of eco-
nomic globalization should be higher (lower), the higher (lower) the degree
of integration of its neighbouring countries with the rest of the world. This
is confirmed by the scatter plot displayed in Figure 3.1. In fact, the instru-
ment alone explains around 34% of the cross-country variation in the incidence
of globalization. The relevance of the instrument is corroborated by the first
stage regressions included in panel B of Table 3.2. The coe cient of the degree
of economic integration in neighbouring countries is in all cases positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the informa-
tion provided by Figure 3.1. Furthermore, the estimated Kleibergen and Paap’s
(2006) rk LM statistics allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the instru-
ment is uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor and that the model is not
identified. Finally, the values of the F statistics for the excluded instrument
lies well above 10 in the various specifications, which indicates that there is no
reason to believe that our estimates are biased by a weak instrument.
To be a valid instrument, however, the degree of globalization in neighbouring
countries should not have influence on spatial inequality in any given country
beyond its e↵ect on the level of globalization in that country. This exclusion
restriction cannot be tested formally in the absence of other instruments, but
we consider that it is a plausible assumption. Nevertheless, one may argue that
the degree of economic integration in neighbouring countries might a↵ect the
dependent variable in model (3.4.1) through its impact on the level of economic
development in neighbouring countries. In order to address this potential con-
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Figure 3.1: Economic globalization and degree of integration in neighbouring coun-
tries.
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Economic globalization in neighbouring countries
cern, we control for the (weighted) average GDP per capita in neighbouring
countries. As can be checked in section 3.5, the observed relationship between
economic globalization and spatial inequality survives this test.
Columns 4-6 in panel A of Table 3.2 present the results of the second stage
regressions. As in the OLS regressions discussed above, the 2SLS estimates
show that the coe cient of the index of economic integration is in all cases
positive and statistically significant. It is worth noting, however, that its size
is larger than in the OLS estimates, which may have to do with a potential
attenuation bias generated by measurement error in the index of economic
globalization. To get a more accurate idea of the dimension of the impact of
economic globalization on spatial inequality, let us consider for example the
case of Malawi. In 2010 Malawi had a relatively low degree of integration with
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the rest of the world (G = 42.1), while the value of the population-weighted
Gini index in that country was around the sample mean (GINI = 0.074).
According to our estimates, if Malawi had had a level of globalization similar to
that of Turkey (G = 55.7), its degree of spatial inequality would have increased
by around 17.6%. These figures suggest that economic globalization exerts a
quantitatively relevant impact on regional income disparities.
So far we have examined the overall e↵ect of economic globalization on spatial
inequality. In order to complement our previous findings, we now use the infor-
mation provided by the KOF index to investigate the role played in this context
by its two components: actual economic flows and existing restrictions on trade
and capital (see section 3.3 for further details). This is especially interesting, as
it is not evident a priori that these two aspects of economic integration a↵ect
spatial inequality in the same way. Accordingly, model (3.4.1) is estimated again
using the subindices of actual economic flows and restrictions as regressors, in-
stead of the overall index employed so far. The results presented in Table 3.3
indicate that the subindex of actual economic flows has a positive and signifi-
cant e↵ect on spatial inequality, which implies that countries with higher values
in this dimension of globalization tend to experience greater regional income
disparities. Regarding the second component of the KOF index, the information
provided by Table 3.3 reveals that existing restrictions on trade and capital do
not have any significant influence on spatial inequality.7
7Following the same strategy described above, the 2SLS regressions in columns 4-6 of Table 3.3
use the (weighted) average of actual economic flows and restrictions in neighboring countries as
instruments for the two components of the KOF index of economic globalization.
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Table 3.3: Actual economic flows, restrictions and spatial inequality.
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Actual economic flows 0.002** 0.002** 0.030*** 0.032***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
Restrictions 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
GDP per capita 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.209*** 0.186*** 0.278***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.058) (0.060) (0.083)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
(GDP per capita)3 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 41.86*** 34.93*** 33.57***
F statistic Actual economic flows 14.96*** 7.60***
F statistic Restrictions 42.77*** 21.36***
Countries 142 142 142 142 142 142
Observations 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the population-weighted Gini index. Heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level.
3.5 Robustness checks
The analysis carried out thus far indicates that the degree of economic integra-
tion with the rest of the world exerts a positive and significant e↵ect on spatial
inequality. This is due to the impact of actual economic flows on regional income
disparities, whereas existing restrictions on trade and capital do not appear to
have influence in this context. In this section we investigate the robustness of
these findings.
3.5.1 Influential countries
As a first robustness test, we examine the impact of influential countries on
the above results. To do this, we begin by removing from the sample the ten
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countries with the lowest and highest average values of the index of economic
globalization throughout the study period. The estimates in columns 1-4 of
Table 3.4 reveal that the coe cients of the aggregate index of economic global-
ization and the subindex of actual flows continue to be positive and statistically
significant in all cases, which means that our results are not driven by the least
and most globalized countries. Analogously, columns 5-8 of Table 3.4 show that
our findings also hold when we exclude from the analysis the ten countries with
the lowest and highest levels of spatial inequality during the study period.
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 AROUND HERE]
We now examine whether the level of economic development matters in this
context. To investigate this issue, we remove from the sample the groups of
low-income countries and high-income countries according to the World Bank
classification. Despite the reduction in the sample size, the results in columns
9-12 of Table 3.4 reveal that our main findings remain qualitatively unaltered.
That said, it is interesting to note that the size of the coe cients suggests
that the spatial impact of economic globalization seems to be greater in low-
and middle-income countries, which is consistent with the empirical evidence
provided by Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2013).
3.5.2 Alternative measures of spatial inequality
The results of our analysis may be sensitive to the choice of the measure used
to quantify the degree of spatial inequality within the various countries. Di↵er-
ent inequality measures may provide di↵erent orderings of the distribution one
wishes to compare, as each index has a di↵erent way of aggregating the infor-
mation contained in the distribution under study (Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose,
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2017). For this motive, and in order to complement the information provided
by the population-weighted Gini index employed so far, we now use other al-
ternative measures of spatial inequality. Specifically, we resort to various mem-
bers of the generalized entropy family of inequality measures (GE( )), and






















pjt (yjt   µit)2
#0.5
(3.5.2)
where   is the weight attached to income di↵erences between di↵erent parts
of the distribution. In our analysis,   =  1, 0, 1.8 GE(0) coincides with the
population-weighted mean logarithmic deviation, whereas GE(1) is equal to
the population-weighted Theil index. In turn, CV has been widely used in the
literature on regional disparities (Williamson, 1965; Lessmann, 2014; Ezcurra
and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2017). As in the case of the population-weighted Gini
index, these measures are independent of scale and satisfy the population prin-
ciple, and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 AROUND HERE]
Table 3.5 provides the results obtained when the estimation of the baseline
model is repeated using as regressors GE( 1), GE(0), GE(1) and CV . The
coe cients of the aggregate index of economic globalization and the subindex
8Note that GE( ) can be transformed into a subclass of the widely employed Atkinson index
with ' = 1     for 0    < 1, where ' is the (relative) inequality aversion parameter (Lessmann
and Seidel, 2017).
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of actual flows are in all cases positive and statistically significant, indicating
that the observed connection between the degree of economic integration and
regional income disparities holds regardless of the specific measure employed to
calculate the magnitude of spatial inequality within the various countries.
3.5.3 Additional controls
As an additional sensitivity check, we examine the possibility that our results
are driven by an omitted variable. This requires controlling for di↵erent covari-
ates that may be correlated with spatial inequality, economic globalization or
the instrument used in the analysis, and checking whether the inclusion of these
covariates a↵ects our estimates.
We begin by considering the role played by natural resources in this context.
Some natural resources, such as minerals and fuels, tend to be spatially concen-
trated, thus a↵ecting industry location and, therefore, the regional distribution
of income within countries (Henderson et al., 2012; Lessmann and Seidel, 2017).
In fact, the presence of natural resources is also likely to have influence on the
degree of openness to world markets. In view of this, we investigate whether the
observed link between economic globalization and spatial inequality still holds
when we control for natural resources. To do this, we use two variables: total
natural resources rents and oil rents, expressed in both cases as a share of na-
tional GDP. Following Lessmann (2014), we also include in the list of regressors
of model (3.4.1) the share of population living in urban areas as a proxy for
potential agglomeration e↵ects, which may a↵ect regional income disparities.
At this point it is important to note that there are numerous studies showing
the existence of a relationship between urban concentration and trade openness
(Frankel and Romer, 1999; Krugman and Livas Elizondo, 1996; Nitsch, 2006).
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Moreover, economic globalization may be associated with the incidence of civil
conflicts (Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Martin et al., 2008). Given the possi-
bility that political instability and internal conflict may also a↵ect the spatial
distribution of income within a country (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), we
also include in the baseline model a dummy variable indicating if the country in
question has experienced a civil conflict in each year of the study period. Fur-
thermore, the existence of more or less developed redistributive policies is likely
to be related to spatial inequality and globalization (Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-
Pose, 2013). Accordingly, any observed connection between economic globaliza-
tion and spatial inequality may be spurious if existing di↵erences in the capacity
of the state to redistribute financial resources across regions are ignored. For
this reason, we follow Rodŕıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) and control for gov-
ernment size, measured as the share of government expenditure in GDP, as a
proxy for the redistributive capacity of the state in the sample countries.
The exclusion restriction implied by our 2SLS regressions is that, conditional
on the set of controls, the instrument has no e↵ect on spatial inequality, other
than its impact through the degree of economic integration with the rest of the
world. As pointed out above, we consider that this is a plausible assumption.
Nevertheless, one might argue that the intensity of globalization in neighbour-
ing countries could have influence on their level of economic development, which
may in turn give rise to population movements between the various countries.
These migratory flows may eventually modify the regional distribution of pop-
ulation within the di↵erent countries, thus a↵ecting their levels of spatial in-
equality. In order to address empirically this potential concern, we also control
for the (weighted) average GDP per capita in neighbouring countries.
The results of estimating model (3.4.1) including these additional controls are
presented in Table 3.6. The majority of the newly-added controls are not sta-
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tistically significant at conventional levels and, more importantly, have little
impact on the main results of the paper. The new controls do not a↵ect the es-
timates of the impact of the degree of economic integration with the rest of the
world on spatial inequality. The coe cients of the aggregate index of economic
globalization and the subindex of actual flows remain positive and statistically
significant in all cases, confirming, once again, the robustness of our findings.
[INSERT TABLE 3.6 AROUND HERE]
3.6 Conclusions
With the aim of improving our understanding of the factors behind spatial
inequality, this paper has examined the relationship between economic glob-
alization and regional income disparities in a panel of 142 countries over the
period 1992-2012. Unlike most of existing studies on this topic, our analysis
uses a comprehensive notion of globalization which takes into account di↵erent
aspects associated with the opening of national economies to world markets.
The instrumental variables estimates presented in the paper reveal a strong
causal e↵ect of the degree of economic integration with the rest of the world
on spatial inequality, indicating that the advances in the process of globaliza-
tion currently underway contribute to significantly increasing regional income
disparities. This means that globalization leads to the emergence of losing and
winning regions within countries, and that the group of losing (winning) regions
tend to be made up of low-(high-)income regions. This result has to do with
the regressive spatial impact of actual economic flows, whereas existing restric-
tions on trade and capital do not exert a significant e↵ect in this context. Our
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findings are robust to the inclusion in the analysis of di↵erent covariates that
may be correlated with both spatial inequality and globalization such as the
level of development, geographical factors, the degree of urban concentration
or natural resources abundance. We have also checked that the results are not
driven by a specific group of influential countries and neither do they depend on
the measure used to quantify the degree of spatial inequality within the various
countries.
Our research raises some potentially interesting implications. Thus, the ob-
served relationship between economic globalization and spatial inequality
should not be overlooked by policy makers and international organizations be-
cause of the negative consequences derived from high levels of spatial inequality.
Regional income disparities may spark social unrest and grievances, which may
contribute to the rise of populism (Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2018). At the same time, the
existence of high levels of spatial inequality may lead to redistributive struggles
across regions, thus undermining political stability and making civil conflict
more likely (Sambanis and Milanovic, 2014). Indeed, the risk is particularly
relevant in the developing world, since the degree of economic integration with
the rest of the world in many developing countries still has a large potential
to grow. In the view of this, the opening of national borders to world mar-
kets should be accompanied by active public policies designed to improve the
conditions for the development of economic activity in lagging regions.
The present paper has documented the unconditional e↵ect of globalization on
spatial inequality. Nevertheless, the impact of globalization on regional income
disparities may be contingent on factors such as the quality of government,
industry mix or the devolution of fiscal and political power from central to sub-
national governments. Further research should explore the empirical relevance
of these potential interaction e↵ects in order to complete our results and at-
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tain a more detailed picture about how economic globalization a↵ects spatial
inequality. Future studies should also examine the transmission channels which
ultimately explain the observed e↵ect of globalization on spacial inequality.
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Definitions and sources of control variables
GDP per capita: Log of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity and
expressed in constant 2011 international dollars. Source: World Development
Indicators.
Natural resources rents: Total natural resources rents expressed as a share of
GDP. Source: World Development Indicators.
Oil rents: Oil rents expressed as a share of GDP. Source: World Development
Indicators.
Urban population: Fraction of the total population living in urban areas. Source:
World Development Indicators.
Civil conflict: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country has
experienced a civil armed conflict in the year in question, and zero otherwise.
A country is recorded as having experienced a civil armed conflict in a given
year if a threshold of 25 or more battle-related deaths has been met. Source:
UCDP/PRIO.
Government size: Government expenditure expressed as a share of GDP.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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Table A1: Robustness analysis: Five-year periods.
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic globalization 0.037** 0.039** 0.054**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024)




GDP per capita -0.006* 0.369** 0.169* 0.206* 0.238*
(0.004) (0.153) (0.091) (0.108) (0.143)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.045** -0.019* -0.023* -0.027
(0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
(GDP per capita)3 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 29.49*** 24.20*** 15.25*** 13.66*** 14.42*** 7.978***
F stat. Economic globaliz. 10.23*** 11.45*** 8.48***
F stat. Actual economic flows 5.01** 2.55*
F stat. Restrictions 14.71*** 7.59***
Countries 142 142 142 142 142 142
Observations 696 696 696 696 696 696
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the population-weighted Gini index. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant
at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Spatial inequality: GINI 2918 0.066 0.032 0.002 0.163
Spatial inequality: GE( 1) 2918 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.046
Spatial inequality: GE(0) 2918 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.046
Spatial inequality: GE(1) 2918 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.053
Spatial inequality: CV 2918 0.131 0.067 0.003 0.356
Economic globalization 2918 3.973 0.363 2.197 4.595
Actual economic flows 2918 3.967 0.425 2.062 4.605
Restrictions 2918 3.927 0.481 1.656 4.590
Ec. Glob. neighb. countries 2918 3.976 0.148 3.097 4.277
Actual econ. flows neighb. countries 2918 3.987 0.157 2.819 4.413
Restrictions neighb. countries 2918 3.955 0.178 2.980 4.290
GDP per capita 2918 8.928 1.251 5.870 11.770
(GDP per capita)2 2918 81.3 22.2 34.5 138.5
(GDP per capita)3 2918 753.3 300.3 202.3 1630.6
Natural resources rents 2915 0.075 0.107 0.000 0.635
Oil rents 2836 0.048 0.112 0.000 0.733
Urban population 2873 0.540 0.227 0.063 0.989
Civil conflict 2918 0.163 0.369 0.000 1.000
Government size 2360 0.312 0.117 0.000 0.710
GDP per capita neighb. countries 2918 8.966 0.439 6.907 9.927
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Chapter 4
The Lucas Paradox in the Great
Recession: Does the type of
capital matter?
Published paper:
Alba Del Villar Olano, 2018. The Lucas Paradox in the Great Recession: Does
the type of capital matter?, Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2),
pages 1052-1057.
4.1 Introduction
Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries? is a key economic
question, raised in Lucas (1990) seminal paper. More than three decades
later, even though there has been a substantial number of empirical studies
trying to provide an explanation to the Lucas Paradox, it remains relevant,
and arguably, unresolved. The Paradox is clear, capital should flow from
countries with low marginal returns of capital (i.e., rich economies) into
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countries where marginal returns are higher (i.e., poor economies). The surge
of financial globalisation in the late 90s along with the recent financial crisis
provide natural examples of the lack of flows from rich to poor countries.
It has been argued that institutions explain the paradox by a↵ecting ex-
ante capital returns and hence capital inflows. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and
Volosovych (2008) (henceforth, AKV) found that institutional quality, not
only is a strong determinant of capital inflows, but also accounts as a robust
solution for the Lucas Paradox, since it removes the positive and significant
relationship between the log of initial income per capita and aggregate capital
inflows per capita. However, the validity of AKV results has been questioned
by Azémar and Desbordes (2013) and Athtaruzzaman (2017), who claim
that their model is missespecified. On the contrary, Göktan (2015) uses
cross-banking statistics of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) to ar-
gue that institutions solve the Paradox once country heterogeneity is controlled.
These empirical papers treat capital inflows as the sum of FDI and Portfolio
Equity liabilities (PE, hereafter) for the period previous to the financial crisis.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the Lucas Paradox is evaluated
in the Great Recession (2008-2015) using the latest available data for capital
stock and institutional quality (Lane and Milessi-Ferreti 2017). Second, I check
whether the Lucas puzzle still holds once we disaggregate data on capital
inflows, studying separately FDI and PE. AKV argue that the reason for
aggregating capital is data availability for PE flows. However, assuming that a
country does not receive capital when in reality it is unknown or not reported,
is a strong hypothesis. Empirical evidence shows heterogeneous patterns for
FDI and PE flows across countries, which suggests that they might have
di↵erent determinants.
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Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical results
and Section 4 concludes.
4.2 Data
The dependent variable is the average yearly change in foreign claims on do-
mestic assets per capita over the 1970-2007 and 2008-2015 periods, reported in
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017). In line with Azémar and Desbordes (2013) and
Akhtaruzzaman (2017), I take the log of the dependent variable to narrow its
range. I examine FDI and PE data separately, as well as the aggregate sum. I
employ the log of initial level of GDP per capita to account for the Lucas Para-
dox (measured in constant USD of year 2000). Following Rodrik et al (2002),
institutional quality is measured using the Rule of Law Indicator included in
the World Governance Indicators compiled in Kaufmann et al (2009).
Table I shows the descriptive statistics for 143 countries with available data for
main variables, excluding financial centers1 and countries with less than half
million population, as in AKV.
Table I: Summary Statistics
1970-2007 2008-2015
Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev
Average Rule of Law index -0.112 0.94 -0.13 0.91
Log Income per capita initial year 8.30 1.20 8.76 1.32
Average Capital inflows per capita 584.86 1,775.31 900.57 2107.3
Average FDI inflows per capita 339.72 1,033.42 483.49 1,347.6
Average PE inflows per capita 242.22 1,057.78 417.08 1,104.58
1Belgium, Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Singapure, Switzerland, UK, Mauri-
tius, Panama and Bermuda, as characterised in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2017).
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On average per capita capital inflows have increased 53% during the Great
Recession period. Per capita FDI inflows have increased by 42% and average
portfolio equity by 72%. Also, there has been a decline in the average quality of
institutions, measured by the Rule of Law index. Figure 1 provides some light
Figure 4.1: The Lucas Paradox in the Great Recession
supporting the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countries, both in the
period (1970-2007) and in the Great Recession (2008-2015). It uses the average
of the log of aggregate capital inflows, measured in per capita terms on the
initial level of GDP ( also in per capita terms). These positive slopes suggest
that capital goes where capital is, and that during the Great Recession Period
this pattern is even more pronounced.
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4.3 Empirical results and discussion
OLS regressions are carried out through the estimation of several variants of
the AKV model using two dependent variables (FDI and PE). Table II shows
results for the 1970-2007 period taking FDI and PE as dependent variables in
Columns 1-4, and 5-8, respectively. Column 1 demonstrates that there is a lack
of FDI flows from rich to poor countries. The log of the initial GDP per capita
is significant at the 1% level and has positive sign. In Columns 2 and 6 insti-
tutional quality is included. It enters with 1% level of statistical significance
and a positive sign. This result suggests that institutional quality has a posi-
tive impact on both types of capital inflows but it is not enough to clear out
the Lucas puzzle, since the log of initial GDP per capita remains statistically
significant. I control for potential endogeneity of the institutions measure using
an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. In line with Alcalá and Ciccone (2004)
and Göktan (2015), I instrument institutional quality with distance from the
equator.2 F-statistic indicates for the excluded instrument, the rejection of weak
instruments hypothesis in both model specifications, Columns 3 and 7. Results
are similar to those found in Columns 2 and 6. Hence, IV exercise suggests that
endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem.
In Columns 4 and 8, I include a set of additional variables examined in AKV
to test the robustness of results. Human capital is measured as the percentage
of enrolment in secondary school. Trade openness is the sum of imports and
exports over GDP. Financial development is obtained as the ratio of domestic
credit to private sector as percentage of GDP. Macroeconomic stability is mea-
sured as the average rate of inflation, and capital openness indicator, Kaopen,
2Data is taken from Dollar and Kraay (2003). Also, the exercise has been conducted using log of
European settler mortality rate as instrument following Acemoglu et al (2001), results are available
upon request.
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Table II: The Lucas Paradox during the 1970-2007 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FDI FDI FDI(IV) FDI PE PE PE(IV) PE Capital
Log(GDP)pc 1970 1.130⇤⇤⇤ 0.699⇤⇤ 0.528⇤ 0.557⇤ 1.517⇤⇤⇤ 0.831⇤⇤⇤ 0.922⇤⇤ 0.797⇤⇤ 0.570⇤⇤
(0.205) (0.213) (0.222) (0.224) (0.235) (0.212) (0.298) (0.269) (0.217)
Rule of Law 0.904⇤⇤⇤ 1.263⇤⇤⇤ 0.895⇤⇤⇤ 1.496⇤⇤⇤ 1.296⇤⇤ 1.303⇤⇤⇤ 0.910⇤⇤⇤
(0.176) (0.279) (0.199) (0.205) (0.415) (0.225) (0.194)
Sch.Enroll (%) 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Trade/GDP 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Credit/GDP 0.004 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Inflation 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Kaopen 0.136 -0.998 0.239
(0.518) (1.052) (0.503)
Observations 115 115 115 111 106 106 106 103 111
R2 0.470 0.591 0.571 0.676 0.474 0.650 0.646 0.686 0.718
Fstat 30.41 83.84 62.021 31.93 41.73 117.9 57.30 41.36 48.63
Dependent variable is the average of the log of FDI inflows per capita in Column 1-4, same for PE in Columns 5-8, and total capital in Column 9.
All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS, except Column 3 and 7 which are estimated by 2SLS.
F stat for 2SLS Columns 3 and 7, provides the F-statistic for the excluded instrument, with a p-value equal to 0.000.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ , ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
is taken from Chinn and Ito (2008). Column 4 shows that among all other
potential factors only trade seems to contribute, in statistical and economic
terms, to the explanation of the lack of FDI from rich to poor countries, along
with institutional quality, which remains significant at 1% level. The log initial
income per capita is still statistically significant at 10% level, so the paradox
is not fully solved. Column 8 reports results for the PE model and presents
evidence on the importance of separating types of capital. Credit provided by
the financial sector is a key factor for PE with 1% of statistical significance but
it is not statistically significant in the FDI model. Also, Rule of Law remains
significant at 1% level with a positive sign. The significance of the log of initial
income has been reduced to 5% level, so it explains better the flows of PE than
those of FDI. Column 9 reports results using the aggregation of FDI and PE as
dependent variable as it is typically done in the related literature. Institutional
quality and trade openness are statistically significant at 1% level, along with
the log of initial GDP at 10% level. Results are robust to employing other
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measures for institutions (ICRG-PRS index), and human capital (total years
of schooling and mortality rate at birth).3
Table III: The Lucas Paradox in the Great Recession (2008-2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Capital Capital Capital(IV) Capital FDI FDI FDI PE PE PE
Log(GDP)pc 2008 1.170⇤⇤⇤ 0.840⇤⇤⇤ 0.5162⇤⇤⇤ 0.742⇤⇤⇤ 1.061⇤⇤⇤ 0.839⇤⇤⇤ 0.733⇤⇤⇤ 1.839⇤⇤⇤ 1.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.922⇤⇤⇤
(0.087) (0.122) (0.1413) (0.127) (0.086) (0.122) (0.125) (0.135) (0.208) (0.236)
Rule of Law 0.637⇤⇤⇤ 1.366⇤⇤⇤ 0.439⇤ 0.429⇤⇤ 0.333 1.529⇤⇤⇤ 1.252⇤⇤⇤
(0.147) (0.2523) (0.179) (0.148) (0.187) (0.264) (0.339)
Sch. Enroll (%) 0.006 0.009 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Trade/GDP 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Credit/GDP 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.003 0.011⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Inflation 0.010 0.017 0.012
(0.018) (0.017) (0.047)
Kaopen 0.343 0.498 0.012
(0.319) (0.306) (0.606)
Observations 143 143 139 124 143 143 124 124 124 112
R2 0.655 0.704 0.678 0.779 0.613 0.639 0.721 0.586 0.688 0.740
Fstat 179.6 162.3 43.98 55.6 152.8 107.3 38.8 186.8 167.0 51.3
Dependent variable is the average of log capital inflows per capita in Column 1-4, same for FDI in Columns 5-7, and PE in Columns 8-10.
All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS, except Column 3 which is estimated by 2SLS.
F stat for 2SLS Column 3, provides the F-statistic for the excluded instrument with a 0.000 pvalue.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ , ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table III reports the OLS regressions for the 2008-2015 period. Column 1 con-
firms the Lucas Paradox during the Great Recession. The log of the initial GDP
per capita is significant at the 1%, using aggregate capital as dependent vari-
able. The coe cient on the log of the initial GDP per capita is greater than for
the previous period. This is a preliminary result suggesting that the Lucas puz-
zle has become much more pronounced during the Great Recession. Institutions
have strong explanatory power but they do not eliminate the positive signif-
icance of the log of initial income per capita as shown in Column 2. Column
3 suggests that this result is not subject to endogeneity issues, following the
same procedure as in Table II. Column 4 shows that trade openness and credit
to private sector, along with the log of the initial income per capita, seem to
3These variables for the robustness checks have been taken from World Bank Open Data Base
and The Quality of Governance Database.
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be the main drivers of international capital flows and that the statistical signif-
icance of institutional quality is reduced from 1% to 10% level (compare across
Column 9 in Table II). This result is better understood once capital flows are
decomposed. Columns 5 to 7 do the same exercise taking FDI as dependent
variable, while Columns 8-10 take PE. In fact, institutions are no longer sta-
tistically significant in the FDI model. Trade and the log of the initial GDP
per capita are the most influential variables for FDI as Column 7 indicates. On
the contrary, institutions remain an important factor in determining PE inflows
(Column 9 and 10) along with the degree of financial development measured by
credit over GDP. In both tables, school enrolment, inflation and capital open-
ness present expected signs but have no explanatory power. The importance
of disaggregating capital inflows is key to understand the true determinants of
international capital flows across countries, specially when analysing the Great
Recession period.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper is the first to show the importance of disaggregating capital inflows
by the type of capital when analyzing the Lucas Paradox. It shows that total
trade flows are a key driver for FDI inflows, while total credit to private sector
mostly determines PE inflows. Moreover, this result holds in the Great Reces-
sion Period and in the previous periods. Institutions, though still important,
cannot solve the Lucas puzzle on their own. Hence, it seems rational to argue
that foreign investors actually reward structural policies that improve the insti-
tutional atmosphere through increased investment. However, which structural
reforms improve the quality of institutions goes beyond the scope of this study
and it is left out for future research.
198
Bibliography
[1] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A. (2001). “The colonial origins of
comparative development: An empirical investigation” American economic
review 91(5), 1369-1401.
[2] Akhtaruzzaman, M., Hajzler, C., Owen, P. D. (2017). “Does institutional
quality resolve the Lucas Paradox?” Applied Economics, 1-20.
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Appendix
Data Description
To capture fundamentals, we use a measure for institutional quality. Data for
institutional variables used by Alfaro et al (2008) are taken from International
Country Risk Guide?s (ICRG) from the Political Risk Services Group. How-
ever, this data is not public. Therefore, we use similar data from Worldwide
Governance Indicators Online Database (WGI), which reports aggregate and
individual governance indicators for six dimensions of governance. A common
feature of both indicators is its low variance across years. These aggregate in-
dicators combine the views of a large number of agents. They are based on 30
individual data sources which are rescaled and combined to create six aggregate
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indicators; Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of violence,
government e↵ectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corrup-
tion. These variables are originally reported in standard units, ranging approx.
from -2.5 to 2.5, where a higher score means higher quality. In particular, we
use the ”Rule of law” index which captures perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. From PRS uses Law and Order.
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Conclusion
“ The Renaissance brought a crescendo of new ideas in the full range of human endeavor,
and with them a century of transformational change. It also brought interdependence, risk,
instability, confusion and fear. The present age feels similar. ”
— Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate in Economics
This doctoral thesis brings together the results of four research papers on the
causes and on the e↵ects of international capital flows. The timing of this the-
sis goes in line with an uncertain global scenario in which both Globalization
4.0 and the future evolution of globalization are being debated in international
forums such as World Economic Forum in Davos (January, 2019). Nevertheless,
we still need to better understand the complexity of the international macroe-
conomic panorama in order to delineate the future evolution of globalization,
both at the trade, at the financial and at the services levels. There are many
global challenges that require some sort of global coordination since countries
can not address them individualy, such as global climate change and increasing
inequalities. Thus, this thesis provides a small step in order to understand the
benefits and the costs of international economic integration using quantitative
methods. The emphasis is on the gross capital flows composition across di↵eren-
tiated economies as a source of wealth transfers across countries, in an scenario
of large volumes of cross-border flows.
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Conclusiones
“El Renacimiento trajo consigo un incremento de la creación de nuevas ideas en todas
las dimensiones humanas, y con él vino un siglo de cambio transformacional. También
trajo interdependencia, riesgo, inestabilidad, confusión y miedo. Los tiempos presentes son
similares.”
— Michael Spence, Premio Nobel en Economı́a
Esta tesis doctoral reúne el desarrollo de cuatro art́ıculos de investigación sobre
las causas y las consecuencias de la globalización financiera. El momento de la
publicación de ésta tésis va ligado a un escenario poĺıtico y económico global
marcado por la incertidumbre sobre la evolución de la integración económica.
Hoy, se está debatiendo como lidiar con la globalización 4.0, en foros como
World Economic Forum en Davos. Sin embargo, necesitamos entender mejor el
complejo panorama macroeconómico internacional para poder delinear la futura
evolución de la globalización, tanto a nivel de comercio, como de mercados
financieros y de servicios. Hoy en d́ıa, hay muchos retos globales, como el cambio
climático y el incremento de las desigualdades, que no pueden resolver los páıses
de forma aislada. Por eso, ésta tésis doctoral es un pequeño paso hacia el mejor
entendimiento de los beneficios y de los costes de la integración económica global
mediante la utilización de métodos cuantitativos. El énfasis es en la composición
de los flujos brutos de capital internacional entre economı́as asimétricas como
fuente de tranferencia de riqueza entre páıses, en un escenario con elevados
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volúmenes de flujos de capital entre páıses.
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